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Abstract 
The pricing method mostly adopted by water authorities (WAs) supplying water for irrigation 
through surface irrigation networks is the flat rate. This scheme violate either the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) Incentive Pricing Principle (IPP) and Polluter Pays Principles (PPP), not providing 
incentives for efficient water uses and disregarding differences in irrigation water use among farmers. The 
use of flat rates is justified by the fact that monitoring water uses is too costly and even not effective, as 
WAs operate in conditions of hidden information. Under such conditions, by being unable to monitor water 
use, farmers have an information advantage against the WA. This fact exposes the WA to suffer a ‘pricing 
failure’ if it decides to apply an incentive pricing strategy (tariffs proportional to the alleged water uses). 
Indeed, farmers might exploit their information advantage behaving in an opportunistic way withdrawing 
more water than declared and finally paying less than they should. This would undermine the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of the WA’s pricing strategies. 
By means of contract theory in this thesis four goals are set: 
The first one is to theoretically assess an incentive pricing schemes for surface irrigation networks 
under conditions of lack of information. I adopted a principal-agent approach for explaining difficulties 
experienced by European WAs operating in the agricultural domain to comply with water legislation in 
the absence of water metering. It is shown that discrimination policies might result in an efficient tool for 
the management of the water resource. Thought from the analysis it is understood that diverse 
characteristics of farm types (i.e. profits and costs) lead to different contracts solutions and drive the WA 
to use different strategies to incentivize farmers to behave truthfully, might be concluded that pricing 
strategies are highly linked with water users characteristic and its application varies with the irrigation 
networks. 
The second goal is to define an efficient pricing scheme for irrigation water in conditions of 
unmetered water use. The study identifies a menu of contracts defined as a set of payments and share of 
irrigated area able to provide incentives for an efficient use of the resource by maximizing social welfare. 
The model is applied in a case study of the Çukas region (Albania) where irrigation water is not metered. 
The results illustrate that using a menu of contracts makes it possible to define the second best solution that 
may improve the overall social welfare derived from irrigation water use compared with the existing 
pricing structure flat rates, though, in the specific case study, the improvement is small. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that irrigation water pricing policy needs to take into account different farm types and that 
appropriate contract-type pricing schemes have a potential role in providing incentives to farmers to make 
irrigation choices to the social optimum. 
The third goal is to investigate an incentive water pricing policy by introducing a monitoring strategy 
that enables the WA to detect farms behaviour with the water resource. In doing so the incentive strategy 
is compared with the flat rate water pricing and is assessed under what conditions the WA might 
provide/not provide incentive water pricing in the absence of water metering. The numerical example 
demonstrates that when the level of water costs and transaction costs are preclusive, an adaptation of 
incentive water pricing is limited. In addition, is shown that only above a certain threshold level of 
monitoring probabilities (with respect to water supply costs and transaction costs) social benefits are higher 
under incentive water pricing than the flat rate instrument. 
The fourth goal of the thesis is to analyse a pricing strategy under the problem of moral hazard where 
monitoring costs are function of monitoring efforts. Under this assumption, the empirical evidences show 
that, if the probability of detecting the noncompliant farmer is function of monitoring intensity, the 
maximization of social benefits is achieved when the level of monitoring is not maximized and there is a 
trade-off between monitoring intensity and efficiency gain by monitoring.  
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In addition, the thesis illustrates how asymmetry of information and transaction costs drive the WA 
to propose a less efficient contract solution due the rent extraction needed to reveal farms’ private 
information and guaranteeing the implementation of the pricing strategy. The main conclusion arising 
from this research turns to be that; the implementation of a pricing strategy depends upon the context 
surrounding the irrigation network.  
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Chapter 1 
1. Background, Problem Statement, Objectives and Modelling 
Overview 
 
 Background  
Increasing water consumption level and adverse climate change impact are expected to rise 
the water scarcity, by rising the need for an efficient water allocation system. To this concern, 
policy makers have called for the regulation of the demand side to stop the loss and overuse of 
the water resource. In the last 30 years, most developed countries have been undertaking major 
policy reforms in the water sector. In Europe, the decline in water quantity and quality has urged 
the European Union (EU) to respond by implementing new policies. Many EU countries have 
implemented new legislative and frameworks to transpose EU’s Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) into national legislation (Garrido and Calatrava, 2010). Likewise developed countries are 
promoting strategies that guarantee full cost recovery (i.e. supply costs, economic and resource 
costs and environmental cost) for irrigated agriculture (Easter and Liu, 2005). Noteworthy, most 
of the developed countries are following pricing policies toward a full cost recovery but various 
countries have failed in their strategies to achieve this objective in accordance with the WFD 
(Toan, 2016; EEA, 2013). 
Pricing policies are considered as an important tool for encouraging water users to better 
manage the scarce water resource and allowing water providers to improve water allocation. 
Based on this background, water-pricing policies are generally seen as one of the most important 
tool for water demand management in the context of the over-abstraction of water (Expỏsito and 
Berbel, 2016). The mechanisms of water pricing are frequently proposed as a strategic instrument 
for water management, such as in the WDF European Commission, (2000) and the Blueprint to 
Safeguard Europe’s Water. 
Over the past decades, scholars have given their contribution with development of pricing 
policies in theory and practice (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997; Dinar et al 2015; Bournaris et al., 
2015; Bartolini et al., 2007). These authors compare and present water-pricing experience across 
many countries over the word. They realize the need for pricing water volumetrically and 
introducing incentive tools to affect the behaviour of water users and suppliers. Johansson et al. 
(2002) provides a comprehensive review of theoretical and practical issues regarding pricing 
irrigation water. They reviewed various methods of irrigation water and identified the important 
impact of water pricing policies across countries. Bournaris et al. (2015) addresses some of the 
most relevant current and perspective issues for water policy. The authors investigate the issue 
in an economic context for the management of irrigation water for agriculture. In addition, the 
book offers a wide variety of innovative approaches of water management in European irrigated 
agriculture. Dinar and Mody (2004) discuss pricing and other complementary economic 
instruments (incentive strategies) as tools to achieve a more efficient water use. Furthermore, Tsur 
(2004) emphasizes that demand management should be a central point in planning water pricing 
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policies to promote efficient use of water resource. Hereto, the European Council made 
recommendations with regard to this issue and water resource sustainability in EU member states 
(Elnaboulsi, 2009). Also, the European Commission (EC) (2015) report highlights the insufficient 
implementation of the measures for achieving the environmental objectives of the WFD related 
to application of transparent water pricing across all member states, mainly due to lack of 
metering. The EC highlights the need for widespread metering in basins where irrigation is the 
main water use and implementation of measures are necessary, mainly for Greece and Italy where 
irrigation is served via surface irrigation networks and per hectare water prices are predominant 
(ARCADIS, 2012).  
Yet, the implementation and the outcomes of such economic tools and incentive strategies 
are depended on several factors that, often, prevent their effectiveness. Lack of water metering is 
the main constraint. This condition hinders the ability to monitor volumes used and to promote 
volumetric pricing as a way to allocate costs and to ensure efficient water use (Viaggi et al., 2010; 
Galioto et al., 2013; Smith and Tsur, 1997; Lika et al., 2016). The impossibility of applying a 
volumetric water pricing in irrigation networks where the irrigation water is served through open 
channels have driven scholars to develop and introduce pricing strategies that are a proxy of 
volumetric pricing. 
However, several difficulties arise while designing these water tariffs. In particular attention 
is given to the effect of transaction costs and asymmetric information on irrigation water 
regulation. The transaction costs (in this study) indicate the cost of implementing the water-
pricing scheme in the region. Asymmetric information may go under the form of non-
observability of farm types and its technology and non-observability of a farm’s actions (Galioto 
et al., 2013).  
Smith and Tsur (1997) initially addressed the issue of asymmetric information for irrigation 
water in the absence of metering. More recently, Gallerani et al. (2005), Viaggi et al. (2010), Galioto 
et al. (2013) and Lika et al. (2016) investigate how the presence of asymmetric information might 
affect the way that WAs design their pricing mechanism in some European regions. Asymmetric 
information for irrigated agriculture appears in two forms: when water authority (WA) is unable 
to observe farm’s characteristic and when the WA is unable to detect farms action. Unmetered 
irrigation water allow farmers to have private information in water use function (Tsur, 2000) as 
such, farmer may benefit from taking its action (moral hazard) that allow him to maximize its 
benefit in spite of what has been agreed in the contract (Latacz-Lohmann, 2005) or when the WA 
may know the existing farm types, but is unable to observe each farm type belong to whom (Lika 
et al., 2016).  
 In line with the above literature which emphasise the need for the development of incentive 
pricing instruments for irrigated agriculture, this thesis further analyse the pricing policies in 
order to evaluate the interplay between farms’ water tariffs and irrigated share (with respect to 
farms’ profits and costs) under full and asymmetric information conditions.  
 
 Problem statement and motivation 
The background provided above shows that in some regions water entities have advanced 
in designing mechanisms and policy implementations according to the WFD demands, but that 
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such steps leave much to be improved with respect to achieving a sustainable water use. Though 
different water pricing mechanisms and strategies exist, the question is whether these strategies 
are worth being implemented, and whether their benefits are tangible in reality when applied to 
heterogeneous populations or farmers with varying characteristics. 
With regard to surface irrigation networks, mostly applied in many regions of Europe but 
not only (i.e. China, India), WAs face difficulties in reforming water-pricing policies in order to 
meet demand management. Incentive pricing mechanisms are vague in most countries, and 
current water pricing systems are often distorted leading to large cases of no incentives for water 
conservation (Shen and Reddy, 2016). In addition, the obstacles WAs face involve lack of water 
metering, the presence of asymmetric information between WAs and water users, high level of 
transaction costs and heterogeneous population of water users complicate the implementation of 
incentive water pricing. These limitations affecting the applicability of ideal pricing instruments 
oblige WAs to implement flat rates disregarding any differences in water uses and not 
incentivizing efficient uses. 
With regard to surface irrigation networks water users respond imperfectly to water prices 
(Garrido and Calatrava, 2010). Their behaviour arise from the fact that uniform tariffs do not 
provide incentives to efficiently use the water resource by not encouraging users to use the water 
on the bases of costs they generate and for what they pay for. In line with these concerns, the 
question is what mechanisms would provide a pricing instrument that guarantee water tariffs 
based on costs generated by each individual farm. In this respect, the choice of the use of a 
principal-agent model aims at analyzing the relationship between principal and agent because 
here is dealt with a case where the water resource is served by the WA (principal) to farmers 
(agents). In addition, a principal-agent model is widely applied in the field of agriculture 
economies. 
What motivates me to conduct this research is the importance of the investigation and 
adaptation of incentive economic instruments in function of the management of the irrigation 
water resource. Although besides the obstacles that impedes the adaptation of incentive 
instruments its development and implementation is fundamental to guarantee an efficient 
allocation of the water resource and to accomplish the WFD requirement with regard to water 
resources. In addition, with this thesis I attempts to shed light in the effectiveness of the 
implementation of incentive strategies and to identify under what conditions they might be a 
substitute of uniform flat rate pricing instruments. The analysis and the comparison with flat rate 
pricing policies (already applied in most of surface irrigation networks) helps to clarify and 
identify conditions when incentive pricing strategies result more costly-effective policy. 
In this respect, the use of incentive pricing strategies from the range of economic 
instruments is one of possible tools applicable to motivate water users to comply with a particular 
policy and to improve the use of the water resource. For instance, provision of incentives boost 
water users to pay water tariffs in function of their water usage, which might contribute in the 
achievement of a more sustainable water use. In addition provision of price discrimination (when 
possible) incentivize water users to a more rational water use and drive to lower water supply 
costs for the WA compare with flat rates. The implementation of these policies would lead not 
only to the achievement of the cost recovery of the resource provision but also to the achievement 
of environmental goals (decline environment pollution).  
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In this regard, while considering the design of incentive pricing policies, the thesis address 
problems of how the water supply costs are distributed among farms. 
 
 Research objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to assess the potential for the use of an incentive water 
pricing scheme for irrigation water, when irrigation water is unmetered. I evaluate this option 
considering two related conditions: transaction cost and asymmetric information. In this study, 
transaction costs are taken to be the costs of implementation and enforcement of the pricing 
strategy and are distinguished from rents generated from asymmetric information. 
The study challenges and discusses the practicability of a tariff design that is able to recover 
water supply costs and deals with biases in information by WA. Under such circumstances, 
conditions are assessed in which it makes sense for a regulator to consider implementing 
incentive pricing mechanisms in a way of maximizing social benefits and incentivizing rational 
water use. 
 
The specific objectives of the research are: 
 
 to provide a theoretical analysis of incentive water pricing for irrigated agriculture under 
the problem of adverse selection. The study also aims at identifying conditions affecting 
the efficiency of pricing strategy; 
 to design an efficient (social welfare maximizing) pricing scheme in conditions of 
unmetered water, using empirical information from a region in Albania; 
 to provide an incentive water pricing strategy in the absence of water metering by 
considering the presence of moral hazard and transaction costs; 
 to analyse a pricing strategy under the problem of moral hazard where monitoring costs 
are function of monitoring efforts. 
 
This research considers several hypothesis under different information basis and is related 
to the regulation of irrigated agriculture via pricing, when there is an inability of the WA to 
distinguish farm types and to detect their actions.  
Different from most of the literature, a novelty in this thesis is that, the models concerning 
adverse selection problem count for several assumptions which aim at not only optimizing water 
supply costs but also considering the profit from the use of water. On the other hand models 
under moral hazard with regard to irrigated agriculture have not been developed previously. In 
addition the modelling approach used here tries to capture the impact of pricing strategies arising 
from information asymmetries and direct transaction costs simultaneously. I also assess optimal 
monitoring levels and conditions under which implementation of monitoring strategy is 
economically efficient. Furthermore, I extend the analysis in identifying conditions where 
incentive water pricing may efficiently replace flat rates in irrigated agriculture.  
From the literature is well known that still several countries use flat rate water pricing. 
Water tariffs are independent of the amount of water delivered. Although water management 
institutions objectives may be at least partially satisfied, price incentives and water conservation 
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strategies are inexistent or yet not applicable. To this concern, I introduce incentive strategies as 
a policy mechanism. The focus is to highlight the importance this tool for irrigated agriculture. 
Whilst analysing this phenomenon, I investigated the role of information asymmetry in 
maximizing/minimizing benefits/costs between WA and water users (farmers). I also investigate 
how does the magnitude and distribution of the surplus vary for society considering different 
economic characteristic and simulate how the introduced model would perform in some 
empirical conditions. While designing different scenarios and options, first attention is given to 
the theoretical context; then empirical examples are presented to test the hypothesis derived from 
theoretical models as a way of assessing the potential impact of the pricing instrument.  
Each specific objective is addressed in a particular chapter developing a specific mechanism 
to match the respective objective. In any designed model, a principal agent relationship is 
analysed. The analysis helps to identify the range of outcomes that may emerge and might help 
to guide decisions on whether to further investigate incentive pricing mechanisms under 
asymmetric information and transaction costs on different cases. The study insights can 
contribute in identifying cases in which traditional flat rate water tariffs already exists, and new 
policy intervention might be needed and applicable to allocate irrigation water resource and 
guaranteeing cost recovery. 
 
 Overview  
The work carried out is organized in eight chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of economic and environmental relevance of water 
resource in agriculture. The chapter starts with a general introduction followed by description of 
instruments for the management of water resource for irrigated agriculture. In addition it 
provides the analysis of water prices for irrigated agriculture with a description of WFD 
principles and obstacles facing water agencies when designing and implementing policies. The 
chapter ends with the illustration of some lessons learned.  
Chapter 3 describes a theoretical interpretation of WAs pricing strategies for irrigated 
agriculture in the absence of water metering under adverse selection. The modelling approach 
considers a reference case flat rate model that often is described as an inefficient solution for 
irrigation management. Its inefficiency is due to high water supply costs and low water 
conservation incentives. At least some of inefficiencies might be translated as a cost for the WAs 
because farmers are unrestricted in the amount of water use and, allow them using resource as 
much they can, their payment from the used resource are not in proportion with the amount 
consumed. With respect to the flat rate case, I develop a principal agent model relying on different 
information bases. First, the model is built under full information, considered as a benchmark; 
than the model is extended with cases under hidden information. I analyse the case of providing 
discriminatory water pricing scheme for water uses, referred to their water use function and 
generated costs to WA.  
With regard to incentive tariffs, a stepwise model is build up with a set of examples. The 
decision variables of the model are water tariffs and farm’s share of irrigated area. Outputs of the 
model include maximization of aggregated benefit, combining farmers benefit and WAs benefit. 
In this setting, aggregated benefit for different modelling conditions can be computed. The model 
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considers heterogeneous farmers and identifies farms choice in response to a menu of contracts 
that reveals their types.  
The structure of the chapter starts with objective setting, followed by the problem 
identification and presentation of the flat rate model. The chapter also describes incentive pricing 
considering several hypothesis under different information bases. Additionally, it is illustrated 
the effect of adding a participation constraint in the model. This is further extended by providing 
a summary of two pricing instruments (flat rate and incentive tariffs) and discussing its potential 
application. The chapter ends with some conclusions.  
Chapter 4, describes a model based on menu of contracts with the purpose of providing an 
efficient water pricing scheme for irrigated agriculture. The developed approach is based on a 
principal agent model and still relies on an adverse selection perspective. This chapter differs 
from the previous one because assumes four farm types in a principal agent relationship and 
focus on an empirical application. In addition, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the impact 
of asymmetric information on the regulator’s decision problem of assigning a share of irrigated 
area and water tariffs. I examine its implication and compare with the flat rate water tariffs. The 
provided empirical example considers different level of water costs. In addition, the empirical 
illustration provides some insights in terms of policy parameters (payments and share of irrigated 
area) profits, net profits, and social net benefit.  
The structure of the chapter starts with the objective and then introduces materials and 
methods followed by a case study selected in a region of Albania. The chapter continues with 
results identified with some empirical simulations. The chapter ends with some discussion and 
conclusions.  
Chapter 5, consist on the analysis of an optimal water pricing strategy through a monitoring 
scheme that aims at investigating the water users’ exposure on overusing the water resource. The 
modelling approach is based on a principal agent theory to guarantee a sustainable water use for 
irrigated agriculture. In addition the model attempts to incentivize farmers to use the water 
resource based in the agreed contract instead of taking costly action.  
Under this reasoning, I analyse a case leading to monitoring strategy to control farms 
behaviour toward the water resource and then discuss and compare results with a flat rate option. 
I tend to discuss how monitoring strategy and probability of detecting compliant/noncompliant 
farmer affect the levels of social benefits, farms tariff and irrigated share of farmland. In addition 
I investigate how monitoring activities serve to guarantee and contribute for a sustainable water 
demand management.  
The chapter starts by defining the objective, and then describes materials and methods 
followed by subsections containing the background literature, the flat rate model, incentive 
strategies under full information and moral hazard assumption; it continues with an evaluation 
of two pricing strategies (flat rate and incentive tariffs). In addition, the chapter involves an 
empirical example comprising a case study and the descriptions of results. The chapter ends with 
some discussion and conclusions. 
Chapter 6, describes a pricing scheme with the aim of developing a mechanism design that 
involves a monitoring strategy with the purpose of detecting farms action. In this chapter, 
differently from the previous one, monitoring costs are a function of monitoring efforts. The 
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modelling aims at identifying under what level of monitoring frequency, monitoring strategy is 
efficient.  
The structure of the chapter begins with the description of the objective, followed by the 
theoretical interpretation of the developed model. Then the chapter presents an empirical 
example for testing the model’s hypothesis. The chapter ends with some discussion and 
conclusions.  
Chapter 7, discusses and compare findings of the previous chapters, in relation to the 
contribution to the literature and implications for future impact analysis. Additionally this 
chapter draws some policy implications. The chapter ends with model limitations and future 
research. 
Chapter 8, conclude the thesis with some main conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
2. The Economic and Environmental Relevance of Water 
Resources in Agriculture 
 
 General introduction  
Most of worldwide water use goes for agriculture, accounting for about 70% of freshwater 
withdrawals and over 40% of OECD countries’ total water withdrawals (Garrideo and Calatrava, 
2010). The water resource of irrigation is withdrawn from rivers, reservoirs and lakes, and 
groundwater and usually supplied for irrigation through open canals or pressurized pipes. 
Climate change and population growth are considered the main factors causing tensions 
and competition for water resources. In addition, the increase of food demand is causing a huge 
impact on the scarcity of water for irrigated agriculture. In recent years, in several countries, 
statistical evidences show a decline in the quantity and quality of water resources, questioning 
for future availability (Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010; Viaggi et al., 2010; Zoumides et al., 2009; 
Vasileiour et al., 2014). In this framework, Mediterranean countries debated on their irrigated 
agriculture because of its high water consumption levels and its apparent inefficiency (Sagardoy 
and Varela-Ortega, 2010; Gomez-Limon and Berbel, 2000). These pressures led many countries to 
(re)think their water policies in order to improve water use efficiency (Zoumides et al., 2009; 
Vasileiou et al., 2014; FAO, 2004; Fragoso and Marques, 2015; Lika et al., 2016). 
In this respect, in Europe, increasing water scarcity and climate variability, brought about 
the introduction of additional policies aiming at increasing water use efficiency and at achieving 
sustainable uses of the resource (Barouchas et al., 2016, Aidam, 2015).  
The management of water resources in agriculture concerns the responsibility of WAs and 
users to guarantee that water resources are allocated efficiently and equitably and used to achieve 
socially, environmentally and economically beneficial outcomes (FAO, 2004; Garrido and 
Calatrava, 2010).  
Regardless of the reason for reforming water policies, knowledge of the value of water is 
essential for efficient management and allocation of water and when designing policies, the value 
of water is also essential to compare impacts of water reform within and across sectors of the 
economy (Qureshi et al., 2010).  
In the following I discuss the management of water resource in agriculture, then I focus to 
the pricing policies potentially applied for irrigated agriculture. In addition, I discuss the WFD 
principles. Furthermore it is analyzed the agency problem with regard to water pricing for 
agriculture. The chapter ends with some lessons learned. 
 
 The management of water resource in agriculture 
The disparity between demand for water and water availability causes water shortage in 
many countries of the world (Sun et al., 2018). The water scarcity varies with its existence, the 
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way of strategy development for its management. The management of irrigation water resources 
is a prior strategy to mitigate future water scarcity problems (Franco-Crespo and Sumpsi, 2017). 
The management of water resources has received increasing attention by experts and policy 
makers since the Dublin conference in 1992 which supported the application of instruments for 
the management of the demand for water, pricing mechanisms and regulatory measures (Dinar 
et al., 2015; Berbel et al., 2017).  
The management of water resource seeks a holistic approach that distinguishes the complex 
relationships among all factors influencing the water demand. It requires involvement of 
supportive policies and comprehensive legislations with a coherent set of incentives and 
regulatory measurements to support these policies (Thivet and Fernandez, 2012).  
In the past the management of water resources has been put in place in most areas to 
guarantee water availability for basic needs, sanitation and the production of food. The 
management of water resources were not based on the formal law but on traditional practices 
(FAO, 2004). The intensification of agricultural production lead to development of more coherent 
water management practices. Worldwide countries promoted the government involvement in 
irrigation management now are shifting to adopting of new strategies by involving farmers as a 
part of development of management and operation planes and leaving governments to focus on 
the management of water on the main system. In some regions the government distribution 
agency manage all the irrigation system down to tertiary canals. In other countries, the water 
management by governments is up to secondary canals and living the other part to be managed 
by users and in some other countries farmers may be engaged for the management of entire 
irrigation system.  
A variety of water management systems exist but I highlight three basic types of irrigation 
management: First, water management by public sector such as an public irrigation department; 
second, water management by private entities a private corporation selling water from tube or 
wells which are more in the bases of trade rather than on the authoritative decision; third 
management via WUA, where the grope of irrigation users who share the common interest on 
the management of their irrigation resource (Groenfeldt and Sun, 1997), thought WUA not always 
maintain entire irrigation project, some duties belong to governments (i.e. building irrigation 
networks, reservoirs and maintenance of primary canals). In addition in some countries are 
applied also water markets as a way of managing the water resource.  
Moreover, the management of irrigation water is sorted out through supply and demand. 
The management of water resource through supply consist in a structural allocation, leak 
detection and control systems in distribution network. This approach targets water users, instead 
of water suppliers, to achieve more sustainable allocation. Demand management approach 
consist of non-structural measures: economic and legal incentives to influence the behavior of 
water users and creation of the institutional and policy environment that enables this approach 
(Savenije and van der Zang, 2002).  
The management of water resource through demand involves many instruments. In this 
regard I attempt to synthesize the indicators described by Savenije and van der Zaag (2002) and 
Kampragou et al. (2010). In general demand management of water resource is based in five 
principles: 
 Implement water conservation practices (i.e. laws and criteria) 
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 Promote water conservation (i.e. provide positive incentives for rational water use taxes 
or voluntary agreements) 
 Invest on water conservation (i.e. develop programs for preventing losses in irrigation 
networks, impose water metering, the use of quotas this mechanism is found to be 
preferred to a purely economic regulation for managing scarcity because they are more 
equitable, transparent and more efficient in meeting demand with supply) 
 Application of economic instruments (i.e. economic incentives as water pricing, 
subsidies, grants, price differentiation; or other economic criteria penalties, legal 
enforcement incentives)  
 Development of education programs or capacity building (i.e. setting examples, 
information campaigns, access to informant and data) 
According to above instruments water pricing mechanism is viewed as one instrument to 
improve the economic efficiency of water resource. In this respect in the following section I 
attempt to assess the role of the economic instrument water pricing in relation with demand 
management for irrigated agriculture. 
 
 The issue of water pricing in agriculture 
The management of water resource via water pricing has been considered as one of options 
for achieving WFD objectives with the purpose to ensure sustainable use of water resources 
(Gomez-Limon and Riesgo 2012; Toan, 2016) and to improve the efficiency of water uses in 
agriculture (Molle et al., 2008; Frija et al., 2011; Speelman et al., 2009; Giannoccaro et al., 2010; 
Shen and Reddy, 2016).  
Many scholars that dealt with the issue of irrigation water pricing believe that the 
management of water demand via pricing is impractical (Molle, 2009). Some scholar argues that 
maintaining low water charges for irrigation send wrong signals to water users, who are not 
enough incentivized to cultivate water-efficient crops and/or to improve their irrigation 
technologies. Additionally, water pricing would not incentivize efficient water uses, unless prices 
are directly linked to water use (FAO, 2004). This is becoming a central issue for the WA in 
designing and plaining the use of the water resource (Masseroni et al., 2017). In this regard some 
authors highlight that the management of water demand via pricing should be further 
investigated and should integrate the social value of the water resource (FAO, 2004, Tiwari and 
Dinar, 1997). 
Pricing is deemed as a potential and desirable tool to arbitrate water allocation between 
sectors and to promote desirable environment objectives. Water pricing involves any charges that 
farmers have to pay for using water (Garrido and Calatrava, 2010; Tiwari and Dinar, 2000). In the 
most general sense, water pricing refers to monetizing the abstraction, the use and the pollution 
of water. Following this broad definition, pricing is not a water allocation mechanism in itself, 
but is a supporting policy instrument to control water use (or pollution) and (re-)finance water 
use-related costs (ARCADIS, 2012). 
Nowadays, a variety of methods of water pricing and water allocations schemes exists. This 
wide range of water pricing schemes adopted by WAs worldwide depends on the infrastructural 
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and socio-economic conditions that characterize the irrigation network served by the WA as well 
as on the broader institutional and administrative context. 
 In the following I cluster existent water pricing approaches in few main categories: 
 
Table 2.1. Water pricing categories 
1. Area-Based 
Charges 
(a) A fixed rate per hectare of farm, where the charge is not related to the 
area irrigated, the crop grown or the volume of water received. It is 
usually part of a “two-part” tariff designed to cover the fixed costs of the 
service. Different tariffs may be used for gravity and pumped supplies.  
 (b) A fixed rate per hectare irrigated. The charge is not related to farm 
size, type of crop grown or actual volume of water received (except that 
a larger irrigated area implies a greater volume of irrigation water). 
2. Crop-Based 
Charges 
A variable rate per irrigated hectare of crop, i.e. different charges for 
different crops, where the charge is not related to the actual volume of 
water received, although the type of crop and area irrigated serve as 
proxies for the volume of water received. 
3. Volumetric 
Charges 
(a) A fixed rate per unit water received, where the charge is related 
directly to, and proportional to, the volume of water received.  
(b) A variable rate per unit of water received, where the service charge 
is related directly to the quantity of water received, but not 
proportionately (e.g. a certain amount of water per hectare may be 
provided at a low unit cost, a further defined quantity at a higher unit 
cost, and additional water above this further quantity at a very high unit 
cost). This method is referred to as a rising block tariff. 
4. Tradable 
water rights 
The entitlements of users in an irrigation project, or more widely, other 
users, are specified in accordance with the available water supply. 
Rights holders are allowed to buy or sell rights in accordance with 
specified rules designed primarily to protect the rights of third parties. 
Sales require authorization by a licensing authority (as in the Murray 
Darling Basin Authority, Australia, and most western states in the 
United States of America), or may require court approval (e.g. Colorado, 
the United States of America) without reference to any specified 
authority. 
Note: The source of this table is FAO 2004, 28 Report 
 
 Non volumetric water pricing 
Most of irrigation water district use non volumetric water pricing strategies: input pricing, 
output pricing, area pricing, flat rates and betterment levy (Tsur et al, 2010; FAO 2004). 
Output pricing scheme implies water charges based in each unit of output produced by 
the user (Tsur et al., 2010). If the output is observable this pricing scheme avoid the 
accuracy of transaction costs (Tsur et al., 2010). Input pricing scheme involves water 
charges based on water consumption, taxes on water-related inputs for example per unite 
charge for each unite of fertilizer purchase (Tsur et al., 2010). In case of area pricing 
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method users are charged for water use for irrigated area, often depending on crop choice, 
extend of crop irrigated, irrigation method and season. Flat rate water tariffs usually are 
applied based on area irrigated (Lika et al., 2016). In addition betterment levy pricing 
method is based on the implicit value of irrigation water by charging water fees per unite 
area, bases on increased in land values (Tsur et al, 2010; Tsur and Dinar, 1997).  
 Mixed tariffs 
These charges combine area or crop based flat-rate with a volumetric element and are also 
called two-tiered or two-part tariffs (ENTEC, 2010). Countries like Austria, Czech 
Republic, Finland Germany, Ireland, Poland and Spain are using mixed tariffs to recover 
supply costs for irrigation water in agriculture. 
 Volumetric water pricing  
This water pricing method is base in volume water consumed. Volumetric water pricing 
requires information on volume used and seeks that WAs to establish prices, monitor 
water usage and collection of fees (FAO, 2004; Tsur et al, 2010). Volumetric charges 
implies also linear volumetric charges, usually applied in Cyprus and Luxembourg, and 
volumetric block tariffs applied in Belgium (ARCADIS, 2013). Volumetric methods 
supplying water to individual farmers are not feasible always in practice because of the 
high costs of implementation mainly for a high number of fragmented farms, instalment 
of volumetric measures are often prohibitively expensive because of complexity of 
installing and large number of measures device and especially in large areas (FAO, 2004; 
Molle and Berkoff, 2007; Molle, 2009) 
 Water Markets 
It has long been recognized that markets provide a means to allocate water according to 
its opportunity cost, and should result in an efficient and conservation tool (Tsur and 
Dinar, 1997; Johansson et al., 2002; Tsur et al, 2010). Water markets consist in a more 
flexible water allocation mechanism than administrative means. The allocation of water 
traditionally belongs to WAs and are underutilized in many areas where they are 
appropriate. However, the allocation of water resource through market mechanism has 
been questioned in developing countries. This strategy requires development of 
institutions and infrastructure for operation (Johensson et al., 2002). Its application is very 
limited because involves substantial externalities, recharge considerations, lack of 
information, high cost of investment and decline average costs of delivery (Tsur et al, 
2010). The application is partially applied in Spain and United Kingdom and they are the 
only European Countries partially apply this mechanism. In some other countries, like 
Romania, the trading of water rights is explicitly prohibited. In addition, OECD (2010) 
confirms that the use of water markets and trading of water entitlements to allocate water 
is practiced only in a very limited number of OECD countries (i.e. Australia) (ARCADIS, 
2012). 
In spite of this instruments discussed by scholar, in practice, most of WAs recover supply 
costs by flat rate pricing schemes whatever is the availability of water resources (INEA, 2011; 
Bazzani et al., 2004; Molle et al., 2008; Lika et al., 2016). Flat rate instrument is relatively easy to 
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be designed and to be implemented, with relatively low transaction costs. This scheme appears 
to be not economically efficient, since water charges are not depending on the amount of water 
used. Under this pricing scheme water uses pay evenly, whenever they are or are not irrigating 
(Molle and Berkoff, 2007; ARCADIS, 2012). Volumetric pricing is applied in those rare 
circumstances where water uses are metered or, at least, monitored but is not always 
implementable as it implicitly requires the measurement of the water withdrawals by farmers. 
Appendix1 2.1 provides a comprehensive list of water pricing schemes currently applied in 
different EU regions.  
With respect to the past literature, below I provide a review of some recent studies provided 
by scholars in the way of assessing the effect of pricing policies to a particular sector. 
Molle et al. (2008) describes roles of water pricing and its limitations surrounding efficiency 
of water pricing mechanisms. I looked at the main practical obstacles related to pricing 
mechanisms: a) increasing prices generally has no impact on irrigation efficiency unless the water 
resource prices are set on the bases of the volume used; b) in cases when water prices are set based 
in volume used, prices are invariably too low to induce a charge in behavior. This is right because 
pressurized systems are associated with high value crops that mean water costs are negligible in 
the crop budged, efficiency is already high and costs of achieving higher efficiency would 
normally offset any gain from a lower water charge. In addition the author indicate that water 
payments exceed operation and maintenance (O&M) only when are included additional 
payments in form of taxes, which usually under management of public authorities users are 
unlikely to accept paying more than the cost of supply (anything beyond this is considered as a 
tax and is rejected), in case when the management of water resource belongs to farmers, they 
never self-inflict prices higher than O&M costs. In addition, the author argue that pricing policies 
are highly related with political economy and its adaptation in the region is limited by political 
implications. 
Aidam (2015) uses a mathematical programming approach aiming at analyzing the impact 
of water pricing policy on the demand for water resources by farmers. The author’s empirical 
simulation show that water pricing is negatively correlated with water demand for irrigation, 
mainly for significant high prices. In this line, Omid et al. (2016) introduce a nonlinear modelling 
in order to estimate farmer’s willingness to pay (WTP). The WTP was estimated though a 
probabilistic optimization method. Their empirical result show that for low water cost, water use 
is not responsive to pricing. The authors conclude that rationing increase water pricing and water 
use declines. The decline of water use is associated with decrease of the cost of water supply. In 
tem of policy implication Adam (2015) highlight the importance of further investigation pricing 
policies but not only by scholars to reform the management of the water resource as a mean of 
improving water use efficiency. In addition, the design of pricing policy that would incentives 
farmers toward less water consumption would be a good policy incentive and advisably to be 
combined with other non-pricing instruments like water harvesting and other water saving 
technologies in order to achieve a meaningful result. 
                                                          
1 The appendix 2.1 refers to ARCADIC 2013 water report, more details can be found in the report. 
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Frogos and Marques (2015) design a Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) as an 
alternative, Econometric Mathematical Programming (EMP) based in the estimation of optimality 
condition with the purpose of assessing the economic impact of water pricing in the context of 
public irrigation scheme. The policy was designed to assess its impact on water demand, irrigated 
land rate, farm profit, cost recovery and total welfare. In addition authors compare two pricing 
policies volumetric tariffs with a block tariffs. They found that bloc tariffs achieve the most 
efficient water allocation, when farmers, water average cost is below 50 Euro/1000m3. Authors 
conclude that the two part tariff (i.e. two part tariff implies fixed and volumetric part) perform 
better then volumetric pricing. Authors argue that EMP perform better in term of efficiency than 
PMP capturing farmer response in terms of crop substitution to water availability and pricing 
policy change. In addition, the authors highlight the need of implementing a more efficient water 
pricing polices above all to manage the risk arising specially by climate change. 
Franco-Crespo and Sumpsi (2017) illustrate a Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 
with the purpose of analyzing the economic impact of pricing policies on agro-food farms. The 
authors describe and assess three pricing policies: flat rates, water blokes and volumetric pricing. 
The authors’ results indicate that flat rates have higher cost/revenue ration than other simulated 
pricing policies. The application of a block tariff represents a greater effect on incomes of farmers. 
Moreover, a volumetric rate, depending on the value of the water allocated can influence the 
reduction of water consumption and thus reduce the negative effects on farmers’ incomes.  
The most efficient method turned to be volumetric pricing with low impact on the proceeds 
of farmer and having the capacity of reducing the water consumption. Nevertheless the authors 
conclude that volumetric water pricing seeks additional costs for the implementation 
measurement adaptations. In addition from the survey authors found that for a hypothetical 
increase of the price of irrigation farmers respond by reducing the cultivated area or even 
deciding to abandon the agricultural area or shifting toward a rainfed crop cultivation. Moreover, 
in this line, Vasileiou et al. (2014) assess the impact of different policy measures in the irrigation 
performance. The alternative intervention measures implies the abstraction quota restrictions and 
volumetric pricing with the purpose of increasing the water use efficiency and ensuring rational 
water use. In order to assess the impact of this instruments a Linear Programing (LP) was used. 
The authors found that an increase of the water pricing beyond £1.00 m3 drive farmers do 
decrease the demand for irrigation and eventually decreasing the WAs revenue from fee 
collections. In addition they highlight the regulation via quotas, where there are pressures 
systems, in order to achieve the most efficient level of water use. In this regard, pricing strategies 
can be combined with many other instruments like quotas (i.e. setting an upper limit to the 
amount of water that may be used) or other economic incentives (i.e. subsidies, penalties, etc.)  
Most of the analyzed literature focuses on analyzing farmers’ responsiveness to water 
pricing. The majority of scholars analyzed and developed different pricing strategies to 
incentivize rational water uses under different conditions. The conclusion of most authors is that 
beneficiaries should pay the full ongoing costs of system operation, maintenance, replacement 
and upgrading of facilities. Such payments should be clearly designated for users by the 
operating agency, and accounting procedures should be transparent and encourage efficiency in 
the operating agency.   
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With the focus to water pricing, a deep and comprehensive analysis of the management of 
water resource for irrigated agriculture is proved in the books of Tsur et al. (2010), Buarnaris et 
al. (2015) and Dinar et al. (2015). 
 
2.3.1 Water Framework Directive  
The EU WFD intended to bring a new regulation for the management of water resources 
(Teodosiu et al., 2003; Viaggi et al., 2010; Voulvoulis et al., 2017). The WFD goal was to create a 
framework to regulate the use of European water bodies. The Directive also required the 
coordination of different EU legislation and established a detailed schedule for action, with the 
year 2015 set as the target year to reach a good status for all European water bodies (European 
Commission, 2012a; Erik, 2015; Giannakis et al., 2016; Voulvoulis et al., 2017).  
Despite the fact that the target year already passed through, EU Member States are still 
struggling to redesign their management, including water-pricing policies in a way that is 
consistent with the WFD principles. Specifically, the WFD introduced few fundamental principles 
to design water pricing:  
 
 Full Cost Recovery (FCR) shall include the recovery of the costs of water services including 
environmental and resource costs having regarded to the economic analysis conducted 
according to Annex III2 
 Incentive pricing principle (IPP) indicate that water-pricing policies provide adequate 
incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, and thereby contribute to the 
environmental objectives of this Directive, 
 The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) that looks at the adequacy of contributions to compensate 
for the cost of environmental damage generated by users; 
 
These principles emphasize the twofold purpose of pricing for water use, namely financial 
and economic. From a financial viewpoint, payments enable the WA to recover all or part of the 
capital and current costs. From an economic viewpoint, payments allow WA to conserve water 
and increase the efficiency of water use. Toan, (2016) aim at providing an international review of 
water pricing policies by focusing on the alignment of costs with prices. The study promote a 
policy change with a focus to a more sustainable irrigation management. The author highlights 
the importance of development and imposition of acceptable price regime in order to answer to 
the question how do we get farmers to pay the costs associated with water and water delivery. In 
addition the author highlights the importance of identification of what farmers must pay for with 
                                                          
2 The economic analysis shall contain enough information in sufficient detail (taking account of the costs associated 
with collection of the relevant data) in order to: 
 (a) make the relevant calculations necessary for taking into account under Article 9 the principle of recovery of the 
costs of water services, taking account of long term forecasts of supply and demand for water in the river basin district 
and, where necessary: estimates of the volume, prices and costs associated with water services, and estimates of 
relevant investment including forecasts of such investments; 
 (b) make judgements about the most cost-effective combination of measures in respect of water uses to be included in 
the programme of measures under Article 11 based on estimates of the potential costs of such measures (European 
Commission, 2000; European Commission, 2010) 
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regards to various costs components of irrigation water (i.e., O&M costs, capital costs, resource 
cost, and environmental costs), and stress the fat that factors that shape these attitudes, are largely 
unexplored.  
The core elements considered when designing pricing policies are recovery of full costs of 
water services and creation of incentive for efficient water use. Yet this objective are not meet in 
especially in developing countries. The main factors affecting to not reach this objective are: the 
provision of large subsidies to water users (i.e. subsidies often are applied in cases when the 
irrigation water is under public system); water prices for irrigation are generally underestimated 
in a way of not covering the cost of delivery; capital investment are not included on the irrigation 
payment; most of water agencies do not set water tariffs on the bases of individual water use; lack 
of incentive mechanisms for rational water use. 
The main assumption underlying the WA’s capacity to accomplish the above policy 
objectives by way of prices is related with his direct or indirect knowledge of the quantity of water 
used by individual sectors or agents (Galioto et al., 2013) 
In addition, it is normally accepted that water pricing should be linked to the actual 
use/abstraction or that there is a contribution from all users in relation to their consumption (or 
pollution). This usually is referred to as the PPP, but its application in practice is often subject to 
debate (ARCADIS, 2012). The adaptation of the PPP might be associated with an increase of prices 
from the necessity to recover environmental costs caused by agricultural practices (i.e. nutrient 
leaching). This leads WAs to set water prices in a higher level. The increase of water prices 
through the application of PPP might prevent water users from abusing with the resource. The 
application of the IPP makes it possible to solve this discrepancy, and also contributes to reducing 
pressures on water resources. Thus, the application of IPP mechanisms would allow WAs to 
comply with the WFD principles, but its applicability relies on the assumption that the WA is 
able to implement and to observe users compliance. In addition, the effectiveness of incentive 
pricing in conditioning both water uses and distribution of costs among users, depends on farms’ 
readiness to accept water tariffs and comply with proposed rules.  
In this regard, many EU countries are providing a particular attention in developing 
incentive pricing strategies that would guarantee an efficiency of water use and moving away 
from flat rates (Franco-Crespo and Sumpsi, 2017). For example, Dono et al. (2010) investigate the 
potential impact on water use and the economic effect of increasing water prices in a 
Mediterranean agriculture with a focus in southern Italy. The authors compared a volumetric 
water pricing scheme with a flat rate prices. They argue that the adoption of flat rates was favored 
only if adequately estimated by the Water Users Association (WUA) as is easier to recover the 
costs of the service.  
 
2.3.2 Agency problem and implications of information asymmetries 
The effectiveness of a pricing policy adopted by local WAs to allocate costs among users 
and to dis-incentivize water misuses, in accordance with the WFD principles, changes 
considerably depending on several factors. The development and implementation of efficient 
policies to manage the demand for irrigation water by WAs is a challenge due to conceptual and 
practical constraint faced (ARCADIS, 2012). 
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The absence of water metering is the main constraint. Water for irrigation is mostly 
delivered through surface irrigation networks. Under such condition, metering individual water 
use is costly and difficult, since it requires a hydraulic device to measure the flow at the head of 
each farm. Moreover, costs associated with monitoring water flows are prohibitive unless water 
is pressurized and meters can be installed (Molle, 2009). This condition hinders the ability to 
monitor the volumes actually used and to implement volumetric pricing as a way of allocating 
costs and ensuring efficient water use (Viaggi et al., 2010; Johansson et al., 2002; Smith and Tsur, 
1997; Galioto et al., 2013, 2015; Lika et al., 2013). In addition, lack of water metering inhibit the 
WA to design water pricing strategies that suit best for farmers and regulators due to high level 
of transaction costs.  
Transaction costs implies costs of administration, implementation, enforcement and 
monitoring. The level of transaction costs is conditioned by the presence of information 
asymmetries between WAs and users. Transaction costs related with administration and 
implementation involve the costs the WA face to administer, manage or establish tariffs and 
collect to water users in a given irrigation sector.   
Information asymmetries usually makes impossible by the WA to fully recognize the 
manner in which individual users exploit water resources (Galioto et al., 2013). Under such 
condition, rational and opportunistic individuals may behave on their own interests to the 
detriment of the community of users or even the society (Johansson et al., 2002). 
Implications of asymmetric information can be overcome if WAs possess technologies and tools 
that make available the necessary information about farmers’ behavior. On the other hand, the 
implementation of technologies is conditioned by the enforcement capacity of the regulator 
(transaction costs, rents, monitoring and sanctioning). 
The design of policy with farmers is often characterized by two types of incentive problems 
of asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 
2005). Adverse selection (hidden information) occurs when the water authority (WA) may know 
the existing farm types, but is unable to observe each farm type belong to whom (Lika et al., 2016). 
Moral hazard (hidden action) occurs if the regulator cannot monitor compliance perfectly, farmer 
has an incentive to cheat if the expected pay-offs to cheating is greater than the pay-offs to the 
alternatives (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005; Ozanne and white, 2008).  
For the reason that the farms behavior is not observable, some farmers may behave 
opportunistically being noncompliant with the rules agreed with the WA. The information 
advantage that farmers possess might be used to attain higher profits to the detriment of other 
farmers (Vedel et al., 2006). If the WA do not monitor farms’ action the probability that farmers 
will act dishonestly would increase (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). This is a common problem in 
the sphere of irrigated agriculture, that’s why the EU highlights the importance of finding the 
appropriate tools and incentive mechanisms to reduce the negative effects of information 
asymmetries in irrigated agriculture (European Commission, 2015). 
When farmers’ actions are observable, the WA can set pricing policies based on individual 
water uses. When the individual water use is not observable, it is possible to price water indirectly 
through other observable variables (Smith and Tsur, 1997).  
There is a broad body of literature that address the issue of asymmetric information through 
the application of principal-agent theory in agriculture (Moxey and White, 1998; Moxey et al., 
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1999; White, 2002; Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005; Choe and Fraser, 1988; Ozanne et al., 2001; 
Millock et al., 2012; Fraser. 2002, 2013); Lika et al. 2017. However, few scholars studied irrigation 
water pricing under asymmetric informant for surface irrigation network. Literature focusing on 
this issue and serving as a point of departure regarding this thesis are: Smith and Tsur (1997), 
Gallerani et al. (2005), Viaggi et al. (2010), Arguedas and van Soest (2011), Galioto et al. (2013, 
2015) and Lika et al. (2016). 
Smith and Tsur (1997) initially addressed the issue of water pricing under asymmetric 
information. They introduce the mechanism design to overcome the problem of adverse selection 
and moral hazard in the absence of water metering. They applied a direct revelation mechanism 
in order to soften the level of information asymmetry between farmers and the WA. They argue 
that the presence of asymmetric information hinders the allocation of resource and regulation is 
needed as a form of setting output/input price combination or imposition of a tax on output. The 
authors argue that in the absence of transaction costs first best solution is attainable. With the 
presence of transaction costs, a second bests solution is achieved. In addition, the authors provide 
a numerical example where they argue that under certain level of transaction costs, the 
introduced mechanism is not effective and beyond a certain level of transaction costs is better to 
not introduce policy regulation. 
Furthermore, they highlight that the literature of water management under asymmetric 
information conditions has received little attention and emphasize the importance of analyzing 
the effects of asymmetric information in a policy design issue and its effect on limiting the market 
mechanism in allocating water resources.  
Dridi and Khanna (2005) introduced a model while studying the efficiency of water trading 
under asymmetric information and different irrigation regime. They developed a mechanism for 
water pricing and examined its implication for adoption of modern irrigation technologies under 
different information circumstances. Their model show that hidden information significantly 
reduce the adoption of modern irrigation technology and lead to more retirement of poor quality 
lands than under full informant. Authors demonstrate that water trading even under asymmetric 
information can improve the allocation of water resource. 
Gallerani et al. (2005) introduce a linear programming model to address the issue of water 
pricing for irrigated agriculture under asymmetric information. The authors use a menu of 
contracts as a mean of linking payment and share of irrigated area in function of water use. Their 
objective was to design optimal water pricing scheme under asymmetric information and 
transaction costs (i.e. transaction cost in their study arise from the money transfer). Authors 
compare the new scheme with traditional flat rate and they found that flat rate is an unsuitable 
tool for guaranteeing social feasibility of irrigation water and leading to an optimal solution based 
on the abandonment of irrigation. They found that improvement of social benefit from irrigation 
water might be achievable even under the existence of asymmetry of information and transaction 
costs. They argue that transaction costs have almost no effect when the full cost of water is very 
low. In addition, the actual social cost of water plays a crucial role not only for designing payment 
levels, but also in influencing the selection of the correct policy instrument. 
The authors argue that the applicability of contract theory is highly linked with the 
characteristic of farm types. The authors emphasize the need to investigate of what influences 
farmers to move on the production function as a function of price incentives and how they will 
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behave under a given policy. In addition, the authors emphasize the importance of addressing 
this concern and how the contracts should be designed in order to achieve better insights to 
support WAs for decision-making policies.  
Viaggi et al. (2010) provide a comparison between a flat rate tariff and a menu of contracts. 
They note a higher variability (hence less political feasibility) in the menu of contracts option, 
where payment differentiation associated to the differentiation of the share of irrigable land is the 
key component determining the self-selection on the part of farmers. In some cases, using real 
data farmers pool together in such a way that differentiation among farmers become inapplicable. 
Additionally, the effect of price on optimal contract design, amplified by the need to provide 
discriminating incentives in the contract solution adds to other considerations in pushing for a 
flat rate as the menu of contracts appears too sensitive to product price scenarios and would likely 
fail to discriminate correctly between farm types if the actual prices were different from the 
expectations of the public regulator. 
In addition authors highlight the importance of assessment and improvement of the 
methodologies toward incentive-oriented pricing mechanisms would be of interest of policy-
makers considering situations of unmetered irrigation water use. 
Arguedas and van Soest (2011) provide a theoretical analysis of the optimal conservation 
contracts under asymmetric information conditions and trying to assess the role of fixed costs on 
the policy design and discuss the prominence of the use of menu of contract for the conservation 
services. In addition, the authors highlight the importance of assessment of factors that affect the 
policy shifting from fist best to the second best solution and distinguish how added factor (i.e. 
fixed cost) impact the solution of the mechanism design and affect the regulators decision to 
collect the necessary information until push him to select other costly-effective mechanism (i.e. 
like conservation action). However, the authors provide evidences when incentive-compactible 
conservation contracts are worthy to be assessed and implemented. 
Galioto et al. (2013) analyzed pricing policies in managing water resources in agriculture 
when the water is unmetered, aimed at verifying whether existing area-based tariff strategies are 
efficient economic instruments for water policy and to what extent alternative design in the 
direction of irrigated area-based instruments can help in better complying with European water 
policy principles. The water pricing model in this study was two tariff regime. The first one, tariff 
imposed on the entire farmland area (no mater share of irrigated area). The second one based in 
per hectare tariff proportional to the irrigated farmland. They found that the existing tariff 
policies, presently based on an area-based flat rate system is justified if transaction costs, due to 
the need to monitor at least irrigated areas under no metering conditions are lower than the 
difference of benefit between two scenarios. From this perspective, the WA should adjust the 
tariffs for irrigation water uses according to the type of priority (funding and/or environmental 
protection) and in compliance with the criterion of cost sharing (equity). 
Recently, Lika et al. (2016) developed a water pricing scheme under asymmetric 
information when water is distributed though surface irrigation networks. The authors introduce 
a social welfare maximization water-pricing scheme using empirical information from an 
Albanian region. As a mean of designing an efficient water-pricing scheme for irrigated 
agriculture, a nonlinear model was used based in menu of contracts and compared with flat rates 
which is the common pricing method applied in the region. The authors found that a second best 
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solution might yield an improvement of social welfare compared with traditional flat rate water 
pricing. In addition, appropriate contract-type pricing schemes have a significant role in 
providing incentives to farmers to make irrigation choice to the social optimum.  
Furthermore, the authors highlight the presence of information asymmetries and the need 
for exploring and reforming water pricing policies in such regions that have recently witnessed 
stronger institutional change and major regulatory instability. Additionally the authors attempt 
to prepare the background for further application and development of water pricing policies in 
other areas with similar characteristics. 
Galioto et al. (2015) analyzed incentive water pricing under adverse selection and moral 
hazard and comparing the discriminatory pricing strategies with a per area based tariff with and 
alternative discriminatory pricing strategy that faces both the issue of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. The authors conclude that the viability of monitoring strategy depends from the water 
regulator’s strategy to monitor farmers and its ability to identify monitoring costs. In this respects 
the authors emphasize the need for a further investigation of less costly strategies for identifying 
positive signals, which boost farmers toward compliance. 
Lika et al. 2017 analyze a case of incentive water pricing for irrigated agriculture under the 
presence of moral hazard and transaction costs. The authors discuss a case when the WA aimed 
at applying incentive water pricing when the irrigation water is served through surface irrigation 
networks. The paper analyses a case when, farmers may own private information on water use 
which is unknown to the WA and they may take opportunistic actions totally or partially 
undetected by the WA (i.e. irrigation higher irrigated then declared ex ante). The design of 
incentive water pricing is with a purpose of sharing water supply costs among water users based 
on theirs water use function and dis-incentivizing farmers from water misuse, in contrast with 
the flat rate where farmers benefit from payments that are set equally among farmers.  
All of these instruments differ in the identification of indirect signals, improving the quality 
of information flows which contribute to influence the level of compliance within the irrigation 
network. That is, for a given organizational arrangement of the irrigation network the level of 
compliance is favored by an increasing quality of information flows.  
The above literature can be summarized by saying that in the absence of water metering it 
is hard to identify indirect incentives for conditioning both the way to share supply costs among 
users and the way to affect the allocation of water resources via pricing. However, the literature 
shows that the menu of contract with respect to the field of irrigated agriculture is little explored 
and further exploitation of such instruments might be considered as a mean of providing relevant 
insights and with a policy dimension.  
 
 Lessons learned  
Over the years, water charges for irrigation has bend developed based on the needs of 
utilities and water users and on the basis of advances in technology. The past literature that 
compare the efficiency of water pricing across different water pricing methods and compare 
experiences among different countries includes Dinar and Subramanian (1997), Tsur and Dinar 
(1997), Dinar and Subramanian (1998), Johansson et al. (2002), Tsur et al. (2004), FAO et al. (2004), 
and Molle and Berkoff (2007). The main conclusion of this authors and others that provide a 
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comparison of water pricing performance among countries is that there is no best practice that 
can be recommended to one county or region (Dinar, 2015). 
The author’s recommendations are that economic instruments, water pricing, can 
significantly affect to a policy framework by incentivizing users behavior and leading to efficient 
allocation of water resource and to the improvement of the amount of fee collection which in 
return being invested to guarantee to supply of the water resource for water users. In addition, 
water-pricing policies should not be used to incentivize rational water uses on its own but should 
be used together with other water saving policies in order to achieve appreciable impacts. This 
suggestion is also motivated by the fact that water pricing affect production costs and essentially 
farmers’ competitiveness and, usually, water pricing levels cannot exceed socially acceptable 
threshold values. 
As it turns out, despite the fact that many high-income countries are improving their water 
pricing policies by introducing pricing strategies in function of individual water use, yet the 
application of incentive strategies is fare from reaching WFD objective. In most circumstances 
transaction costs may be prohibitively high, preventing from adopting incentive tariffs and/or 
limiting its effectiveness. Thus, the level of transaction costs condition whether or not to adopt 
incentive tariffs, the ways incentive tariffs could be implemented, the relevant effectiveness in 
terms of impact on water uses as well as on the allocation of supply costs within the community 
of users. 
However, further investigation must be made by considering other factors that influence 
pricing method. In this respect, the EU commission highlights the integration of water 
management through water pricing policies in combination with other non-pricing measures. 
Strategies of water demand management needs to find the right combination of pricing and non-
pricing instruments to achieve efficient and sustainable use of water resources in agriculture 
(EEA, 2017; Tiwari and Dinar, 2003).   
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Chapter 3 
3. Designing a Theoretical Principal Agent Model under 
Adverse Selection. 
Paper under review3 
 Objective  
The objective of this chapter is to provide a theoretical analysis of incentive water pricing 
for irrigated agriculture under the problem of adverse selection. The study also aims at 
identifying conditions affecting the efficiency of pricing strategy. 
Theoretical analysis is carried out by using a principal agent model, this method is widely 
applied in the field of agriculture economics. In this respect the study deals with a case where the 
WA (principal) supply the water resource to a community of farmers (agents) and farmers in 
return pay water tariffs for irrigation. Firstly the study adopt a framework based on the flat rate 
model of water pricing which is mostly applied in the field of irrigated agriculture, especially 
when the irrigation water is unmetered. Secondly with the main focus I develop incentive pricing 
strategies as a mean of linking water tariffs with the amount of water use by farmers. To this end 
the study assesses the efficiencies/inefficiencies coming from the development of these pricing 
policies.  
The paper is organised as follow, section 2 describes the problem surrounding the use of 
water resources in irrigated agriculture; section 3 introduces the flat rate model; section 4 deals 
with incentive tariffs of water pricing. This section analysis the model and illustrate the problem, 
starting from a simple case with full information and then extending it to include asymmetric 
information. The section involves 5 subsections: The first and second subsections consider the 
design of pricing strategy when the WA face the same water cost function of providing the water 
resource under different information conditions (full and lack of information); in the third and 
fourth subsections are analysed cases of different information conditions with different cost 
functions and in the fifth subsection is discussed the effect of an participation constraint in the 
model. Section 5 provides some synopsis of two pricing policies flat rate and incentive tariffs; 
section 6 is devoted to the discussion of the developed pricing policies. Finally, section 7 presents 
the main conclusions.  
 
 The Problem 
Information asymmetries usually make impossible by the WA to fully recognize the 
manner in which individual users exploit water resources (Galioto et al., 2013). Under such 
condition, rational and opportunistic individuals may behave on their own interests to the 
                                                          
3A slightly modified version of this chapter is under review as an article as follows:  Viaggi, D.; Galioto, F.; Lika, A. 
The design of pricing policies for the management of water resources in agriculture under adverse selection. Journal 
of Water Resource and Economics 
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detriment of the community of users or even the society (Johansson et al., 2002). This is a common 
problem in the sphere of irrigated agriculture, that’s why the EU highlights the importance of 
finding the appropriate tools and incentive mechanisms to reduce the negative effects of 
information asymmetries in irrigated agriculture (European Commission, 2015). 
A typical agency problem surrounding the use of water resources in agriculture arises when 
farmers withdraw water to irrigate from surface irrigation networks managed by a private or 
public regulator. Here, farmers own private information on water uses which is unknown to the 
water regulator. Due the impossibility to monitor directly water usage it is difficult for the water 
regulator to price water according to the amount effectively applied by the farmer, which 
depends, in turn, on farmer’s characteristics.  
In this reasoning the above problem is analysed by developing the method used by Viaggi 
et al. (2010), Galioto et al. (2013) and Lika el al. (2016); the conceived model is based on the 
textbook models illustrated in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) and Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
In the following, I analyse the economic implications under two pricing instruments flat rates and 
incentive tariffs. 
 
 Flat rate model 
In most cases, for a surface irrigation network the WA applies flat rates, especially when 
there is no limitation in the availability of the water resource and differences in water use cannot, 
or are too costly, to be assessed. This condition motivates the imposition of flat rates by WA even 
if the level of water use varies. With flat rates, farmers are charged equally whether they are or 
they are not irrigating (Molle and Berkoff, 2007) or if they are using more or less water. In such a 
way, during the irrigation season farmers take the decision on how much to irrigate and when, 
without being influenced by the price paid to the regulator for the supply of water, because tariffs 
play just the role to recover supply costs but have no role in terms of incentives to optimise the 
use of water. The regulator requests to the farmer to pay the agreed tariff in order to recover costs 
that he faces to supply water during the irrigation season. In this framework, farmers’ decision 
on water use is independent from the cost faced by the water regulator to supply the service, 
while the supply cost depends on water use.  
From now on, without loss of generality I will consider the share of irrigated area as the 
decision making variable by the farmer (determining water use and hence the supply cost for the 
regulator). Moreover, it is assumed farm size equals 1 for each farm type served by the water 
regulator and considered a per hectare profit which is function of the share of irrigated area. The 
assumption considers farmers to have a nonlinear profit function, while the WA faces linear water 
supply costs with respect to the irrigated share: 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0, 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 0 and 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0, 𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0, 
where i represents the farm type and 𝑥𝑖 is the share of irrigated area with respect to the type i.  
Under this condition, a rational farmer will choose to irrigate the share of irrigated area that 
will let him maximize profits, according to the following maximisation problem: 
 
max V𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑡 (3.1) 
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The maximization problem is defined as the difference between farmers profit from the use 
of water 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖), and the tariff paid by the farmer to the WA for the supply service t. By taking the 
First Order Condition (FCO) from equation (3.1) with respect to the irrigated farmland, 𝑥𝑖, it is 
obtained the optimal level of the share of irrigated area, which is determined when the marginal 
profit equals zero, being t fixed irrespectively of the amount of irrigated land: 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) = 0 (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.2) indicates that the value of the flat rate tariff does not affect the farm choice 
about the share of irrigated land. On the other hand, the optimal share of irrigated land is different 
across farms, depending on farm’s i profit function. Let’s call this level 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅 where the superscript 
FR indicates flat rate, given by solving equation (3.2). 
The objective function of the regulator can be seen in different ways. The one used here is 
assuming that the regulator aims to optimize the social benefit, S, given by: 
 
𝑆 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖[(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑣𝑡]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3.3) 
Subject to:  
CR: 𝑡 ≥
∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅)+𝑣𝑡𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
        i  n and  𝑣 ≤ 1, (3.4) 
 
Where, 𝑐𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅) are the costs faced by the regulator to divert water for irrigation into the 
network to meet the demand; 𝛿𝑖  is the probability that the water supplied by the regulator is 
demanded by farm type i and 𝑣 indicates transaction costs. Here transaction costs indicate a fixed 
component on water tariffs considered for costs of implementation and enforcement of the 
pricing strategy. The only decisional variable in this problem is t, which do not differ among farm 
types as the regulator is assumed not being in the condition to recognize differences in water uses 
or to impose a specific quota. Hence, the amount of irrigated land is given as a solution of the 
farm problem and not linked to any regulatory parameter. Assuming that the cost faced by the 
regulator to supply water is shared equally across farms regardless of whether or not they are 
irrigating, the cost recovery constraint in this problem, CR, takes the form of equation (3.4). 
Conditions in equation (3.4) are added in order to ensure that transaction costs can be covered by 
the water tariffs and the 𝑣 is always strictly positive.  
If I confine the decision-making problem of the regulator to equation (3.3) and (3.4), the 
result is rather straightforward. As farmers’ profits and regulator’s costs are not affected by 𝑡, the 
maximisation problem become the same as minimising 𝑡, subject to (3.4). As a result, CR is 
satisfied always with strict equality.  
The level of social benefits achieved will be given by solving the farm problem, with 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅, and substituting the result in equation (3.3). The problem of equation (3.3) indicate that if 
transaction costs are very high, it would be socially preferable not to collect water tariffs.  
In terms of farmers’ participation, it turns out that there are two regulatory options. First, if 
tariffs are imposed to everybody in an area, some farms will have positive profit due to irrigation, 
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while the others will have a negative profit. Still everybody will irrigate at the optimal level 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅 (which may in principle include an irrigation area equal to zero). 
The second option is that farmers can drop out of irrigation, for example by giving up the 
option to irrigate. If this is admitted, no tariff will apply to them, which implies also that the tariff 
will be recalculated on the subsample of farmers (with  𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑡 ≥ 0). An individual 
participation constraint would not make sense in this setting, as the regulator does not know the 
individual optimal size of irrigated land, nevertheless this issue is tackled subsequently. 
 
 Incentive tariffs model 
This section reflects the case in which the water provider is willing to apply incentive tariffs. 
The decision to apply incentive tariffs forces to deal with a number of management problems 
related to their design and to guaranteeing the implementation. 
Below, I model the behaviour of the WA whose aim is to maximize the social benefit by 
incentivizing efficient water use. By assumption, the water regulator is not able to monitor water 
use directly. Thus, to incentivize rational water use he might apply a tariff linked to some 
observable characteristics related to water use, such as the type of crops, the type of irrigation 
system, the irrigated area, etc. As an instance, farmers irrigate different share with different 
composition of crops, resulting in different crop water requirement for their farm. Eventually it 
is possible the estimation of individual crop water requirement per irrigated area and 
determining the tariff for the respective irrigated share in function of water consumption and 
guaranteeing appropriate water tariffs based in individual generated costs from irrigation.  
Differently to the former problem, ex-ante, before the irrigation season, the regulator can 
offer a menu of contracts to farmers. The menu combines the tariff and the share of irrigated area. 
Farmers may choose the contract they see as more profitable for their farm, engaging in providing 
different payments and being constrained to a different share of irrigated area.  
In line with most of the literature (Moxey et al., 1999; Viaggi, 2010; Arguendas and van 
Soest, 2011; Galioto et al., 2013), it is assumed the regulator knows farm types served by the 
irrigation network but he is not in the position to recognize to which type each farm belongs to. 
Hereby, to incentivise farmers to reveal their true type along with the choice of the contract from 
the menu, the regulator must set up a pricing scheme which includes the incentives needed to 
induce farmers to choose the ‘contract’ designed for the typology they belong to. 
Let us now formulate the first part of the problem, where the water regulator attempts to 
maximize the aggregated social benefit, subject to cost recovery constraints: 
 
max
{𝑡𝑖,𝑥𝑖}
𝑆 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖[(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑐(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑣𝑡𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (3.5) 
s.t:  
CRi: 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑣𝑡𝑖                i  n and 𝑛 = 1,2  (3.6) 
 
Where, 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖, indicate the tariff and the share of irrigated land, that are decisional 
variables, i.e. terms of the contract, that are differentiated among farm types.  
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The objective function (3.5) is determined by the sum of farm profits, water regulators costs 
for water provision and transaction costs 𝑣. In this assumption, like the previous one, transaction 
costs per unit of payment request to farmers are taken to be the same between types and 
proportional to the amount of money taken through the tariff. Transaction costs include costs of 
administration, implementation, enforcement and monitoring (Smith and Tsur, 1997). 
Transaction costs related with administration and implementation involve costs the WA face to 
administer, management or establishment tariffs and collect to water users in a given irrigation 
sector. Certainly there may be other cases in which transaction costs differ in their form and 
among types; however these different assumptions are left for future research. In addition, the 
balance of profits and costs linked to each individual farm type is weighted by the frequency of 
the farm type 𝛿𝑖 (which can be considered as the total land used by each type, or, with unit size 
of the farm, as the number of farms in each type). 
The cost recovery constraints CRi, ensures that the cost of water provision incurred by 
farmers is paid by each farm type in form of tariffs proportionally to costs that each farm type 
generates (i.e. according to the use of water). Note that this is indexed on i and is hence different 
from a total costs recovery constraint in which farms may compensate for each other costs, 
bringing to cross-farm subsidies and perhaps generating adverse incentive on farms’ water use 
(overusing the water resource, especially when water is served via surface irrigation networks). 
The cost recovery constraint integrates the transaction costs 𝑣 needed to enforce the incentive 
tariff strategy. In addition, the cost recovery constraint serves as an economic instrument for 
guaranteeing the fair share of the water supply costs and transection costs among users. In term 
of regulatory policy, the CRi harness farms’ willingness to overuse the water resource. 
 
3.4.1. First hypothesis, full information the same water cost functions 
We begin with the rather simplified assumption of full information and the same fixed 
component 𝑐 of water cost function across farmers. The properties of farmers profit function are 
{𝜋1(𝑥1), 𝜋2(𝑥2)} where 𝜋1(𝑥1) > 𝜋2(𝑥2) and cost function {𝑐(𝑥1), 𝑐(𝑥2)} where 𝑐(𝑥1) >  𝑐(𝑥2). In 
reality, most farmers probably do not have 𝑐 the same due to differences in their characteristics, 
but at the same time, there are also a number of cases in which farmers use similar technologies, 
so this hypothesis can be considered as realistic in at least a number of cases. It is supposed that 
the profit function of the farmer is concave with 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 0 and cost function is 
linear with 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝑐′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0. If the water regulator has perfect information about farms’ 
characteristics, the objective function (3.6) is maximized subject to the cost recovery constraint 
(CRi). The Lagrangian is as follows: 
 
max
{𝑡𝑖,𝑥𝑖}
𝑆 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖
2
𝑖=1
[𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑐(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑣𝑡𝑖] + ∑ 𝜇𝑖
2
𝑖=1
[(1 − 𝑣)𝑡𝑖 −  𝑐(𝑥𝑖)] 
 
Taking the FCO with respect to 𝑡𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖: 
 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= −𝛿𝑖𝑣 + 𝜇𝑖(1 − 𝑣) = 0  (3.7) 
27 
 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 𝛿𝑖[𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑐′(𝑥𝑖)] − 𝜇𝑖𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) = 0   (3.8) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜇𝑖
= [(1 − 𝑣)𝑡𝑖 −  𝑐(𝑥𝑖)] = 0  (3.9) 
 
By solving equation (3.7) and substituting 𝜇𝑖 in the equation (3.8) the following solution is 
achieved: 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) =
𝑐′(𝑥𝑖)
(1−𝑣)
  (3.10) 
 
By solving the equation (3.10) it is possible to determine the optimal irrigated share, marked 
as 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵 superscript FB stands for first best solution and substitute it in equation (3.9), from which 
the optimal level of water tariffs with respect to the type is determined:  
 
𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵 =
𝑐(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵)
1−𝑣
    
 
(3.11) 
If 𝑣 = 0 the equation (3.11) revert to:  
 
𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗ = 𝑐(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗)      
 
(3.12) 
The outcome of equation (3.12) indicates that the first best (FB) water tariffs cover exactly 
the water supply costs and the optimal level of farms’ tariff is determined when the marginal 
benefit equals social marginal costs and 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗ stands for first best irrigated share with no 
transaction costs.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the solution for a single farm and explains the impact of transaction 
costs on farms’ irrigated share and water tariffs. The concave curve indicate the possible 
combination levels of profit achieved for a given share of irrigated area. The straight increasing 
line toward the right hand side indicate the costs and the dashed line increasing on 𝑥 indicate the 
impact of transaction cost on overall costs, by shifting it at a higher level. All this lines belong to 
farm type 𝑖.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates that for increasing level of transaction costs 𝑣 > 0, it is optimal for the 
regulator to impose farmers a shift in the share of land from  𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗to 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵 with 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗ >  𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵 and 
increase the water tariffs from 𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗to 𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵. This is also visible from the fact that 
𝑐′( 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵)
(1−𝑣)
>
𝑐′(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗) ∀ 0 < 𝑣 < 1. In general, water tariffs are diminished because of the decrease of the 
irrigated share of land demonstrated with the shift from point A to B in Figure 3.1 but still 𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵 >
𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗  due to the impact of transaction costs. This inequality becomes larger as 𝑣 approaches toward 
1. Hence the level of farm’s profit become 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵) < 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵∗) and social benefit decreases as well 
(due to higher costs and lower profit from water use). 
In following I will keep this symbols 𝑡𝑖
𝐹𝐵, 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵 to illustrate the first best solution.  
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3.4.2. Second hypothesis, asymmetric information and the same water cost 
functions 
 
In this section, is considered a case in which the water regulator has not complete 
information about farm types identification. Assuming that the water regulator offers a menu of 
contracts to farmers, but cannot observe if they choose the contract designed for their type or 
misrepresent themselves in the contract selection. In order to ensure the self-selection of farmers 
through contract design, the incentive constraints is added and the objective function is modified 
in the following form (still assuming 2 farm types, 1 and 2): 
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿[(𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑐(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + (1 − 𝛿)[(𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑐(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2] (3.13) 
s.t:  
𝐶𝑅1: 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1 (3.14) 
𝐶𝑅2: 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥2) + 𝑣𝑡2 (3.15) 
𝐼𝐶1:  𝜋1(𝑥1) − 𝑡1 ≥ 𝜋1(𝑥2) − 𝑡2 (3.16) 
𝐼𝐶2:  𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 ≥ 𝜋2(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 (3.17) 
 
The incentive constraint ICi, ensures that each farmer will find it profitable to choose the 
contract intended to him. The result of this constrained optimisation problem is a menu of 
contracts defined by the combination of tariffs 𝑡𝑖 and quota of irrigated farm land 𝑥𝑖. 
Let’s determine the solution assuming that there is no participation constraint; it means that 
the farmers can then also drop out if they find not profitable to participate. Inspecting the problem 
of equation (3.13), subject to constraints, however, the first question is if equation (3.16) and (3.17) 
are binding. 
From the assumptions is known that the cost function is assumed to be linear and the same 
for both farm types this implies that 𝑐′(𝑥1) = 𝑐′(𝑥2) and 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝑐′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0. Farm’s profit 
Figure 3.1. First best solution with the variation of costs 
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function is concave with 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 0 , as well, without loss of generality this 
assumption considers that type 2 farmer is the one with lowest marginal productivity, i.e. 
𝜋1(𝑥1)  > 𝜋2(𝑥2) ∀𝑥 and 𝜋1′(𝑥1)  > 𝜋2′(𝑥2) ∀𝑥.  
Given these assumptions and assuming farms’ profit function is included in the regulator’s 
objective function, hence the levels of 𝑥 of the respective ones in the first best are also the private 
one, once the water cost is internalized. The effect is hence similar to that of a linear volumetric 
tariffs a more formal explanation is provided in the Appendix 3.4.2. 
Things would change if the properties of profit, cost functions or 𝑣 will change, in the next 
section the problem is analysed in the case of linear but different cost curves. Other options are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 
3.4.3. Third hypothesis, full information and different water cost functions 
In this section the first best menu of contracts under perfect information is illustrated with 
reference to different water cost functions and is assumed that 𝜋1(𝑥1) > 𝜋2(𝑥2), but now, 
differently from the previews analysis, it is supposed that farmers have different cost function 
with 𝑐1(𝑥1) > 𝑐2(𝑥2). This is usually an assumption from the literature as it provides a 
benchmarking for the alternative information conditions. However, it could be a realistic option 
when farmers have very heterogeneous irrigated land uses and the WA can assign to each farm 
a contract type without the need to apply any incentive to discriminate farmers (i.e. of course the 
resulting incentive scheme will remain rather approximate compared to water metering; the 
difference will depend indeed on heterogeneity of water use and becomes an empirical issue).  
Under this assumption the objective function is rewritten in the following form: 
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿[(𝜋1(𝑥1) − 𝑐1(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + (1 − 𝛿)[(𝜋2(𝑥2) − 𝑐2(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2] (3.18) 
s.t:  
CR1: 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑐1(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1  (3.19) 
CR2: 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑐2(𝑥2) + 𝑣𝑡2 (3.20) 
 
With such hypothesis, the cost recovery constraint (CRi) is satisfied with strict equality for 
both types, while the IC constraint is not needed (due to the full information assumption). By the 
assumption that the WA does not need to apply any incentive strategy to discriminate farmers, 
without loss of generality, this lead to a solution as the one in the section above: 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵) =
𝑐𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵)
1−𝑣
  (3.21) 
 
By solving equation (3.21), it is obtained the optimal share of irrigated area 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝐵. With 
respect to irrigated share to each type, from equations (3.19) and (3.20) (solved with strict 
equality) it is possible to determine the tariff levels for each farm type. Farm’s i marginal profit, 
marginal cost and transaction costs incurred to enforce the incentive pricing mechanism, 
contribute in conditioning the optimal level of the share of irrigated area. In the special case of 
𝑣 = 0, the optimal solution would be the one in which marginal profits equal marginal costs of 
increasing the share of irrigated land, as estimated in the first hypothesis.  
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In terms of performance and in comparison with the flat rate water pricing, the strategy 
under incentive water tariffs is expected to reach higher level of social benefits than the flat rate, 
while the share of irrigated land is lower, i.e. 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗ < 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅. The real difference from of two water 
pricing policies is hence an empirical issue. 
 
3.4.4. Fourth hypothesis, asymmetric information and different water cost 
functions  
In this hypothesis, it is supposed that the water regulator is not in a position to identify 
farm types. The regulator knows the characteristics of two types but does not know which farm 
is of what type. The regulator might encounter difficulties to discriminate farmers based on 
observable information and the solution of the first best might not always be applied or lead 
farmers to cheat about their type (adverse selection) with resulting low efficiency of regulation. 
Yet, the regulator can set a menu of contracts for incentivizing farmers to reveal their type based 
on the selection of the contract and still applying water tariffs related to the irrigated share to 
recover supply costs.  
In case of many farmers, the design of the menu of contracts is now an empirical issue. 
However the direction of the solution can be understood under the assumption of 2 farm types 
with well behaving profit functions (high productivity type 1 and low productivity type 2) and 
respecting Spence-Mirrlees condition for profit functions. The Spence-Mirrlees condition is 
assumed to hold by considering that farm type 1 has a steeper profit function than the farm type 
2 and the first derivative of profit function of types 1 is always greater than types 2, i.e. profit 
curves cross only once.  
In this problem, the mechanisms design is at the core of the study in such a way as to 
identify the means of implementing a given allocation of the irrigated share with respect to the 
tariff when the relevant information is missing and through the design of the contract menu.  
Under asymmetric information, if the WA is unable to observe farm types, there might be 
an incentive for farmers to declare themselves untruthfully in contract selection. This incentive 
may arise from the fact that one of the farmer may find profitable to select the contract designed 
for the other farmer. 
If farmers reveal themselves untruthfully, the first best solution is impossible to achieve 
because water tariffs are not connected to farms’ water profits and supply costs. In this case, the 
involvement of incentive constraints in the objective function become a necessary condition as a 
mean of forcing farmers to reveal their true type. Under this assumption, the objective function 
takes the following form:  
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿1[(𝜋1(𝑥1) − 𝑐1(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + 𝛿2[(𝜋2(𝑥2) − 𝑐2(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2]  
s.t: 
𝐶𝑅1: 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑐1(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1  (3.19) 
𝐶𝑅2: 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑐2(𝑥2) + 𝑣𝑡2 (3.20) 
𝐼𝐶1 𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 ≥ 𝜋1(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 (3.16) 
𝐼𝐶2 𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 ≥ 𝜋2(𝑥1) − 𝑡1 (3.17) 
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In following three different cases are analyzed: 
First: The properties of the profit and costs function of each type are assumed to be 𝜋1(𝑥1) >
𝜋2(𝑥2) and 𝑐1(𝑥1) > 𝑐2(𝑥2) and 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0, 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) < 0; 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0, 𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0. This condition 
shows that high productivity farmer, type 1, faces higher water cost compared with low 
productivity farmer, type 2. Differences of costs and profits can have different explanations but 
in this instance, farmers’ profit and cost depends on their characteristics.  
Here I evaluate the option whether the first best solution hold even under asymmetric 
information. Figure 3.2 illustrates a case when first best is incentive compactible at least for some 
combination of profit and cost functions, in particular due to the distance between the two cost 
functions, assuming profit functions as given. The 𝜋1 belong to the concave profit curve for farm 
type 1 which is steeper than that of type two 𝜋2 in each point. The cost line 𝑐1 belongs to types 1 
farmer and is greater than the types two 𝑐2. The red point A on the cost function of type’s 2 
indicate the first best solution for the type 2; the same applies to point B for the type 1. 
From the assumptions above, we expect that type 1 behave truthfully because he can get a 
higher profit (vertical distance between profit and cost function in point B) by paying higher 
tariffs 𝑡1 and benefit of the higher share of irrigation water allowed by this contract.  
If I draw the parallel profit function of type 1 farmer 𝜋1
′  (high productivity) passing through 
the point A (fist best solution of the farm type 2) is realized that farm type 1 is not interested in 
cheating option because the difference between cost that he faces is less than the profit that type 
one would gain by cheating. This is shown from the profit curve which passes above the red point 
B which is the solution designed for farm type 1 in the first best. The first best solution still hold 
and is the same with the one of equal costs introduced above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second: Lets still consider the properties of profit and cost function as 𝜋1(𝑥1) > 𝜋2(𝑥2) and 
𝑐1(𝑥1) > 𝑐2(𝑥2) and 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0, 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) < 0; 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0, 𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0 and have a case in which the 
difference of the cost function is larger than in the first assumption above. 
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Figure 3.2. First best solution under asymmetric information  
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For a large enough difference of cost functions (compared to the difference in the profit 
function), one farmer might have incentives to cheat hence creating a problem of adverse 
selection.  
The illustration of the solution under this assumption is supported by a graphical 
interpretation in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows that the difference of the cost function of two types 
is higher than the one considered in Figure 3.2. This difference is described by the distance of the 
parallel of the profit function  𝜋1
′ , drawn through the point A that indicate the first best solution 
of types 2, with the solution concerning indeed type 1 point B illustrated by the vertical bolded 
black line (i.e. from  𝜋1
′  to B). In this case, the first best solution is not incentive-compatible 
anymore because the farm type 1 finds profitable to mimic farm type 2 (i.e. type 1 choses the 
contract designed for type 2, as the combination of tariffs and irrigated share of type 2 ensures 
him a higher profit). Therefore, a second best policy needs to be design by the regulator using 
mechanisms design. 
With the purpose of inducing farmers to pay according to generated costs by irrigating, the 
regulator may be forced to implement some restriction criteria. “Worsening” the pricing 
condition to at least one farmer (the ones with lower marginal profitability) to dis-incentivize the 
selection of the wrong contract by the other farmer.  
The worsening condition under this assuming implies increasing water tariffs of the farm 
type 2 in the form of an additional payment (higher overall tariff compared to the first best). This 
increase is described by the vertical black bolded line illustrated by the distance from point A to 
A’. The tariff increase is at least up to the level that equalize the distance between 𝜋1
′  curve and 
red point B. Hereto if we draw another parallel of the profit curve of farm type 1 indicated by  𝜋1
′′ 
through the point belonging to the second best solution of type 2 (point A’) it is achieve that the 
cheating farmer, type 1, under second best is indifferent between contracts because cheating 
option will not make him better off. The second best contract solution is the one illustrated by the 
point B for farm type 1 (the same as in the first best) and point A’ for type 2 (different from the 
first best). 
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Figure 3.3. Second best solution under asymmetric information  
33 
 
 
Thus, in second best CR1 and IC1 bind with strict equality. Solving the objective function 
subject to binding constraints the following solution is achieved. Full derivation of theoretical 
results is provided in Appendix 3.4.4: 
 
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1
∗) =
𝑐1
′(𝑥1
∗)
1−𝑣
  (3.22) 
𝜋2
′ (𝑥2
∗) =  
𝑐2
′(𝑥2
∗)
1−𝑣
+
𝑣
1−𝑣
[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2
∗) − 𝜋2
′ (𝑥2
∗)]  (3.23) 
 
The solution indicates that the contract designed for the high productivity farm type is the 
same as in the first best, while the contract designed for the low productivity type has a tariff 
distortions which correspond to the distance between A and A’ in Figure 3.3. The level of tariff 
distortion is in the size of the value of the second part of RHS of equation (3.23).  
One might think why the regulator do not interfere by adjusting 𝑡1 ?  
The 𝑡1 cannot be altered; if the regulator decreases 𝑡1 to make IC1 or IC2 binding violates 
CR1 setting water tariffs less than costs. If the regulator increases 𝑡1, CR1 does not bind, becoming 
strictly greater than costs which actually this action (from Figure 3.3) further incentivize the type 
1 toward the cheating option. This occurs because for a higher water cost level, the type’s 1 net 
profit further decreases which drives him in the temptation of taking a cheating option.  
This analysis allow us to conclude that the fist best solution is achievable under asymmetric 
information only in cases where the distance of the costs function is too close between type such 
that do not motivate farmers to claim higher irrigation water costs otherwise the optimal solution 
would be the second best. Note however that this is true if transaction costs for monetary transfer 
are assumed to be zero, i.e. the additional payment asked to the farm type 2 is not costly for the 
regulator. This assumption is revised in the next case. 
Third: under this hypothesis, the properties of the profit and cost function are still 
considered as in the case above, but it is assumed that the water regulator faces positive (high) 
transaction costs linked to payments by farmers. As the transaction costs are set linear on tariffs, 
for increasing transaction costs level, the distance between costs function of farmers will further 
increase and the cost of monetary transfer for tariff will make costly to increase the payment for 
one of the farmers.  
The additional payment, due to transaction costs coming from the money transfer, would 
drive the WA to choose different incentive strategy to motivate farmers to select the right contract 
instead of continuing to increase the tariff until making it prohibitively expensive for the farmer 
1. Now the strategy is to propose also a decrease of the irrigated share which is illustrated in 
Figure 3.4.  
The solution under this assumption is illustrated by the black lines shaped from point A to 
A’ and the decrease of irrigated share of farm type 2 from 𝑥2
𝐹𝐵 to 𝑥2
𝑆𝐵. This move is associated 
with the establishment of a new level of water tariffs from 𝑡2
𝐹𝐵 to 𝑡2
𝑆𝐵 from type 2 and 𝑡2
𝐹𝐵 = 𝑡2
𝑆𝐵 for 
farm 1.  
The second best solution is determined at point B for farm type 1 and A’ for type 2. In 
addition the decrease of irrigated share of farm type 2 is associated with decrease of profits by 
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determined a new level of profit from 𝜋2
𝐹𝐵(𝑥2
𝐹𝐵) to 𝜋2
𝑆𝐵(𝑥2
𝑆𝐵) and for the type 1 the level of profits 
will be the same as his irrigated share is not altered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The main result of this analysis is that the shape of profit functions and the difference of the 
costs function between types are fundamental in determining the contracts solution. It may be 
concluded that considering different profit and cost function drive to major changes of the menu 
of contracts and boost the water regulator to use different strategies to incentivize farmers to 
behave truthfully. In addition if transaction costs are too high4 other potential trade-off may arise.   
                                                          
4 For high cost levels due to transaction costs and water supply costs farmers decrease the irrigated share in a greater 
size, leading to other contract solution designed by the WA. For example might be a case that binding constraints 
become CR1,2 and IC1. Solving the objective function (20) under the Kuhn-Tucker conditions analyzed in the appendix 
3.4.2 and adjusted with regard to the new form of cost function yield the following solutions (i.e. full solution is 
provided in Appendix 3.4.5): 
 
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1
𝑆𝐵) =
𝑐1
′ (𝑥1
𝑆𝐵)
(1−𝑣)
  (3.22) 
𝜋2
′ (𝑥2
𝑆𝐵) =
𝑐2
′(𝑥2
𝑆𝐵)
(1−𝑣)
+
𝜇
(1−𝛿)
[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2
𝑆𝐵) −
𝑐2
′(𝑥2
𝑆𝐵)
(1−𝑣)
] = 0  (3.24) 
 
The symbol 𝜇 in equation (3.24) indicates the multiplier achieved from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which is involved 
to enable the optimization problem to be solved. The multiplier measures the range of change of profits as the irrigated 
share changes. In addition this variable affects the tariff level set by the water regulator. As well, the value of the second 
part of the RHS of equation (3.24) influences the additional payment that type 2 suffers as a mean of avoiding the 
regulator’s risk of experiencing an adverse selection problem. If the RHS of equation (3.24) is less than marginal profit 
in first best solution, naturally the tariff for farm type 2 is higher than in first best, otherwise the opposite would happen. 
In this line, the additional contribution that farm type 2 will be depended from the value of the second part of the RHS 
of equation (3.24) and multiplier 𝜇.  
In addition the multiplier in (3.24) makes stronger the conflict between additional payment imposed to type 2 and the 
allocation efficiency, because of reduction of irrigated share of farm type 2 in second best solution.  
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Figure 3.4. Second best solution when overall costs are 
increased 
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In term of policy implication, the achievement of first best menu of contracts under asymmetric 
information indicate that the WA can discriminate farm types through menu of contracts without 
imposition of costly restrictions in the form of information rents to the societies expense and the 
designed policy might be imposed without decreasing its efficiency.  
However the analyze developed so far may be extended in several ways. A potential 
development of this hypothesis may be drawn by focusing: 
 when the 𝜋1(𝑥1) > 𝜋2(𝑥2) and 𝑐1(𝑥1) < 𝑐2(𝑥2) and 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0, 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) < 0; 𝑐𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) >
0, 𝑐𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0 and checking which farm pretend to behave as another type and under what 
condition 
 by involving a participation constraint and assessing its implication in the contract 
solution  
 by considering fixed and variable costs and evaluating other contract solutions and its 
effect on social benefits 
 by evaluating options under different settings of transaction costs and assessing its 
implications on the policy design 
 an assessment of cases under multi-dimensional of asymmetric information may sharply 
change the water regulators strategy to find optimal contract solutions 
All this points are not addressed in this thesis but may be considering for further 
development of this analyze.  
 
3.4.5 Effect of participation constraint 
Related to the above theoretical analysis in this section it is discussed the case in which the 
water regulator faces very high water supply costs, which inevitably are converted to a higher 
water tariffs for farmers. Under such hypothesis, heterogeneity among farm types (i.e. in term of 
water use or land use) permits for different water productivity among types. This assumption 
could potentially involve cases that farms returns by irrigation are nearly equal with their water 
tariffs, or tariffs may prevail over the farm’s profit.  
In such a setting, the participation constraint, PCi, guarantees that the tariff paid by farmers 
should not be greater than their profit received by irrigation.  
 
PCi:  𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) −  𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0                 i  n (25) 
 
                                                          
Another result from this analysis is that high level of water costs (with respect to transaction costs) influences the 
decrease of irrigated share of both farmers but the irrigated share of the type 2 is twice effected: first the farmer 
decreases the irrigated share because of the effect of high transaction costs; second due to interaction of the water 
regulator to dis-incentivize the type 1 from cheating action. This stands for the fact that above some threshold of overall 
water cost levels (supply costs and transaction costs), the marginal cost by increasing the water tariffs will be fare 
greater than the marginal benefit until becoming negative (the marginal benefit can be negative if the costs continue to 
increase and irrigated share stays unchanged). Hereto the WA cannot offer to the farmer a contract that secures a 
negative marginal profit, in this manner he interfere by decreasing the irrigated share. The decrease of irrigated share 
would be up to the level that high productivity farmers is not interested in cheating. 
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Note that if applied in this way, this constraint forces the model to reduce the tariff rather 
than dropping participants from irrigation, hence redistributing the tariff to another participant. 
Thus, I focus here on the WA’s strategy and his power to discriminate water tariffs between users.  
The modelling contract on variables can be generalised to other contract settings, in this 
case depends in affordability of water tariffs and profits by irrigation. Herein the farm’s ability to 
support water supply costs is different. For very high water tariffs, farms’ willingness to the 
contribution is reduced and the emergence of the conflict may arise, potentially hampering the 
implementation of the menu of contracts. If farmers are thought to be unlikely to cheat and 
obtaining positive benefit, then WA can set the optimal incentive strategy and discriminating 
water tariffs among water users as described above. If the opposite occurs, the strategies cannot 
be valid anymore. Because, to avoid the risk of incurring in adverse selection the WA cannot raise 
the tariff or propose larger decrease of irrigated share, because the farmer cannot afford the rise 
of water tariffs above the accepted threshold, otherwise his benefit by irrigation will be negative 
and more likely the farmer would rule himself out of irrigation that means the PCi is violated. 
This condition implies that, paradoxically, when the cost of water is particularly high, 
justifying the need to differentiate tariffs among users, the rent extraction needed to guarantee 
farmers discrimination might not be sustainable, failing to discriminate users by the means of 
pricing instruments.  
 
 Flat rates VS incentive tariffs 
The consideration made so far regarding pricing strategies in the absence of water metering 
reveals that the choice of the pricing method by water regulator is strictly contingent to the reality 
he face. The economic problem of the water regulator involves the maximization of the social 
welfare. This is because the social welfare is conditioned of the pricing system adopted by the 
regulator to recover supply costs.  
The flat rate water pricing is innovative in the designed form and perhaps scholars have 
overlooked its theoretical interpretation, possibly due to its economic inefficiencies. Although yet 
this tool is commonly used in irrigation districts because of less application complexities even 
that the water tariffs are equally set among farm types disregarding the water consumption.  
With the imposition of flat rates the regulator contributes in maximizing the social welfare 
simply by guaranteeing the supply of the service. However, the allocation of water resources 
among farm types is not efficient. That is, the marginal costs faced by the regulator to supply 
water are higher than the marginal benefits that farmers obtain by irrigating, with the results of 
wasting water resources and of increasing costs. The economic loss is caused by the inefficiency 
of the pricing criteria imposed by the water regulator to recover supply costs. 
Under incentive water pricing scheme farmers will stop irrigating when their marginal 
profit by irrigation equalize marginal costs, with respect to the farm type. In this reasoning when 
marginal profits equalize marginal costs make possible water conservation and lowering costs 
with respect to flat rates. The restriction effect in the second best would reflect lower level of net 
profit for the low productivity type. With the imposition of incentive tariffs, the regulator 
contributes in maximizing the social benefit not simply by satisfying farmers’ water requirements 
but also guaranteeing a rational allocation of costs among users and efficient use of water 
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resource. However, the imposition of incentive tariffs in the absence of water metering implies 
the occurrence of transaction costs. These costs possibly are explicit (i.e. enforcement costs) and 
implicit (i.e. rent extraction) and condition the practicality of incentive pricing mechanisms.  
Even though with the introduction of incentive pricing mechanisms by the regulator the 
economic condition of some farmer will become worse off (i.e. low productivity farm type) 
because of the need to solve any information failure. Certainly, the WA might still chose to apply 
the incentive pricing scheme if the overall benefit generated with the introduction of the new 
pricing criteria are higher than the benefit generated by the flat rate scheme. 
 
 Discussion  
The aim of the chapter is to provide a theoretical interpretation of incentive water pricing 
scheme with the focus of maximizing social benefits. The study considers a mechanism design 
with regard to adverse selection problem and assess the option choice between alternative 
mechanisms flat rates and incentive tariffs.  
The developed incentive-pricing model is similar with Viaggi et al. (2010) and Arguendas 
and van Soest, (2011) but the mechanism design differ in a conceived form and taken 
assumptions.  
Regarding incentive pricing strategy, its development and implementation regularly is 
highlighted by the WFD for all member states of EU and frequently are proposed as a strategic 
tool for water policy (European Commission, 2000; European Commission, 2012; Giannakisa et 
al, 2016; Exposito and Berbel, 2016 and Lika et al., 2016). The presence of a heterogeneous 
population of farms managing water resources with common rules partially driven by the 
progressive enforcement of the WFD principles calls for the need of strategy developments 
towards incentive oriented water pricing systems, including cases where water is unmetered 
(Viaggi et al., 2010). In this perspective and refereed to the WFD (Article 9) the research focus on 
the introduction of the incentive water pricing mechanism when water is served through surface 
irrigation networks by means of modulating water tariffs with the amount of water use.  
Despite the wide suggestions from the EU for the implementation of incentive strategies 
and tariff differentiation among farms in irrigated agriculture, yet these tools are not rigorously 
applied in most of the EU regions. Tariff differentiation makes sense if the regulator is supplying 
water to farmers which are heterogeneous in water uses. The degree of farm heterogeneity in 
water use and land use is an important implication while designing water-pricing schemes for 
irrigated agriculture. Frequently condition the feasibility of incentive water pricing and often 
generates misleading incentives in water use for irrigation. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates cases that farmers are characterized by different degree of 
heterogeneity of water use and land use. The plotted rectangular in the figure displays different 
combinations of the level of heterogeneity among farm types and implies several implications for 
the WA for policy design option:   
Case 1: If the community of farmers are located downright of the figure (farm types have 
high heterogeneity of water use and low heterogeneity of the irrigated share) the WA will face 
the adverse selection problem. This implies a distortion of the variables of the contract for at least 
one of the farm types. Under this condition a second best solution is achieved. This option is 
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analysed previously where the optimal static incentive tariffs second best is compared with the 
first best one.  
Case 2: For lower level of heterogeneity of water use and land use (down left), the 
regulator’s supply costs among farm types are similar and the need to discriminate tariffs among 
farm types may not be economically efficient.  
 Case 3: When the community of farmers is located in up left rectangular, the regulator face 
farmers with high degree of heterogeneity in land use and less heterogeneous in water use. The 
fact that farmers are not heterogeneous in land uses and in water use does not justify any tariffs 
differentiation. With such hypothesis, the regulator can simply apply a flat rate or, better, a tariff 
proportional to the irrigated area, without applying more complex incentive pricing strategy. 
 Case 4: If the community of farmers is located in the up right of the figure (high degree of 
heterogeneity of water use and land use) the applicability incentive pricing strategy is limited 
mainly by two reasons: a) the WA face very diverse water supply costs among farm types and b) 
the WA face very high transaction costs for policy implementation. Both aspects impede 
implementation of incentive water pricing scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusions 
The provision of water resource through open canals and the potential inefficiencies in its 
use by farmers under flat rate pricing motivates the study for the design of alternative pricing 
strategies that provide incentives for rational use. The study considers a principal agent model 
which allow the water regulator to develop strategies under full information and hidden 
information.  
Incentive water tariffs and tariff differentiation are auspicious to meet the WFD 
requirements. However its application not always is favoured because of high level of transaction 
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costs (i.e. costs of implementing the enforcement policies and costs arriving from information 
asymmetries) which impedes the application of this mechanisms consequently uniform pricing 
mechanisms are established by water regulators.   
Transaction costs significantly affect water regulators mechanisms for imposing a pricing 
criterion until questioning the implementation of incentive pricing instrument. And with regard 
to surface irrigation networks, the presence of transaction costs become more evident. In addition 
costs arising from information asymmetries are fundamental in policy design. For example in 
absence of water metering the water regulator often is unable to propose a policy at no 
information rent, expect the special case when the water regulator face a group of farmer with 
the same or similar water cost function or incentive strategies through contracts differentiation is 
not necessary. This way, the implementation of mechanism design under hidden informant and 
its efficiency rely on the regulator’s ability to elicit farms’ private information at low social cost. 
In this respect while designing incentive mechanisms must be considered trade-offs 
between the costs of revealing hidden information and benefits from applying mechanisms.  
Indeed, with regard to above examined cases, the implementation of incentive tariffs in the 
absence of water metering is strongly affected by composition of farm types surrounding the 
irrigation network. It is realized that farms’ characteristic, level of heterogeneity, profit and cost 
functions are crucial to the path of developed mechanism.  
In case when farmers are less heterogeneous with regard to irrigated share and highly 
heterogonous on water use function the adverse selection problem occurs. This obstacle is 
avoided by imposing some restriction criteria to one of frames. This restricted conditions in 
economic term would be the additional cost that farmers pay as a mean of shrinking the difference 
between farms water cost in order to not allow them falling in the temptation of adverse selection. 
This obstacle limits the power of the WA to implement a pricing instrument in a way that tariffs 
reflect the true cost of water.  
Therefore, heterogeneity among farm types is another condition that has a profound impact 
on the water regulator’s decision from implementing one policy to another because of facing 
diverse water supply costs of the provision of the resource to a group of frames with divers 
characteristics.   
In doing so, it is necessary to incorporate in future policies new techniques and water 
pricing scheme that guarantee the maximization of social welfare with regard to existing 
instruments in the way to accomplish the WFD principles. The WFD claim to meet these 
principles and particularly should not be overlooked, especially when beneficiaries are 
heterogeneous in water uses.  
In this viewpoint, the applied method can be exploited in different perspectives. For 
instance developing models in the empirical contest to achieve a more evident result coming from 
real case irrigation districts in order to authenticate the functionality of models. In addition 
another treatment can be in the environments when the WA faces together the problem of adverse 
selection and moral hazards, or to identify conditions explaining the reason why the WA’s pricing 
strategies might appear inconsistent with WFD principles in the absence of water metering. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Pricing Unmetered Irrigation Water under Asymmetric 
Information and Full cost Recovery 
Published paper5 
 Objective 
The objective of this study is to design an efficient (social welfare maximizing) pricing 
scheme in conditions of unmetered water, using empirical information from a region in Albania. 
This objective was reached by using a mechanism design approach that makes it possible to 
identify a menu of contracts discriminating among farmers and is implemented assuming that 
the WUA seeks to motivate farmers to use the optimal amount of water in a context of asymmetric 
information. 
The main originality of the study rests in combining a rather recent and unexplored field of 
investigation (asymmetric information in water pricing) and a context (Albania) in which water 
use is still insufficiently investigated. As such, the study is intended to be exploratory in nature, 
and hence suitable to prepare the background for further applications and improved modelling 
approaches in other areas with similar conditions. 
Chapter is divided into six sections. Subsequently is described the approach and method 
used, as well as the selected model. The chapter continues with the introduction of case study 
and presents an overview of the current situation with regard to irrigation in a selected area of 
Albania and the country as a whole. Then I show model implementation and the identification of 
a menu of contracts under asymmetric information. In addition the study extend to the 
interpretation of achieved results. The chapter ends by offering both a discussion and conclusions 
highlighting how contract theory provides meaningful guidelines for reforming the water pricing 
system. 
 
 Materials and methods 
This research considers a menu of contracts for water charging in an irrigated area. The 
menu of contracts was compared with flat rate payments, since the flat rate payment is, at present, 
the only scheme being implemented in the case study area. The menu of contracts is described in 
the form of a first and a second best solution, in order to consider both the best feasible case 
(second best) and the best theoretical solution in case of perfect information. The method is based 
on the application of a menu of contracts as an instrument for the assessment of possible 
improvements in water pricing in conditions of asymmetric information regarding water use by 
farmers, and follows the method implemented by a recent paper (Viagg et al., 2010). 
                                                          
5This is a published version of the following article: Lika, A.; Galioto, F.; Scardigno, A.; Zdruli, P.; Viaggi, D. Pricing 
unmetered irrigation water under asymmetric information and full cost recovery. Water 2016, 8, 596 
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In order to identify the optimal contract scheme, a mechanism design approach was 
implemented. The purpose of this approach was to identify the appropriate design for a menu of 
contracts identified by a payment 𝑝𝑖 and a share of irrigated area 𝑞𝑖 (related to water use) that is 
able to provide incentives towards (more) efficient water use. On the contrary, in the flat rate case, 
the payment is determined by the irrigable area and the farmer decides how much land to irrigate 
independent from the payment (Viagg et al., 2010). 
Though rather simplified in this application, the model represents, in essence, a theoretical 
approach to understanding contractual relationships between the principal and the agent in the 
case of water resources. The principal is the person who delegates tasks or the party who offers 
the contract to the agent. The agent is the person who can either take the contract, to perform a 
task on behalf of the principal or having implications for the principal’s objective function, or 
leave it. 
In this context, asymmetric information is a situation in which different knowledge related 
to water consumption could favour one party as opposed to another. Under perfect information, 
the regulator knows all the needed information and can set the optimal water quota for each 
farmer (and set the related price individually). Under asymmetric information, the regulator does 
not have all of the required information about the farm that would allow this (Galioto et al., 2013, 
Johansson et al., 2002; Viaggi et al., 2010; Smith and Tsur, 1997; Tsur et al., 2000). 
In this regards, asymmetric information can appear in three forms: as moral hazard, when 
the agent can take an action unobserved by the principal; adverse selection when the agent has 
some private knowledge about his cost and/or benefit that is unknown to the principal; and no 
verifiability, which occurs when the principal and agent share, ex post, the same information, but 
by law no third party can observe this information (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002). In the case studied in this paper, asymmetric information is considered in the 
form of adverse selection only. 
A menu of contracts is created as the combination of a payment 𝑝𝑖 with respect to allowed 
share of irrigated area qi. By setting the menu, the regulator has the objective to maximize the 
social benefit z(qi) represented by the sum over i farm’s profit minus the cost of water provision 
as defined in equation (1), and with i = 1,.. n representing the different farm types. Without loss 
of generality, it is assumed a Leontief technology for all the production factors concurring in 
generating the farms profit 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) and this is expressed as a function of the share of irrigated area 
qi for each farm type i.  
Farm profits are calculated by considering farms’ revenue excluding all costs except for the 
payment for irrigation water. Revenue is estimated by assessing the yield of agricultural crops 
cultivated in a given area (kg/ha) multiplied with market price of each crop in (ALL/Kg) is found 
the revenue (All/ha) for each crop in a given hectare. The sum of revenue of each crop per hectare 
yield the total revenue per hectare. Now in order to estimate farms profit with respect to irrigated 
share, from total revenue is subtracted the revenue of non irrigated crop and all possible costa 
needed for crop production for each farm type. 
The cost is given by 𝑐𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖). 𝑤𝑖 is the farm’s water use function and c is the unit cost of 
water given in €/m3 and assumed as not changing with the amount of water used. The total cost 
of water is dependent on the estimated amount of water demand by each farm type (m3/ha) and 
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is given in unitary terms €/ha (i.e. further explanation for the estimation of profits and costs are 
provide in the model implementation section). 
The regulator is also assumed to have the obligation of cost recovery, which means that the 
payments (either p or pi) need to cover the cost of water provision. Cost recovery can be achieved 
by individual farms in the case of full information (first best), while it can be achieved only on 
the aggregate in case of asymmetric information. The concept of full cost recovery in its wider 
form is better tackled by (Toan, 2016; and Rogers et al., 1998). 
The farm’s net profit Π(𝑞𝑖) is achieved as the difference between the farm’s profit and the 
associated payment (pi) for water provision. The payment can, in fact, be either a flat rate, 
homogenous across farms (p), or differentiated by farm (pi). Without loss of generality, for 
simplification, I assume homogenous farm size equal to 1. 
Assuming the first best conditions (full information), the water regulator seeks to set the 
water price in such a way as to maximize social benefits (as given in equation (4.1) below), subject 
to the cost recovery constraints provided in equation (2). 
 
max 𝑧(𝑞𝑖) = ∑[𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖)]
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4.1) 
FCRi: 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑐𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖)  𝑖  𝑛 (4.2) 
 
The best result from a social point of view is achieved where the conditions of equation (4.3) are 
met: 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖
∗) = 𝑐𝑤𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖
∗)  𝑖  𝑛 (4.3) 
 
This is the first best solution corresponding to the level of the share of irrigated area for 
which the marginal profit equalizes the marginal cost of water for society. Equation (4.2) specifies 
that the full cost recovery principle of the WFD must be met by society as a whole and also by 
individual farms. In the problem, equation (4.2) is satisfied with strict equality as there is no 
reason to increase the price of water above the supply costs for society. Equation (4.3) defines the 
optimal share of irrigated area for each farm type 𝑞𝑖
∗. 
It is worth noting that if metering had been possible, the same result would have been 
achieved by imposing a volumetric charge equal to c and this would have corresponded to the 
marginal profit of water use (expressing both water and profit as a function of the share of 
irrigated area being irrigated): 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖
∗)
𝑤𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖
∗)
= 𝑐 (4.4) 
 
The opposite situation is given by the flat rate payment, in which the regulator cannot 
impose the share of irrigated area, but only ask for a flat payment p per unit of irrigable area. Each 
43 
 
farmer contributing for the provision of water with a flat rate payment will choose to irrigate a 
share of area that will allow him to maximize profits: 
 
max Π𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) −  𝑝, (4.5) 
 
The maximization problem of equation (4.5) with respect to the share of irrigated area 𝑞𝑖 
leads to the optimal level of irrigated area, which is the level for which marginal profits equal 
zero: 
 
𝜋𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖
𝐹𝑅) = 0 (4.6) 
The level of the flat rate payment does not affect farm choices, as farmers irrigate the same 
share of irrigated area regardless of the level of the tariff. On the other hand, the optimal share of 
irrigated area is different across farms depending on the farm’s i profit function.  
The level of social benefits achieved will be given by Equation (4.1), with 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖
𝐹𝑅, while 
the optimal level of the payment will be derived by the total cost: 
 
𝑝𝐹𝑅 =
∑ 𝑐𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖
𝐹𝑅)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
 (4.7) 
 
If the price of water is greater than zero, 𝑐 > 0, then, the share of irrigated area under the 
flat rate scenario will be greater than the share of irrigated area under the first best pricing 
scenario (i.e., 𝑞𝑖
𝐹𝑅 > 𝑞𝑖
∗ for all farms). The total social benefit will be lower than in the first best 
scenario, as the share of irrigated area will be higher than the social optimum. The total amount 
of payments, on the contrary, will be higher, as the overall amount of water used is higher. The 
payment for individual farmers may be lower or higher than in the first best scenario depending 
on whether the individual farm is below or above the average water consumption. 
I now turn to the third option, which assumes that the water provider does not have 
complete information about each farm type. More specifically, the provider knows the existing 
farm types, but is unable to observe each farm type, which could give an incentive for farmers to 
misrepresent themselves. Under these conditions, the principal cannot assign the optimal 
contract type to each farm. However, it can still design a menu of contracts that would induce 
farmers to reveal their type through the choice of the contract. This, however, can entail an 
information rent for some farmers. 
The problem can be now represented as a maximization of equation (4.1), subject to the 
following constraints: 
 
PCi: 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0  𝑖  𝑛 
ICi: 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖′) − 𝑝𝑖′   𝑖  𝑛 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖′ 
FCRi: 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖)  𝑖  𝑛 
(4.8) 
 
The participation constraint PCi guarantees that it is not possible to ask farmers for more 
money than the profit generated from the water provided. The incentive constraint ICi guarantees 
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that each farmer will have an incentive to choose the type of contract that is designed for him, 
when profit minus cost of water for farm type i is higher than the profit of farm type i’ which uses 
the share of irrigated area 𝑞𝑖′  and pays the price for water as another farm type that is different 
from i, (i.e., i’). Finally, the Full Cost Recovery FCRi constraint guarantees that the cost of water 
provision is completely paid by each farm type, since the price of water for farm type i should be 
higher or equal to the cost of water used, taking into account the water use expressed as a function 
of 𝑞𝑖. Full cost recovery in this paper assumes that the WUA is seeking to recover operation and 
maintenance costs for supplying water to the irrigation network. The total cost of water is 
dependent on the estimated amount of water demand for each farm type (m3/ha). Typical 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs in the region include payment to water masters to clean 
and maintain the secondary canals, as well as the managing and distribution of water to tertiary 
canals to facilitate the withdrawal by farmers. The cost of investment and the primary canals to 
divert water are not under the WUA responsibility and are not considered in this paper. The state 
provides assistance to cover the investment and maintenance of primary canals and the diverting 
water from reservoir to irrigation network.  
The maximization problem above, expressing the formulation of the menu of contracts 
under asymmetric information, does not imply a consistent theoretical solution unless rather 
restrictive hypotheses are imposed. In this case, I leave to the empirical application to identify the 
numerical solution able to modulate the payment and share of irrigated area in such a way as to 
render the farmer indifferent to his or her contract type and to mimicking others. Further 
illustration is provided in the results section. The above-illustrated models were implemented 
using GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System), well know optimization software. 
 
 The case study 
Community irrigation management has a long tradition in Albania. Yet during the 
centralized socialist system from 1945 to 1990, everything formally belonged to the state. It is 
worth noting that during this period the country invested heavily in irrigation, drainage, 
reclamation, and land improvement projects, hence increasing the irrigated area to about 50% of 
the total agricultural land. The post-communist period was characterised by the dismantlement 
of the previous system and an increase in farmers’ distrust toward the central government. At 
this time, land privatization started rapidly in Albania; the result of which was the creation of 
more than 400,000 small farms with an average size of about 1.4 ha (Ismaili, 2009). 
After 1991 the irrigation network was shattered almost everywhere in the country, and a 
huge share of firmly irrigated land became non-irrigated due to the destruction of many channels 
and water distribution systems. The small private farms with insufficient land in many cases have 
fundamentally changed the character of agriculture, and the role of irrigation and their needs 
with respect to irrigation have not been clearly communicated. Therefore, the Water Enterprises 
were not able to better classify irrigated and non-irrigated area and likely failed to distribute 
water to a relevant share of small farms. The Government of Albania adopted the policy to 
transfer the operational responsibilities of secondary irrigation canals to water users through 
Water Users Associations (WUAs), with the operation and maintenance of the primary canals 
and irrigation reservoirs under the responsibility of the state-owned Water Enterprises. 
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The establishment of WUAs was in accordance with Law No. 9860 of 2008, later amended 
and supplemented by Law No. 8518 of 1999 regulating irrigation and drainage. This law 
establishes a legal framework for creating and operating associations of water users. Moreover, 
the law defines the structure and organisation of these associations. 
The WUA are unions of farmers, operating and maintaining the irrigation distribution 
facilities transferred to them for this use, and were expected to improve the cost recovery process 
and develop a more effective water payment system in the long run. The WUAs are responsible 
for distributing water among their members and collecting water charges; farmers in the area pay 
for irrigation water provided by a WUA. 
The WUA of Çukas, located in the Commune of Lushnja, in central Albania, was selected 
for the case study and is used as a prototype to discuss the operational methods for improving 
the performance of irrigation water charges throughout the country. The WUA covers a total area 
of 5630 ha, out of which the irrigated area accounts for 4405 ha and there are 3218 farmers. The 
main cultivated crops are: winter wheat, maize, alfalfa, vegetables, beans, greenhouse vegetables, 
and grapes. The area has an abundance of water, most of which is from open canals, while in 
recent years additional infrastructures have begun to use pressurized pipes. Even though the 
water regimes differ, the entire area is characterised by a flat rate pricing system. 
The application of water tariffs is uncomplicated, but collection and water management is 
not without challenges. The water payments are based on the area of land irrigated, independent 
of the amount of water used, and are set as a flat rate water tariff in ALL/ha (ALL is Albanian 
currency, which in Albanian is called LEK), (i.e., farmers also pay a yearly fee independent from 
irrigated area for maintenance of irrigation and the drainage system). Payments are usually made 
in advance such that water provider can estimate the overall irrigated area as farmers pay and 
subscribe for irrigated hectare (there are cases in which they do not pay, but irrigate during the 
season, this could constitute another topic for research and discussion). Accordingly, by receiving 
payments in advance they are not able to link the water payments with demand and cannot 
modulate advance payments with water consumption in the season. Water providers estimate 
only the irrigated hectares and know the crop cultivation in area during the irrigation season. 
Moreover, there is a conflict between upstream and downstream irrigators in the region, and for 
this reason, downstream farmers may lack water for irrigation in the peak period. 
Given this situation, and knowing that water is unmetered in the case study, for simplicity, 
I considered the payment method as a fixed payment (flat rate) for the irrigated area. In such 
circumstances, it was not possible to suggest water payments based on water metering. 
Accordingly, I propose a scheme based on a menu of contracts so as to link the water payments 
with corresponding water consumed for the share of irrigated area. 
 
 Model implementation 
The implementation of the above-mentioned models require several different farm types to 
be taken into consideration. In Table 4.1 I present four farm types and illustrate the category that 
each type belongs to in terms of total land for each type, number of farmers in each type, available 
land, agricultural land, and the average farm size. According to the data collected through 
interviews with members of the WUA, I was able to identify the number of different cultivated 
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crops in very fragmented plots, provided as a percentage with respect to the overall cultivated 
area within the type. Moreover, the level of water consumption of specific cultivated crops was 
identified for each type and the agricultural production value of each crop for each farm type 
(quantity produced multiplied by the market price of the product). The farms’ profits shown in 
the table represent the difference of the profit under an irrigation regime with non-irrigation. In 
addition, the table highlights that farm types 1 and 2 have mixed cultivated crops with the highest 
level of water consumption, in total, per hectare compared with types 3 and 4, which gives them 
in return the highest level of yield. Furthermore, the size of the cultivated area of the same crop 
over types is different and sometimes with different levels of production values, even though 
farmers are approximately applying the same amount of water. This is plausible as in the region 
irrigation practices are quite standardized for crop typologies, while other factors, such as land 
quality, might differ considerably within the region.  
 
Table 4.1. Main characteristics of farm types 
Category 
Farm Type 1 
Category 
Farm Type 2 
0–1 Ha 1–2 Ha 
No. of farmers 662 No. of farmers 1495 
Available land 377 Available land 2289 
Agricultural land 307 Agricultural land 2122 
Average farm 
size 
0.46 Average farm size 1.42 
Crops 
Cultivated 
% 
Water 
Use 
m3/ha 
Profit 
€/ha 
Crops 
Cultivated 
% 
Water 
Use 
m3/ha 
Profit 
€/ha 
Cucumbers 12 4000 26,785.71 Tomatoes 2 4000 21,428.57 
Beans 9 2400 1499.97 Vegetables 5 2800 3750.00 
Maize 32 3600 1166.67 Vineyard 2 600 1957.14 
Alfalfa 19 2400 590.91 Maize 14 3600 1333.3 
Wheat 28   Alfalfa 54 1200 624.68 
    Wheat 24  - 
Category 
Farm Type 3 
Category 
Farm Type 4 
2–3 Ha >3 Ha 
No of farmers 828 No. of farmers 233 
Available land 1999 Available land 965 
Agricultural land 1292 Agricultural land 684 
Average farm 
size 
1.56 Average farm size 2.94 
Crops 
Cultivated 
% 
Water 
Use 
m3/ha 
Profit 
€/ha 
Crops  
Cultivated  
%  
Water 
Use 
m3/ha 
Profit 
€/ha 
Vegetables 16 2,800 4017.86 Vegetables 6 2800 4821.43 
Vineyard 16 600 2935.71 Vineyard 6 600 3914.29 
Maize 18 3600 1666.67 Maize 6 3600 1833.33 
Alfalfa 35 1200 725.97 Alfalfa 79 1200 759.74 
Wheat 15 0  Wheat 3 0  
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Table 4.2 illustrates the profit function and the water cost function according to each farm 
type. The profit function of each farm type 𝑦𝑖 = −𝑎𝑖𝑞𝑖
2 + 𝑏𝑖𝑞𝑖, is obtained by regressing the 
differences of the profit obtained for each irrigated crop and the profit obtained for not irrigated 
crops with respect to the share of irrigated area.  
The profit function is concave and the quadratic function is taken to better adapt the shape 
of the empirical water production functions that are used in many cases in the field of agricultural 
economics. 𝑦𝑖 represents the profit of the farm based on the observed crop mix, with respect to 
the share of irrigated area on total, and for each farm type. The (a, b) coefficients are the 
coefficients obtained by regressing the achieved profit with respect to the share of irrigated area. 
It is worth noting that the profit function is taken as a farm’s revenue from cultivation minus 
expenses for seed or plants, fertilizer, pesticides, and tilling, while costs such as labour and costs 
of irrigation are not subtracted. The revenue is estimated by considering the yield of each crop 
cultivated in a given area, multiplying with the respective market price of each crop (ALL/kg).  
Based on estimated crop water consumption and unit water cost with respect to each farm 
type, I estimate the cost of water for each crop, which leads to an estimation of the total cost of 
the overall area cultivated and irrigated for each specific farm type. The computation of the cost 
function is adjusted and made based on a consideration of the unit cost of 0.06 €/m3. This 
represents the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The O&M costs are associated with the 
supply system from the secondary canals into the farm. Typical O&M costs, in the region, include 
payment to water masters to clean and maintain the secondary canals, as well as the managing 
and distributing of water to tertiary canals to facilitate the withdrawal by farmers. A negative 
cost function is achieved due to the fact that, as following the sequence of crops, their shape is an 
empirical issue and does not represent the theoretical increasing marginal function.  
 
Table 4.2. Profit function and cost function with respect to share of irrigated area (𝑞𝑖). 
Functions Farm 1 Farm 2 Farm 3 Farm 4 
Profit 
function 
y = −9973q2 + 
14293q 
y = −5063q2 + 
7617.6q 
y = −2094q2 + 
3809.8q 
y = −1787q2 + 
3572.2q 
Cost 
function 
y = −103q2 + 234q y = −88q2 + 170q y = −68q2 + 161q y = −59q2 + 141q 
 
Incorporating in the model the profit and cost function taken from Table 4.2, I was able to 
calibrate the models presented overhead with the actual data of the area. 
 
 Results 
The results of the simulation for the three different pricing schemes are reported in Table 
4.3. Results are expressed in terms of policy parameters (payments and share of irrigated area), 
profits, net profits, and social net benefit. 
The flat rate option shows a social benefit 𝑧(𝑞𝑖) is inferior compared with both first and 
second best options, while the farm’s profit is higher. The net benefit of farm type 1 is higher in 
the flat rate case. This happens because the farmer may cultivate high water consumption crops 
and benefit from the fact that payments are set equally among types. This mechanism would 
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favour some farmers that cultivate high water consumption crops and penalize others that 
consume water in smaller amounts but are forced to pay the same amount as the others. 
Nevertheless, the overall water payments are higher on average in the flat rate case (as they have 
higher irrigation shares), compared with first best option.  
 
Table 4.3. Flat rate, first best, and second best water payment scheme. 
Flat Rate 
Farm Types 𝒒𝒊  (%) 𝒑𝒊 (€/ha) 𝝅𝒊(𝒑𝒊) (€/ha) 𝚷𝒊(𝒒𝒊)  (€/ha) 𝐳(𝒒𝒊) (€/ha) 
Farm 1 0.717 91.262 5121.1 5029.811 
11,138.74 
Farm 2 0.752 91.262 2864.8 2773.575 
Farm 3 0.91 91.262 1732.9 1641.614 
Farm 4 0.999 91.262 1785.0 1693.738 
First Best 
Farm Types 𝒒𝒊  (%) 𝒑𝒊 (€/ha) 𝝅𝒊(𝒑𝒊) (€/ha) 𝚷𝒊(𝒒𝒊)  (€/ha) 𝐳(𝒒𝒊) (€/ha) 
Farm 1 0.712 114.41 5120.90 5006.47 
11,139.24 
Farm 2 0.748 77.94 2864.76 2786.82 
Farm 3 0.9 89.84 1732.70 1642.86 
Farm 4 0.993 81.83 1784.90 1703.09 
Second Best 
Farm Types 𝒒𝒊 (%) 𝒑𝒊 (€/ha) 𝝅𝒊(𝒑𝒊) (€/ha) 𝚷𝒊(𝒒𝒊)  (€/ha) 𝐳(𝒒𝒊) (€/ha) 
Farm 1 0.712 114.41 5121.1 5006.47 
11,139.24 
Farm 2 0.748 104.48 2864.8 2760.28 
Farm 3 0.9 89.84 1732.9 1642.86 
Farm 4 0.993 81.83 1785.0 1703.09 
 
Looking carefully at the mechanisms behind the results of the second best menu of 
contracts, it appears that the participation constraints are never binding, the cost recovery 
constraints are binding for farm types 1, 3, and 4, while the incentive constraint is binding for 
farm type 1 only. This means that in the second best menu of contracts, the water regulator can 
adopt a strategy that offers farmers the opportunity to irrigate the optimal share of irrigated area. 
This indeed happens for farm types 2, 3, and 4, all of which will opt for the contract targeted to 
their type. The opposite holds for farm type 1, which has the highest water payment, and who 
would try to misrepresent himself by mimicking farm type 2. Therefore, to make farm type 1 
indifferent to the contract that belongs to him and the contract designed for another farm type, 
an increase in the water payment for farm type 2 is made, which is illustrated in Table 4.3, second 
best solution. Other farmers, namely types 1, 3, and 4 pay equal as in the first best solution 
(considering other options, the range of farmers that cheat during the contract selection may 
change (i.e. for different profits and costs)). The solution reached shows that all farm types still 
irrigate up to the level that marginal profit equalizes the marginal cost of supplying water (as 
seen in equation (3)), which means that there are no additional supply water costs for the water 
provider and the same water cost level is incurred. However, the water payment differs at least 
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for farm type 2. This increase in farm type 2’s water payment does not affect the social benefit, 
which will be the same as in the first best solution. Nevertheless, this causes a decrease in his net 
profit, which is lower compared with first best solution Π2(𝑞2
𝐹𝐵) ≥ Π2(𝑞2
𝑆𝐵) (the  Π2(𝑞2
𝐹𝐵)  and 
Π2(𝑞2
𝑆𝐵) indicate the farm type 2’s net profit in the first and second best menu of contracts. This 
result is connected to the assumption that the higher payment in itself has no additional social 
cost; otherwise a need for additional incentive payments would also be accompanied by a change 
in optimal share of irrigated areas. 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out to evaluate farms’ behaviour under an increase in water 
costs (Table 4.4 and Figures 4.1–4.4). I assume water cost levels from 0.00 €/m3 to 1.20 €/m3, in 
spite of the fact that the upper levels are rather unrealistic in the area. In this way, I show potential 
real life results in the range below 0.50 €/m3 (considering a potential future increase of water costs 
also in a context of climate change and higher probability of water shortages even in water-rich 
areas), while the water cost levels above 0.50 €/m3, rather far from real-life values, are used as a 
more academic exercise in order to better show the functionality of the models proposed and to 
highlight the role of asymmetric information, as well as to clearly show the difference between 
the first best and second best option.  
As expected, the increasing level of water costs results in an increase in water payments for 
farmers and a decrease in the farm’s net profit. Under a flat rate scheme, where this higher cost 
is not transferred to farmers, the demand for irrigation water remains at the optimal level when 
the water costs increase, but there is an increase in water payments for farmers. 
Under the menu of contracts option, the regulator responds to the higher water costs by 
reducing the share of irrigated area allowed in the contracts, which leads to a reduction in water 
use. Also under the menu of contracts, the water payment increases as the water cost increases, 
but shrinking the share of irrigated area is associated with diminishing compensation payment 
(which is reasonably associated to a decreased irrigation share). Table 4.4 illustrates the 
corresponding social benefit for each pricing scheme for different water cost levels. Over the 
variation of water cost levels, the total social benefit decreases. With water costs equal to zero, the 
three pricing schemes are equivalent. By increasing water costs, a difference becomes evident 
between flat rate and the other two options, and this difference becomes greater as the water cost 
increases. This is because the flat rate option does not transfer the costs to the farmers. 
 
Table 4.4. Range of social benefits as water costs increase z(𝑞𝑖). 
Water Cost Flat Rate First Best  Second Best 
€/m3 (€/ha) (€/ha) (€/ha) 
1.20 4202.79 4616.93 4476.52 
1.08 4932.89 5229.12 5019.25 
0.96 5662.99 5873.94 5686.55 
0.84 6393.09 6540.81 6536.44 
0.72 7123.19 7223.55 7219.44 
0.60 7853.29 7918.29 7918.29 
0.48 8583.39 8622.45 8622.45 
0.36 9313.49 9334.24 9334.24 
0.24 10,043.59 10,052.33 10,052.33 
0.12 10,773.69 10,775.77 10,775.77 
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0.00 11,503.79 11,503.79 11,503.79 
 
Concerning now the difference of social benefit between the first best and second best, this 
occurred due to the fact that for some water cost levels, in the second best solution, farmers 
decrease the share of irrigated area more than in the first best, which corresponds to a lower level 
of social benefit. In addition, for water cost level above 0.60 €/m3, the difference becomes more 
evident. 
Figure 4.1, given below, illustrates the range of the share of the irrigated area as the water 
cost increases on the primary axes, and the trend of the social benefit on the secondary axes for 
each pricing option. The term IRR (i.e., IRR-Flat Rate) on the table stands for the irrigated share 
provided as averages across farms, and SB stands for social benefit. Under flat rate of water 
pricing option (green line), farmers do not decrease the share of irrigated area for the fact that 
their payments are not directly linked with the amount of water used. Under the menu of 
contracts, this is different: farmers decrease the share of irrigated area as the water cost increases. 
Under the first best option, the decrease of the irrigated share varies in the range 0%–15% while, 
under second best, farmers decrease the irrigated share even more, in the range 0%–52%. The 
decrease of the share of the irrigated area is associated with decreases of the farms’ profits. 
Figure 4.1 also provides the trend of the social benefit under different water pricing options; 
as expected, the social benefit decreases as the water cost increases in all cases. However, in the 
first part up to 0.6 €/m3, the range of decrease of the social benefit appears to be in the same 
portion for all pricing options (actually, it differs by a very small amount); above 0.60 €/m3 the 
change starts to be more evident. This occurs due to the fact that up to a water cost level of 0.60 
€/m3 farmers do not decrease the irrigated share as much, which does not reflect the decrease of 
the social benefit; above 0.60 €/m3 the differences in decreasing the social benefit become more 
distinguishable. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. The IRR-Flat Rate, IRR-First Best, and IRR-Second Best curves illustrate the trend of 
the share of irrigated area. The SB-Flat Rate, SB-First Best, and SB-Second Best curves illustrate 
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the trend of the social benefit considering three water pricing scenarios, as the water cost 
increases. IRR, irrigated share provided as averages across farms; SB, social benefit. 
A graphical illustration is provided in Figures 4.2–4.4 to show the trend of a farm type’s net 
profit under different water cost levels with respect to different water payment options. 
In all water pricing options, the increase in the water cost would reduce the farm’s net 
profit. Regarding the flat rate water pricing scheme, Figure 4.2 shows that the percentage decrease 
goes up to 38% for farm type 1 and 100% for farm types 3 and 4, which means that farm types 3 
and 4 stop irrigation at some levels of water cost increase.  
Under the first best (Figure 4.3) and the second best menu of contracts (Figure 4.4), the 
increase of water costs decreases a farm’s net profit, as in the flat rate case. In the first best option, 
the range of percentage decrease goes up to 40% for farm type 1 and the highest level of a net 
profit decrease occurs to farm type 3, with a decrease up to 92%. In the second best option, the 
percentage of decrease of the farms’ net profit is even greater for some farmers, for farm type 1 
the net profit decreases up to 40%, as in first best option, and farm type 4 experienced the highest 
level, with a decrease up to 100%. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Farm net profit under flat rate water pricing scenario 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Farm net profit under first best water pricing scenario 
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Figure 4.4. Farm net profit under second best water pricing scenario 
 
 Discussion and conclusions 
This paper discusses the option of applying a menu of contracts in Çukas (the case study 
area in Albania) for irrigation water pricing. The aim of the study was to define an efficient price 
scheme under asymmetric information using a principal-agent model. In particular, I considered 
the potential of the menu of contracts by using a mechanism design approach which thereby 
made it possible to identify a menu of contracts discriminating among farmers and to implement 
it in such a way as to assume that the WUA seeks to motivate farmers to use the optimal amount 
of water in a context of asymmetric information, and to compare it with the flat rate water pricing 
scheme currently applied in region. Few scholars have focused on the theory of water pricing 
through the principal-agent model. This paper follows a method proposed by recent studies, 
notably (Galioto et al., 2013; Viaggi et al., 2010). 
I acknowledge the weaknesses of this approach and the limitations in proposing 
straightforward applications of the results to real life pricing. The quality of policy design is 
generally dependent on the data available and the tools used. A significant limitation 
encountered was that the respective offices in the case study area were not able to provide the 
full information required for the study with regard to irrigation water (for example, more 
accurate information regarding costs and benefits of farmers in order to better define the profit 
and cost function with respect to each farm type). An additional limitation is that the demand 
functions were obtained by considering revenue with and without irrigation for the same crop 
rather than proper demand functions based on water production functions and the crop mix. 
These simplifications significantly affected both the design of the menu of contracts and the 
results. 
Despite these limitations, the method may hint at ways of mitigating the problem of 
asymmetric information, even in cases of unmetered irrigation water, since the price 
discrimination provides incentives for farmers to choose among contracts. Nevertheless, the 
results show that using a menu of contracts (i.e., second best) characterised by variability of water 
payments to different farm types, may improve the overall social welfare derived from irrigation 
water use. On the other hand, the flat rate scheme only provides a water payment to recover costs, 
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thereby providing no incentives for efficient water use and conservation. Moreover, the menu of 
contracts provides a useful framework to study the problem of water pricing in cases of 
unmetered water. 
In practice, however, it may be difficult to propose a menu of contracts to water users in 
Çukas (Albania) because of the novelty of this approach compared with the traditional method. 
Even if I am aware of the difficulties inherent in this methodology in terms of application and 
implementation, my intention was to provide a useful method for the creation of mechanism 
design through contract theory. Furthermore, the theory of menu of contracts could encourage 
policy makers to consider this new pricing strategy as an option and to use insights derived from 
this approach in improving the irrigation system. 
The application of this method and the realisation of tangible outcomes can be reached by 
implementing it with a better endowment of data. Moreover, the method used can be improved 
in the near future by estimating more reliable demand functions. In addition, further research 
could be undertaken by theoretically developing the framework for designing payments under 
asymmetric information. This would go a long way towards analysing the feasibility of the model 
in real life conditions and towards evaluating its effectiveness.  
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Chapter 5 
5. Water Authorities’ Pricing Strategies to Recover Supply Costs 
in the Absence of Water Metering for Irrigated Agriculture 
Published paper6 
 Objective 
The main objective of this paper is to provide an incentive water pricing strategy in the 
absence of water metering by considering the presence of moral hazard and transaction costs. In 
addition, the incentive pricing strategy is compared with the flat rate model and an empirical 
example is provided to provide an assessment of expected impacts. 
The chapter is organised in four sections. The second section is divided in six subsections.  
The first one provides a brief background and literature; the second describes the model setting; 
the third describes the flat rate water pricing scenario; the fourth provides the incentive water 
pricing scenario by considering the case of full compliance and perfect detection; the fifth 
subsection describes and analyse the presence of moral hazard problem. The last subsection 
evaluates flat rate and incentive tariff strategies. Section three describes an empirical example and 
involves two subsections: the case study and model parameterization are described in the first 
one and the results achieved are described in the second. The chapter ends with section four that 
provides a discussion, conclusions and possible extensions of the model. 
 
 Materials and methods  
5.2.1. Background literature 
In the case of a surface irrigation network, the water provider usually applies flat rates, 
especially when there are no limitations to the availability of water resources and differences in 
water uses cannot be, or are too costly to be, assessed. With flat rates, users are taken to have 
similar access and are charged equally across farms (Molle and Berkoff, 2007) i.e. the tariff is the 
same per hectare of land for all farms. Indeed, the regions supplied by surface irrigation network 
usually are very large and comprise huge extensive farms irrigating only a small quota of the 
cultivated agricultural land or specialized small fruit and vegetable farms irrigating most of the 
cultivated land. As a result, farmers benefit differently from the water supplied by the WA and 
pay tariffs as a part of total overall water supply costs which are, however, proportional to the 
total agricultural farmland and not to the irrigated farmland. Moreover, flat rates do not usually 
incorporate the environmental costs generated by irrigation activities, which threaten the status 
of water resources, especially due to nutrient leaching. Under such conditions, missing to link 
tariffs to water use and disregarding the total costs generated by the use of water resources, the 
                                                          
6 This is  published version of the following article: Lika, A., Galioto, F., Viaggi, D. Water authorities’ pricing strategies 
to recover supply costs in the absence of water metering for irrigated agriculture. Sustainability, 2017, 2210 
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water provider cannot expect that tariffs provide incentives to farmers to rationalize the use of 
water for irrigation. Tariffs play just the role of recovering supply costs.  
A typical agency problem surrounding the use of water resources in agriculture arises when 
the WA decides to apply incentive tariff schemes for the water supplied through surface irrigation 
networks. In this case, farmers may own private information on water use which is unknown to 
the WA (e.g. water use profitability) and they may take opportunistic actions totally or partially 
undetected by the WA (e.g. a different amounts of water withdrawn compared to that agreed or 
assigned to the farm). These actions lead to increasing the WA’s water supply and the 
management costs (Fraser, 2013). 
In particular, when a certain amount of irrigation water is assigned or self-reported by the 
farmer, the WA often faces difficulties in verifying whether farmers are complying with the 
amount reported. Under such condition, monitoring is costly and not fully effective. To avoid 
non-compliance, the WA might apply a sanction to farmers (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005). 
Thereby, farmers’ actions remain solely the choice of the farmer, but depending on incentives to 
take the action. These incentives against cheating not only depend on the sanction, but also on 
the efficacy of monitoring in detecting their action. In this respect, different technology options 
may be available. Direct monitoring by WA operators may be very costly, while the use of 
information technologies could be much cheaper and hence help to discourage cheating and free 
riding due to information asymmetries. 
If the WA monitoring capacity is perfect (the WA is in a position to perfectly detect who is 
complying or not with the agreed amount of water at zero cost) the incentive mechanism is fully 
efficient and non-compliance is avoided with no sanction. If this is not the case, the WA needs to 
design an incentive water pricing scheme, including a monitoring and sanctioning strategy, to 
boost compliance (Rothkopf and Pibernik, 2016). The optimal monitoring strategy depends on 
the cost needed to enforce such mechanisms and on the effect on water use efficiency.  
Given this context, the model below simulates the behaviour of a WA the aim of which is 
to maximize the social benefit incentivizing rational water use. It is considered that the water 
authority is acting on behalf of a group of farmers: it seeks to maximize total farmer profits minus 
the costs of water provisions (including environmental costs); it also shares costs among users 
according to water use and may provide sanctions for non-compliant farmers. In addition, to 
incentivize rational water use the WA may apply incentive tariffs linked to some observable 
characteristics correlated to water use. 
In order to analyse these contract design issues, the methodology is developed based on the 
Principal-Agent Theory (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Laffont and Martimort, 2002), taking into 
account potential instrument design based on the asymmetric information literature. Specifically, 
the analytical approach developed in this study makes it possible to estimate the costs faced by 
the WA in setting up different pricing mechanisms in those circumstances where water is not 
metered. 
 
5.2.2. Model setting and flat rate pricing scheme 
The sequence of decisions for the flat rate scenario works as follows: 1) During the irrigation 
season farmers take decisions regarding how much to irrigate; 2) At the end of the irrigating 
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season the regulator recovers supply costs by imposing a flat rate. In this framework, farmers’ 
decisions with respect to water uses is independent of the cost faced by the water regulator to 
supply the service; on the contrary, the supply cost and hence the tariff depends on water uses. 
This occurs because farmers sign for water uses ex ante, while decisions on pricing are taken by 
the regulator ex post, at the end of the irrigation season, and depend on what farmers have 
subscribed to ex ante.  
Consider that farm type 𝑖 when 𝑖 = 1, . . . . , 𝑛 has a cultivated area with different crop water 
requirements. Without loss of generality is assumed that each farm has a land area equal to 1. 
Supplying the water to the farm is costly for the WA 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) and the farmer, as a result of irrigation 
receives a profit of 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖). A quadratic production function is assumed for input factors 
concurring in generating the farms profit 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) with regard to a cultivated crop. The water 
supply cost function 𝑐(𝑥𝑖) represents total water costs for delivering the water to the farm for 
irrigating each crop of farm type 𝑖. The character 𝑥𝑖 indicates the share of irrigated area of the 
farm type 𝑖. From now on, the share of irrigated area 𝑥𝑖 is consider as a proxy for water use, while 
farm profits and regulator supply costs are assumed to be a function of the share of irrigated area 
and are assumed to be increasing and concave in 𝑥 with 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 , 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) ≤
0 , 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 0 
Under such a condition, a rational farmer will choose to irrigate a share of area that will 
allow him to maximize his profit: 
 
max 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) (5.1) 
 
The irrigated share is the decisional variable and is the percentage of total cultivated area 
of the farm. Thus, the profit function is a per hectare profit function. Then, the optimal level of 
the farm’s irrigated share 𝑥𝑖 is the level for which marginal profits equal zero: 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) = 0. Let us 
call this level 𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅. 
Ex post, the regulator must recover supply costs by imposing water tariffs to farmers. It is 
also assumed that the WA does not face any enforcement and monitoring costs, nor other 
transaction costs. Moreover, the WA, by assumption, is not in a position to monitor the farms’ 
water use and consequently to allocate supply costs among farmers based on actual uses.  
Under such condition, the per hectare tariff paid by farmers will be:  
 
𝑡𝐹𝑅 =  
∑ 𝑐(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛  (5.2) 
 
Where, 𝑡𝐹𝑅 is the tariff paid by each farmer 𝑖 𝜖 𝑛 and the superscript FR indicate flat rate 
𝑡𝐹𝑅 . The farmer pays the water tariffs based on the overall water supply costs 𝑐(𝑥𝑖
𝐹𝑅) and there is 
no link between farms’ water consumption and the tariff paid to the regulator. 
 
5.2.3. The incentive pricing scenario 
The absence of water metering does not prevent the WA from implementing indirect 
incentive tariffs. The WA could regulate water uses by connecting tariffs to the share of irrigated 
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land. The effectiveness of the strategy may depend on the WA’s ability to monitor farmers action. 
The quality of monitoring and the relevant costs affect the practicality of the incentive tariffs. 
The sequence of decisions for the incentive pricing scenario works as follows: 1) Before the 
irrigating season the regulator sets the pricing level per hectare of irrigated farmland and the 
farmer informs the regulator of the area he intends to irrigate; 2) during the irrigating season the 
regulator monitors the agricultural region served by the water supply network to check whether 
or not farmers are complying with their initial proposals; 3) at the end of the irrigating season 
farmers pay the agreed tariff to the regulator plus a sanction if it determined that they were not 
compliant during the irrigating season. Under such a hypothesis, farmers’ decisions on land use 
are conditioned by the tariff the regulator sets to recover supply costs. The implementation of 
incentive water pricing by the regulator would generate transaction costs, 𝑣. The transaction costs 
are assumed to be the costs needed to implement the new incentive pricing criteria and to monitor 
water users. 
In the following sub-sections, a principal-agent model is set up in which the goal of the 
regulator is to maximize the social benefit. Specifically, in the first subsection I disregard the 
moral hazard problem and deal only with presence of transaction costs under the assumption of 
full information and discuss the equilibrium solution obtained. Then, I relax this assumption by 
introducing the conditions that favour the occurrence of moral hazard and the instruments that 
might be used to avoid such a risk, and discuss again the new equilibrium solution. 
 
5.2.4.  Incentive pricing with full compliance and perfect detection 
In this section is analysed the contract offered to the farmer that combines the irrigated 
share 𝑥 and the water tariff 𝑡, assuming the WA fully observes the farm’s action. In such a 
situation, the WA’s problem is to recover water supply costs.  
 
max 𝑧  =  𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥) − 𝑣𝑡 (5.3) 
s.t. 
CR: 𝑡 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥) + 𝑣𝑡 (5.4) 
 
The maximization of social benefit 𝑧 makes it possible to maximize the aggregate profit (i.e. 
the WA’s and farm’s profit) and involves the farm’s profit 𝜋(𝑥), the WA’s water supply costs 𝑐(𝑥) 
and transaction costs 𝑣 linear on tariff 𝑡. The objective function is subject to a cost recovery 
constraint (CR), indicating that the water tariffs must cover at least the water supply costs and 
the transaction costs generated by implementing incentive water pricing. 
Given the transaction costs generated by the water tariff, it can be supposed that the CR 
constraint is always binding in optimum. Rearranging equation (5.4) is possible to determine the 
level of the tariff 𝑡, which is in function of the irrigated share and transaction costs. 
  
𝑡 =  
𝑐(𝑥)
1−𝑣
  (5.5) 
 
Substituting in the objective function equations (5.5): 
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𝑧 = 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥) − 𝑣 (
𝑐(𝑥)
1−𝑣
)   
 
And taking the derivative with respect to 𝑥, the First Order Condition (FOC) yields the 
following optimal solution:  
 
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝑥
 =  𝜋′(𝑥) − 𝑐′(𝑥) − 𝑣 (
𝑐′(𝑥)
1−𝑣
)  =  0  
𝜋′(𝑥)  =  
𝑐′(𝑥)
(1−𝑣)
  
(5.6) 
 
By solving equation (5.6), where the farm’s marginal profits 𝜋′(𝑥) equal marginal costs 𝑐′(𝑥) 
weighted by the level of transaction costs 𝑣, it is determine the optimal share of irrigated land 𝑥 
which can be therefore replace in equation (5.5) to determine optimal water tariff 𝑡.  
The result of equation (5.6) implies that when transaction costs are high the optimal 
irrigated share decreases and the tariff increases. The optimal level of 𝑥 reaches its maximum 
when 𝑣 = 0, in the absence of transaction costs, and the marginal benefit equals the marginal 
social cost of water.  
 
5.2.5. Incentive pricing with effective detection 
In the absence of water metering, under the incentive pricing scenario the farmer’s decision 
may either to participate and comply with the agreed rules or to participating and cheat, e.g. 
irrigating higher irrigated share than this allowed by the contract. Compliance implies a disutility 
for the farmer. This disutility is equal to the difference between the maximum profit that the 
farmer would obtain in the absence of incentive pricing and the profit the farmer would obtain 
by irrigating the share of irrigated area declared at the beginning of the irrigation season, 
𝜋(𝑥𝐹𝑅) − 𝜋(𝑥). If the farmer chooses not to comply with his statement, his disutility would be 
equal to zero. 
With the purpose of discouraging false reporting, the regulator monitors farm actions. If 
the regulator deems that there are no problems, the farmer will pay to the regulator the agreed 
tariff 𝑡. Otherwise, the farmer is obliged to pay a sanction, 𝜀, in addition to the tariff. Assuming 
that the farmer is risk neutral, sanctions can be considered the utility that the farmer obtains when 
complying with the rules.  
In this assumption it is considered that monitoring costs are involved in transaction costs 
and no explicit costs from monitoring. The monitoring strategy introduced by the WA to detect 
farmers’ actions in the absence of water metering is not perfect. That is, the WA might fail to 
detect farmers’ behaviour. Without loss of generality, a discrete probability setting is introduced, 
where:  𝑃0 is the probability that the farmer is found to comply with his statement when he is 
actually complying and  𝑃1 is the probability that farmer is found to be non-compliant with his 
statement when he is actually not complying. Likewise, (1 −  𝑃0) and (1 −  𝑃1) are the 
probabilities of failing to capture the right signal. The incentive strategy is a viable strategy 
when 𝑃0 dominates  1 − 𝑃1, otherwise the prerequisite to implement an incentive pricing strategy 
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fails. That is, the range of possible values for  𝑃0 is (1 −  𝑃0) <  𝑃0 < 1 and for (1 −  𝑃1), 0 < (1 −
 𝑃1) <  𝑃0. 
In addition, the sanction applied by the regulator to dis-incentivize non-compliance is 
assumed to contribute to increasing transaction costs. With such a hypothesis, the following 
problem includes a sanction item in the objective function and an incentive compatibility 
constraint (IC) besides the CR constraint discussed above.  
 
max 𝑧 =  𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑡 + 𝜀) (5.7) 
s.t: 
CR: 𝑡 ≥  𝑐(𝑥) + 𝑣𝑡 (5.4) 
IC: 𝜋(𝑥) − (1 −  𝑃0)𝜀 ≥  𝜋(𝑥
𝐹𝑅) − 𝑃1𝜀 (5.8) 
 
Where:  𝑃0 and  𝑃1represent probabilities of detection, 𝜋(𝑥) indicates the farm profits in 
function of irrigated share, 𝑡 indicates the tariff and 𝜀 represents sanction. The IC guarantees a 
utility for compliance which is higher than the utility of being non-compliant. The left hand side 
of the newly introduced IC is the reduced form of  𝑃0( 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑡) + (1 −  𝑃0)(𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑡 − 𝜀). 
Likewise, the right hand side is the reduced form of  𝑃1[𝜋(𝑥
𝐹𝑅) − 𝑡 − 𝜀] + (1 −  𝑃1)(𝜋(𝑥
𝐹𝑅) − 𝑡). 
The reason behind this constraint is that in order to make sure the farmer complies with the rules, 
the benefit obtained by the farmer when he observes the rules must be greater than the benefit 
obtained by the farmer when he does not observe the rules. The IC can be further rearranged 
highlighting that to incentivize compliance, the utility the farmer obtains by complying with 
rules, 𝑃1𝜀 − (1 −  𝑃0)𝜀, must be higher than the relevant disutility, 𝜋(𝑥
𝐹𝑅) − 𝜋(𝑥). It is worth 
noting here that the utility that the farmer obtains by complying with rules is influenced by the 
fact that the farmer has some probability of being detected as non-compliant. 
Overall, differences in utilities are conditioned by the WA’s monitoring capacity 
(probability to correctly detect farmers’ behaviour) and by the magnitude of the losses 
experienced when complying with rules.  
When the IC constraint holds with strict equality it is possible to estimate the level of the 
sanction: 
 
𝜀 =  
𝜋(𝑥𝐹𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥)
 𝑃0−(1− 𝑃1)
  (5.9) 
 
The level of sanction is obtained by the difference between the profit obtained with no 
restriction on irrigated land use 𝜋(𝑥𝐹𝑅) and the profit obtained with restriction on irrigated share 
𝜋(𝑥) divided by the difference between the probability that compliance is detected  𝑃0 when the 
farmer is compliant and the probability that the farmer is detected compliant when he is non-
compliant 1 −  𝑃1. 
The following solution is obtained by substituting in the objective function 𝜀 determined 
from equation (5.9) and 𝑡 determined from equation (5.4) when both constraints are satisfied with 
strict equality and taking the FOC with respect to 𝑥: 
 
𝜋′(𝑥)  =  
𝑐′(𝑥)
(1+
𝑣
  𝑃0−(1−𝑃1)
)(1−𝑣)
  (5.10) 
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The equilibrium reached in equation (5.10) (see Appendix 5.2.5) is contingent of 
probabilities of detection and transaction costs. The variation of its components influence the 
optimal level of the irrigated share, the level of tariff and the level of the sanction, contributing in 
conditioning the magnitude of the social benefit. By increasing the accuracy of monitoring 
(probability to correctly detect farmers’ actions), farms’ irrigated share decreases, the tariff 
decreases and the sanction needed to discourage non-compliance decreases.  
Given the transaction cost levels, the maximum impact on a farm’s irrigated share is 
obtained when 𝑃0 = 1 and (1 − 𝑃1) ≅ 0, that is, when monitoring is perfect. The farmer is 
complying with the rules of the contract and the WA’s capacity to determine that farmer is 
complying with the rules is maximized. Under such a hypothesis, the equilibrium solution is 
subject to the level of transaction costs. The higher the level of 𝑣 the lower the irrigated share. 
On the contrary, when 𝑃0 ≅ (1 − 𝑃1) then 𝜋(𝑥)′ ≅ 0. That is, the equilibrium solution regresses to 
the flat rate case as the incentive mechanism has no effect on irrigated land use.  
Finally, for (1 −  𝑃1) <  𝑃0 < 1 and 0 < (1 −  𝑃1) <  𝑃0 there are infinite intermediate 
solutions between the above-discussed probability scenario limits. 
With reference to transaction costs, with increasing transaction cost levels the tariff level is 
increased from equation (5.4) and, as a result, increases the marginal profit level in equation (5.10) 
and decreases the share of irrigated area. The farmer might be wishing to decrease the irrigated 
share to pay less. Under such conditions, the cheating option may become more attractive and 
the moral hazard problem is more likely to prevail. As a reaction, the WA increases the sanction 
to discourage non-compliance. In addition, the value of the sanction is also influenced by the 
accuracy of the instruments adopted by the WA to monitor uses and increases with the reduction 
of the accuracy level.  
 
5.2.6 Evaluating strategies under the two pricing schemes 
As discussed above, the WA might face additional transaction costs and suffer some 
inefficiency due to imperfect monitoring to implement an incentive pricing strategy in the 
absence of water metering.  
Because of this, the WA might decide to keep the flat rate tariff if the social benefits 
generated by the implementation of such pricing regimes are higher than the social benefits 
brought about by the implementation of the incentive pricing schemes: 
 
𝑧 = max{𝑧𝐹𝑅; 𝑧𝐼𝑇}  (5.11) 
 
Where, 𝑧𝐹𝑅 and 𝑧𝐼𝑇 stand respectively for the social benefit under the flat rate pricing 
scenario and the social benefit under the incentive pricing scenario. For the flat rate scenario, 
transaction costs are assumed to equal zero.  
As stated previously, the prerequisite to implement an incentive tariff is that the probability 
to detect farmers as compliant when they are actually complying must dominate the probability 
to detect farmers as compliant when they are actually not complying. Such a prerequisite of 
dominance is a necessary condition to implement an incentive tariff, but is not a sufficient 
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condition to justify the transition from the flat rate regime to the incentive pricing regime. The 
transition is favoured for high levels of supply costs recovered by pricing water, for high degrees 
of accuracy of the instruments adopted by the WA to monitor water usage and for low levels of 
transaction costs faced by the WA with the implementation of the incentive pricing scheme.  
Another aspect motivating the transition from the flat rate regime to the incentive pricing 
regime is the presence of a heterogeneous population of farmers. Unlike the flat rate, incentive 
pricing enables the WA to allocate supply costs among users on the basis of actual uses. This 
effect might positively impact overall social benefits and make it possible to tie supply costs to 
the benefits generated by the provision of water to irrigation. 
 
 Empirical example 
5.3.1 Case study and model parameterisation 
In order to assess the introduced pricing mechanisms I discuss the results obtained from 
Çukas, a region of Albania where the irrigation network is served by open canals. This area of 
Albania was selected because it comprises the most intensively irrigated agricultural area in the 
country and because of the need for water pricing reforms in such a regions and a country as a 
whole that have recently experienced stronger institutional change and major regulatory 
instability. Albania is blessed with plentiful water resources, but due to the lack of maintenance 
and poor management of irrigation infrastructure, and lack of an appropriate monitoring system, 
the needs for irrigation are currently not met in time and quantity. As a result, the efficiency of 
water use for agriculture remains low. In this context, the main concern is the compliance with 
EU legislation and the WFD implementations. 
The cultivated area is approximately 5630 ha out of which 4405 ha are cultivated. The main 
crops are: winter wheat, maize, alfalfa, vegetables, beans, greenhouse vegetables, and grapes. The 
average farm size is quite small (1.4 ha) compared with the average of EU countries and farms 
comprise mixed cultivated crops with diverse water requirements that are served from open 
canals. In the past (before 2016) water management was under Water User Associations (WUAs) 
and the establishment of WUAs was in accordance with Law No. 9860 of 2008, later amended and 
supplemented by Law No. 8518 of 1999 regulating irrigation and drainage. In 2017 the 
management decisions were delegated to the municipalities. Nonetheless, the municipalities can 
also delegate the management and tariff collections to the WUA.  
Tariff setting is now carried out according to the new Law No. 24/2017 for the 
administration of irrigation and drainage whereas Article 20 regulates water tariffs for supplying 
the water to farmers. The municipality sets a tariff level for each farmer based on farmers’ 
irrigation water requests. For surface irrigation networks, the water tariffs are estimated based 
on the irrigated area and disregarding the irrigated crop. The water tariffs include all water 
supply costs to deliver water to the farm and are approved by the municipality council. Tariffs 
are set under a flat rate system with the sole purpose of recovering water supply costs. The tariff 
is hence uncorrelated to the amount of water consumed. The WA estimates only the irrigated 
hectares and disregards the cultivated crops in the area. The water tariffs are usually determined 
ex ante by allowing the regulator to estimate the overall irrigated area as farmers pay and sign for 
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irrigated hectare. There are usually cases where a farmer has not paid in advance but irrigates 
during the irrigation season (Lika et al., 2016). Accordingly, recovery of supply costs do not reach 
the expected level. In addition, the WA, based on Legislation No. 24/2017 for the administration 
of irrigation and drainage, has no clear strategy of monitoring water users; the regulator only 
monitors and provides evidence for the overall amount of water used during the entire year. 
In addition, as Albania’s intention is to join the EU, water policies must conform to the EU’s 
legislation and strategies. In line with the EU’s strategies, there is a need for determining new 
water pricing policies that ensure the sustainability and the efficiency of water use. 
In this regard is developed incentive water pricing strategy under monitoring conditions 
because of its potential implementation in the region, and, possibly, in other irrigation networks 
with similar characteristics. The reason for underlying pricing schemes with asymmetric 
information is because the irrigation region is highly characterized by information asymmetries 
as well the impossibility of implementing a direct volumetric pricing due to unmetered irrigation 
water use. Moreover, the flat rate water pricing approach implemented in the region does not 
provide any incentives to farmers for rational water use. 
According to the mechanism introduced above, in this example it is assessed the per hectare 
social benefit generated in an agricultural region served by surface irrigation networks under the 
flat rate pricing scheme. Then, I compare the current situation with incentive pricing schemes 
under different assumptions with the aim of identifying the condition under which the 
introduction of incentive pricing schemes might be viable.  
To introduce this illustrative case, the profit and cost function are obtained from (Lika et 
al., 2016). In this application are assumed two levels of water supply costs. First, water supply 
costs are the same as in the reference case (0.06 €/m3). Then, water supply costs are assumed to 
increase ten times with respect to the reference value (0.6 €/m3). This scenario is introduced with 
the twofold purpose of emphasizing the possible effects generated by the implementation of 
incentive pricing schemes and to include other potential costs not actually accounted for WAs in 
Albania, such as the environmental costs caused by the decay of the status of water resources as 
a result of irrigation.  
The farm’s profit functions is estimated based on the difference of the profit obtained for 
each irrigated crop and the profit obtained for non irrigated crops with respect to the share of 
irrigated area. A quadratic concave profit function is used 𝜋(𝑥) for a given farm type. The farm’s 
profit function is calculated as a farm’s revenue from cultivation minus expenses for seed or 
plants, fertilizer, pesticides, and tilling, while costs such as labour are not subtracted. The water 
supply costs 𝑐(𝑥) are determined based on crop water consumption and unit water cost with 
respect to each farm type; in this way is estimated the cost of water for each crop, which allows 
for determining the total water supply cost for overall irrigated area with regard to the type. The 
estimated water supply costs include payment to water masters to clean and maintain the 
secondary canals, as well as the management and distribution of water to tertiary canals to 
facilitate withdrawal by farmers (Lika et al., 2016). 
 
5.3.2 Results 
The assessment of two water pricing policies is illustrated by Figure 5.1-5.6. 
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Figure 5.1 and 5.2 illustrates how the level of sanction varies with probability of detection 
and transaction costs (i.e. in figures, for the simplicity of representing the effects of probabilities, 
the variation of 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 are considered as increasing or decreasing with the same scale). The 
solution accounts for different levels of monitoring probability and transaction costs. The 
monitoring costs are assumed to be a parameter in the objective function, which do not influence 
in the analytical way the solution of the problem, but would effect in the efficiency of incentive 
water pricing scheme. 
Figure 5.1 shows that the value of sanction start increasing only above some threshold of 
probability of detection and reaches its highest level then start decreasing. With increasing 
probability of being detected, above the threshold level, farms costly behaviour decreases because 
of high possibility of being caught. When probability of detection goes toward maximum, the 
farmer irrigate optimally as in the full information condition. This implies that from equation 
(5.10) the value of sanction still is positive even the monitoring probability goes toward 1 and this 
happened due do the positive difference of nominators (irrigated share) in equation (5.10). 
Furthermore, when the necessary condition set above is violated (i.e. the rage of possible values 
for  𝑃0 is (1 −  𝑃0) <  𝑃0 < 1 and for (1 −  𝑃1), 0 < (1 −  𝑃1) <  𝑃0), monitoring probability does not 
impact on sanctions.  
In addition, sanction is positively correlated with transaction costs as illustrated in Figure 
5.2. With increasing transaction costs, sanction increases. This result happened because, high level 
of transaction costs effect by increasing the overall supply costs of the provision of the resource, 
eventually translated higher tariffs for farmers. For higher tariffs farms incentive to cheat 
increases because the gain by cheating, avoiding true tariffs, will be higher than the loss if being 
detected, in this reasoning, to avoid this costly event there is an increase of sanction up to level 
that dis-incentivise farms costly action. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Sanctions in function of detection probabilities 
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
S
an
ct
io
n
 (
€
/h
a)
Probability of detection
Sanction for different levels of probability
64 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Sanctions in function of transaction costs 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the variation of the share of irrigated area under two water pricing 
scenarios and different levels of water supply costs and transaction costs. With flat rate water 
pricing, the probability of detecting farms’ action do not influence farms’ irrigated share as 
farmers are not constrained in terms of water use. Under incentive tariffs, in Figure 5.3 when 
water supply costs are taken low (0.06 €/m3) and transaction costs high (0.5 €/ha) it is observed 
that above threshold level, set by the prerequisite condition, with increasing detection 
probabilities farmers start decreasing the irrigated share. Comparing this result with Figure 5.4 
in which water supply costs are taken high (0.6 €/m3) and transaction costs are low (0.005 €/ha) 
the effect of the probability of detection on the irrigated share is the same but for higher water 
supply costs, at some interval of probabilities of detection, farmer trend to decrease the irrigated 
share in a larger size. This outcome is achieved because of high water supply costs. If the farmer 
continues to keep a higher irrigated share his net profit decreases and he will not be better off. In 
addition, in Figure 5.4 above the threshold level of monitoring probabilities the blue line becomes 
flat. This effect occurs because of sanction effect. For higher water costs, its effect on the farm’s 
net profit becomes stronger and the farmer prefers compliance instead increasing the irrigated 
share with the possibility of being sanctioned. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The variation of irrigated share for water cost at 0.06 
€/m3 and transaction costs 0.5 €/ha 
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Figure 5.4. The variation of irrigated share for water cost at 0.6 
€/m3 and transaction costs 0.005 €/ha 
Figure 5.5 shows the variation of social benefit under incentive tariffs and flat rates. The 
observed level of social benefits is achieved under water supply costs and transaction costs as in 
Figure 5.3. The share of irrigated area for water cost 0.06 €/m3 and transaction costs 0.5 €/ha and 
the presence of transaction costs are assumed only under incentive water pricing. 
Figure 5.5 shows that for low water supply costs and high transaction costs the incentive 
water pricing strategy is not preferred by the WA because the social benefits under this pricing 
instrument are lower than in flat rates, even the detection probabilities are increasing. Under this 
situation, transaction costs decrease the expected social benefits and the WA would impose a flat 
rate strategy. The numerical example also proves that the curve of social benefit seems to be flat 
for both pricing strategies. Under a flat rate the line is flat because probabilities have no effect on 
irrigated shares and tariffs, and eventually do not effect social benefits. Despite the high level of 
probability of detection, under incentive tariffs for low water costs, farmer decreases the irrigated 
share in a small size (in decimals),which have little effect on sanction and only a very small effect 
on the social benefit. In addition, from the observed outcome of social benefits, for higher levels 
of transaction costs the implementation of incentive tariffs is not justified.  
The comparability of two pricing instruments becomes more evident when the water 
supply costs are higher and transaction costs are low as illustrated in Figure 5.6. This example 
considers the water supply costs that are similar to those of European countries where the unitary 
cost of water is higher compared to reference cases (Giannakis et al., 2016) 
For flat rate water pricing the same effect is observed as in Figure 5.5. For incentive water 
tariffs, the social benefit varies with the level of probability of detection. Below the threshold level 
of monitoring probabilities, the WA face water supply costs and transaction costs that achieve 
lower levels of social benefits compared with the flat rate. When the monitoring probability 
exceeds the threshold level its impact on improving social benefits becomes evident. As the 
probability of detecting a farm’s action increases, the social benefit increases and under a certain 
level of monitoring probability the social benefit with regard to incentive tariffs becomes much 
greater than in the flat rate case. The efficacy of incentive water tariffs increases and results in 
greater social benefits. 
Notably from Figure 5.6 the variation of the social benefit is not too high, even when 
transaction are high. This is explained with the fact that, the effect of transaction costs on the 
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overall water supply costs is not so strong so as to push farmers toward a higher decrease of 
irrigated share. The cultivated crop of chosen farm type hare high productive crop, which means 
until some level of water tariff the demand for water is inelastic. If tariffs do not influence to much 
in water demand farmer will not decreasing the irrigated share in high portion. As the irrigated 
share is a decision variable and influences farms profit and social benefits, this implies that the 
effect on social benefit will be small and this explains the fact why the variation of the social 
benefit is not to large even with high level of transaction costs. 
In addition, the numerical example shows that when the level of water costs and transaction 
costs are preclusive, the efficacy of incentive mechanisms is limited. The numerical example 
illustrates that only above a certain threshold level of monitoring probabilities (with respect to 
water supply costs and transaction costs) the incentive tariffs perform better than the flat rate in 
terms of social benefits. 
 
Figure 5.5. Social benefit under two pricing options for water 
cost at 0.06 €/m3 and transaction costs at 0.5 €/ha 
 
Figure 5.6. Social benefit under two pricing options for water 
cost at 0.6 €/m3 and transaction costs at 0.005 €/ha 
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 Discussion and conclusions  
The paper analyses a model of a non-linear water pricing scheme and examines the 
implications of moral hazard problems while designing water pricing strategies for irrigated 
agriculture. The focus of the paper was to develop an incentive water pricing instrument that 
would influence farm behaviour towards a more efficient use of water. The model is designed as 
a social welfare maximizing problem that includes the maximization of farm benefits and costs 
to regulators.  
In recent decades, many scholars have analysed the problem of moral hazard in agriculture 
by using principal-agent theory (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005; Choe and Fraser, 1988; Ozanne 
et al., 2001; Millock et al., 2012; Fraser. 2002, 2013). The authors have given attention to developing 
models in order to overcome the problem of moral hazard in agri-environmental policies. With 
regard to irrigated agriculture Smith ant Tsur, (1997) provide a pricing strategy by applying a 
revelation mechanism with a focus on analysing the implications of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. 
With regard to the above-reference literature, to my knowledge, the model has not yet been 
applied in an empirically tractable form in the field of irrigated agriculture. The model seeks to 
provide a pricing scheme through a monitoring strategy that would dis-incentivize farms from 
cheating and guarantee a higher benefit when complying with agreement entered into with WAs. 
The implementation of incentive water tariffs results from the need to share supply costs among 
users according to water use and dis-incentivizing farmers from water misuse, in contrast with 
the flat rate where farmers benefit from payments that are set equally among farmers. The use of 
flat rate water pricing in irrigation regions is justified because it is easier to implement despite 
the fact that this instrument allows for significant water wastage and large economic costs. 
Moreover, current tariffs do not reflect the true cost of water, as tariffs are used to recover 
maintenance costs and not capital and environmental costs. As a result, tariffs are low and any 
variation in the pricing criteria would not contribute to generating appreciable benefits, especially 
considering the low elasticity characterizing the demand for irrigation water.  
The application of the PPP might cause increases in the tariff level due to the need to recover 
the environmental costs generated by upstream pressures on water resources caused by 
agricultural activities. Downstream pressures on water resources from agricultural activities (i.e. 
nutrient leaching), could be tackled through the application of additional instruments (i.e. 
imposition of restrictions on fertilizer use and/or higher fertilizer prices). In any case, the 
application of the PPP determines higher tariffs. Consequently, with flat rates the disparity would 
increase among farmers using more water than they pay for and farmers using less water than 
they pay for. The application of the IPP makes it possible to solve this discrepancy, and also 
contributes to reducing pressures on water resources. 
By referring to introduced methodological approach, the application of the PPP might 
result in an increase in the tariff level for both the flat rate and the incentive tariff scenarios. Any 
increase in the tariff level goes hand in hand with an increase in the benefits obtained with the 
transition to incentive pricing schemes. However, the application of the PPP, in addition to the 
IPP, could contribute to the generation of higher transaction costs (also in the form of information 
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rents) which could, in turn, offset the additional benefits brought about by tariff improvements. 
The net balance is a numerical issue depending on the individual case. 
Our results indicate that when the water supply costs are low and transaction costs are high 
incentive water pricing is less preferable than flat rate pricing. The efficacy of the incentive water 
pricing strategy increases with increasing water supply costs and decreasing transaction costs. In 
addition, the monitoring strategy, to be effective, requires that the probability of detecting the 
actions of the farmer be high in order to maximize social benefits. On the other hand, if the WA 
establishes low monitoring measures there is benefit loss as farmers may undertake costly actions. 
With regard to the case study, if the water supply costs are too low and transaction costs high, as 
assumed, the incentive tariffs do not justify their implementation in terms of social benefits 
because the presence of transaction costs negatively impact on the efficiency of incentive water 
pricing and makes it less efficient than flat rate pricing. However, this scenario should be further 
investigated to estimate the actual transaction costs involved in applying incentive tariffs in the 
region. It is worth noting that this region has the most intensive agricultural production in 
Albania and analysing the actual irrigation water pricing problems and suggestion of a new water 
pricing policies might be in its advantage for the time being or for the future. In light of the fact 
that water supply costs may increase, the second scenario may be applied (i.e. 0.6 €/m3) which 
implies that the gain in social benefits from incentive tariffs will be significantly increased. 
In addition, if no other outside options exist (i.e. pricing water volumetrically or 
introducing other strategies that allow for sustainable irrigated agriculture) monitoring strategies 
should be considered as an effective measure in the irrigation projects where its characteristics 
make it possible to apply this instrument. 
In this regard, the model can be proposed for application in other areas where irrigation 
networks are via open canals and water delivered to farms is unmetered (e.g. in Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, Italy or Greece). Furthermore, the model allows for financial sustainability. The WA at 
least recovers the water supply costs and imposes a strategy according to which farmers manage 
water resources in a manner that is consistent with water conservation efforts and discourages 
misleading incentives (irrigating higher irrigated share than agree ex ante).  
The model has several limitations; the main one is that it counts for a single period. In the 
multi period case the water authority would have the opportunity to receive information about 
the farm’s past behaviour as such behaviour may persist in upcoming periods and alter tariffs 
and irrigated shares accordingly. This would increase the efficiency of the monitoring activity 
and impact on the WA’s revenue and the farm’s benefit. This also enables the WA to improve its 
ability to target its verification efforts in the future (Hart and Latacz-Lohmann, 2005).  
Furthermore, the provided model is based on several simplified assumptions, among which 
the fact that it does not account for the effects of monitoring efforts on cost and effectiveness. 
However, the model can be extended and developed in several ways, one of which might be to 
analyse a case in which monitoring costs are a function of monitoring frequency (commonly 
applied in agri-environmental schemes) or extending the model by introducing the problem of 
adverse selection which could further hinder the possibility of discriminating tariffs among 
farmers. This development is beyond the scope of this paper and might be an interesting topic for 
future research. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Designing Water Pricing Policies under Moral Hazard: A case 
of Modelling Monitoring Costs in Function of Monitoring 
Efforts 
 
  Objective 
The objective of this study is to analyse a pricing strategy under the problem of moral 
hazard where monitoring costs are function of monitoring efforts. In addition, with this study I 
aim at demonstrating under what levels monitoring is efficient and in term of policy implications 
I attempt to illustrate the effect of the mora hazard problem in irrigated agriculture.  
This research is based on the literature that treats the asymmetric information for irrigated 
agriculture as Galioto et al. (2013), Ozanne et al. (2001) and the study describes the need to 
implement monitoring tools in irrigated agriculture systems and introduce a pricing scheme by 
trying to incorporate monitoring costs on the incentive water tariffs.  
This chapter is organized in four sections. In section two is developed the theoretical model and 
start by assuming that the WA can fully detect farm’s action, then the study extends to the model 
development by introducing a case when the WA does not have full information about farm’s 
action and involves some probability of detecting farm’s behaviour. In the third section I attempt 
to provide an empirical example and check under what conditions the monitoring intensity is 
efficient. The chapter ends by drawing some discussion and conclusions. 
 
 Theoretical model 
This section sets up a theoretical model based in principal-agent theory for providing an 
incentive water-pricing scheme. The principal is the WA who supplies water to farmers and the 
agent is a farmer who demands water from the WA.  
The application of principal-agent model is intended to apply some economic criteria for 
water management in irrigated agriculture. The model identifies under what condition is optimal 
for the WA to monitor farmers with the intention of mitigating costs arising by farms’ cheating 
action. Their action consist in reduced cost-effectiveness of the policy outcome (Fraser, 2013). In 
addition, farmers action is assumed to be one dimensional, complying or not with the agreed 
rules for the irrigated share.  
In this setting is considered that the WA deals with one farmer. The relationship between 
WA and the farmer is such that, the WA delivers and manages the water resource and the farmer 
irrigates the land in return for a payment in form of tariffs. The WA’s objective is to maximize 
social benefits by making an offer to the farmer. The farmer is supposed to accept the offer but 
might be compliant or not.  
In following the model assumes that the farmer and the WA share the same information in 
term of water use and its profitability than analysis extends to a moral hazard where asymmetric 
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information occurs. Moral hazard problem enters when farmer takes some action that would 
result costly for the WA (e.g. during the irrigation season farmer irrigates a greater share 
compared with what agreed before the irrigation season) and has a twofold impact on the 
regulator’s costs: increasing costs for supplying water into the network and increasing costs 
because of being obliged to implement a monitoring strategy to prevent such a farmer behaviour. 
In order to prevent any costly action, during the irrigation season, the WA try to incentivise the 
farmer to comply with what he has agreed in the past. The designed strategy is such that the WA 
monitor his irrigated area and cultivated crops in the way of detecting whether there are 
irregularities compare with what farmer declared ex ante. The model setting under monitoring 
activity would allow the farmer to participate and give him the opportunity to avoid the extra 
costs in form of sanction that he receives if would be found noncompliant with the rules of the 
contract. 
The intention of the WA is to determine a water-pricing scheme that allow the farmer to 
pay the water tariff according to the amount of water consumed. I am aware that under surface 
irrigation network is not possible to measure in unites a delivered amount in the farm. To this 
concern, I consider farm’s irrigated share as a proxy of farm’s water use. This allows to link water 
tariffs with farm water consumption. The irrigated share is defined such that, the WA and the 
farmer agree before the irrigation season on cultivated crops in a given area and the WA estimates 
the crop water requirements and determines the total amount of water that a farm needs during 
the entire irrigation season. This way, based in the overall cultivated area the WA easily can 
determine the share of irrigated area for each farm, similar to the paper of Lika et al., 2016.  
According to this assumption, is assumed that the WA proposes an offer that combines the 
share of irrigated area and the water tariff {𝑥, 𝑡}. Bearing in mind that the WA wants to determine 
farm’s irrigated share at the level of what is optimal from the social point of view 𝑥 with respect 
to associated tariff 𝑡. Under this conditions farmer accept the contract ex ante but might not 
comply ex post because might choose a level of irrigated share which is optimal from private point 
of view 𝑥𝑃𝑅 that maximizes his profit. If the farmer chooses to irrigated 𝑥𝑃𝑅 he applies 
unrestricted level of water use and receives a level of profit 𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅). If the farmer choose to irrigate 
the share of what is optimal from social point of view he would be restricted on the share of 
irrigated area and receives a restricted level of profit 𝜋(𝑥) where 𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) ≥ 𝜋(𝑥).  
Moreover, if the farmer chooses to irrigate 𝑥 instead of 𝑥𝑃𝑅 he receives a disutility, defined 
by the difference between the profit received by irrigating from what is optimal from private 
point of view and from what is optimal from the social point of view.  
 
𝜓(𝑥) =  𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝜋(𝑥) (6.1) 
 
If the WA is able to fully detect farm’s action and finds no irregularities in the irrigation 
network, the farmer would pay the tariff 𝑡. Otherwise, the WA sanction the farmer 𝜎 for being 
noncompliant with the statement. The sanction is in the form of extra payment and its role is to 
dis-incentivise the farmer from cheating action. If the farmer non-complies with the rules and 
avoid to be caught from the WA he avoids the loss from sanction. This loss is defined by the level 
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of utility that he receives 𝑢(𝜎) = 𝜎7. The difference between the received utility and disutility 
determines net utility.  
 
𝑈 =  𝑢(𝜎) −  𝜓(𝑥) (6.2) 
 
6.2.1 Model under full information 
Under full information the WA offers a contract to the farmer where specifies the share of 
irrigated area and the associated water tariff. Without loss of generality, the irrigated share is 
receive as a proxy of water use and equals 1. The water tariff depends on the water supply cost 
function. Under this setting is assumed the WA is fully able to detect farm’s action and the social 
welfare maximizing objective function takes the following form:  
 
max 𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡) =  𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿𝑡  (6.3) 
s.t. 
CR: 𝑡 ≥  𝑐(𝑥) + 𝛿 𝑡 (6.4) 
 
The objective function involves a quadratic farm’s profit function 𝜋(𝑥) which is considered 
𝜋(𝑥)′ > 0 and means that profit function is increasing at 𝑥 and 𝜋(𝑥)′′ ≤ 0 with a constant sign as 
used in most of the literature (see the text book of Salanie, 2005). The second component 𝑐(𝑥) 
indicates that the WA has some costs to supply water to the farm and 𝑐(𝑥)′ > 0, 𝑐(𝑥)′′ ≤ 0. The 
third term indicates the value of transaction costs in function of tariff, defined by symbol 𝛿 which 
is a linear parameter on tariff. Transaction costs are received to be costs of implementing the 
pricing strategy. The cost recovery constraint (CR) indicates that the tariff pied by farmer must at 
least include costs generated by supplying water to the farmer and costs of implementing the 
pricing scheme. 
Under such a situation it is assumed that CR binds with strict equality. That is, the water 
tariff is set exactly up to level of water supply costs plus transaction costs, because of the 
regulator’s desire to receive from farmers the water tariff as close as possible with the real costs. 
By solving the equation (6.4) with equal sign is determined the value of tariff: 
 
𝑡 =  𝑐(𝑥) + 𝛿 𝑡  
𝑡 =
𝑐(𝑥)
1−𝛿
  (6.6) 
     
Equation (6.6) means that the optimal level of tariff is in function of the irrigated share and 
transaction costs. 
By substituting in the objective function the equation (6.6) and taking the first order 
condition (FCO) with respect to 𝑥 the solution yields: 
 
𝜋′(𝑥∗) =
𝑐′(𝑥∗)
(1−𝛿)
  (6.7) 
       
                                                          
7 This item can be considered as an opportunity costs of compliance 
72 
 
From solution of equation (6.7) is determined the optimal level of irrigated share 𝑥∗ from 
WA’s point of view that is weighted by transaction costs (full derivation of results is given in 
appendix 6.2.1). Substitution this value in the equation (6.6) the value of tariff can be determined. 
As the derivative is 𝜋′(𝑥∗) ≠ 𝑐′(𝑥∗), ∀ 𝛿 ≠ 0 this result tells us that water tariffs are set at different 
level from ′(𝑥∗) = 𝑐′(𝑥∗). The difference is subject of the value of the transaction cost. 
 
6.2.2 Model under moral hazard   
Let’s consider the case when the WA’s monitoring accuracy is not fully efficient but the WA 
has some probability of detecting farm’s noncompliance. The level of the social benefit at this 
instance is also influenced by farm’s action chosen to comply with the statement, the probability 
of detection if the farmer non comply and the level of sanction imposed to the farmer.  
Let 𝑃(𝑚) be the probability of detecting the noncompliant farmer depending on monitoring 
intensity 𝑚 and assumed  𝑃′(𝑚) > 0, 𝑃′′(𝑚) = 0. Monitoring is costly for the WA, this is indicated 
by the item 𝑘 linear on monitoring intensity 𝑚.  
Under this setting is considered that the farmer participate in the scheme but can pursue a 
strategy of complying with rules or noncomplying. Thus, farm’s participation is ensured but its 
compliance remains contingent of farm’s choice. Given that the farmer is fully informed about 
the outcome achieved from his action, by participation he makes a net profit corresponding to the 
level of the difference of the profit achieved by the restricted level of irrigated share with the tariff 
(𝑥) = 𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑡. If the farmer decide to take action of irrigating up to his private optimal irrigation 
share 𝑥𝑃𝑅, his level of net profit is depended on whether or not is detected by the WA (i.e. 
𝑉(𝑥𝑃𝑅) = 𝑃(𝑚)(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡 −  𝜎) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑚))(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡)).  
The readjusted objective function (6.3) takes the following from: 
 
max 𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑚) =  𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿(𝑡 + 𝜎) − 𝑘𝑚  (6.8) 
s.t. 
CR: 𝑡 ≥  𝑐(𝑥) + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑘𝑚  (6.9) 
IC: 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑡 ≥ 𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡 − 𝑃(𝑚) 𝜎  
 
(6.10) 
The term 𝑘𝑚 entered in the objective function (6.8) indicate that the WA in addition to the 
previews costs face costs of monitoring farm’s action. Furthermore in the objective function is 
involved the transaction cost linear on tariff and sanction. The CR constraint indicate that the 
water tariff paid by farmer must include the cost of supplying water to him 𝑐(𝑥), transaction costs 
𝛿 𝑡 and monitoring costs 𝑘𝑚. The incentive constraint described by equation (6.10) is a reduced 
form of 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑡 ≥ 𝑃(𝑚)(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡 −  𝜎) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑚))(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡) which indicate that 
compliance would secure the farmer a level of net profits higher or at least as non-compliance. 
In this line the WA can deal with moral hazard problem by providing to the farmer an offer 
which would give him an incentive to be compliant (𝑡, 𝑥). If the farmer complies the offer should 
secure him a greater level of utility instead of cheating.  
In addition, it is assumed that both constraints (CR and IC) are binding in optimum. 
Therefore the WA’s problem is: 
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𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑚) =  𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿(𝑡 + 𝜎) − 𝑘𝑚 (6.8) 
s.t. 
CR: 𝑡 =  𝑐(𝑥) + 𝛿 𝑡 + 𝑘𝑚  
IC: 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑡 = 𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) −  𝑡 − 𝑃(𝑚) 𝜎  
 
The maximization of social benefit from the equation (6.8) now is contingent of the optimal 
level or irrigated share 𝑥, the tariff 𝑡 and probability of detecting the noncompliant farmer 𝑃(𝑚).  
From equation (6.10) the value of sanction is determined when this equation binds with strict 
equality (i.e. the IC binds because the value of sanction increases up to level that the constraint is 
binding). By solving equation (6.9) and (6.10) the outcome yield: 
 
𝑡 =
 𝑐(𝑥)+𝑘𝑚
(1−𝛿)
  (6.11) 
 
The optimal level of tariffs now is determined from the ratio of the sum of water supply 
and monitoring costs with weighted value of transaction costs. 
 
𝜎 =
𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅) − 𝜋(𝑥)
𝑃(𝑚)
 (6.12) 
 
The value of the sanction (6.12) is determined from the outcome of the ration of the 
difference of the private profit with the profit determined from the optimal level of irrigated share 
by WA’s point of view with the probability of detecting the noncompliant farmer. Substituting 
equation (6.11) and (6.12) in the objective function and taking the FCO with respect to 𝑥 and 𝑚, 
the following solution is as in equation (6.13) and (6.14). By solving equation (6.13) is determine 
the optimal level of irrigated share from the WA’s point of view and the optimal level of 
monitoring probability from equation (6.14) (i.e. full derivation of this results is provided in the 
appendix 6.2.2). 
 
𝜋(𝑥)′ = (
 𝑐(𝑥)′
(1+
𝛿
𝑃(𝑚)
)(1−𝛿)
)  (6.13) 
𝑃(𝑚) = √
𝑘
(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥))(1−𝛿)𝑃(𝑚)′
  (6.14) 
 
The solution of equation (6.13) has several implications. If the 𝑃(𝑚) = 1 indicate that 
monitoring intensity is maximized and the WA can perfectly detect farm’s action. In addition the 
value of 𝑥 determined from equation (6.13) (if 𝑃(𝑚) = 1) is contingent of transaction costs. 
Moreover, transaction costs would affect the value of sanction estimated from equation (6.12).  
If the WA reduces the monitoring intensity there is a decrease of probability of detecting 
the noncompliant farmer. The decrease of 𝑃(𝑚) (i.e. with respect to constant level of transaction 
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costs) impact on the increase of the ration of the denominator in equation (6.13) leading to an 
increase of irrigated share toward the 𝑥𝑃𝑅. For increasing farm’s irrigated share there is a twofold 
outcome from equation (6.12): the difference of the nominator will be decreased but the general 
outcome of the sanction increases due to the 𝑃(𝑚) decreases. Additional increase of sanction 
would further disincentives the farmer to take a cheating action. 
In addition, the optimal level of monitoring probability determined in equation (6.14) 
depends from the level of monitoring costs 𝑘 which is in function of monitoring intensity, farm’s 
profit for a given irrigated share and transaction costs.   
To this end the main result is that the WA has a trade-off between the loos from the costs 
arriving from supplying water for higher irrigation share compare with what is optimal from his 
point of view and the gain from maintaining low level of monitoring costs by decreasing 
monitoring intensity (𝑚 < 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥) where 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑥 indicate the maximum level of monitoring 
intensity. 
 
 Numerical Example 
In this section, I illustrate the moral hazard model based on an empirical simulation and 
assess farm’s behaviour in function of monitoring intensity set by the WA. For the purpose of this 
simulation example a quadratic profit and cost functions8 are assumed 𝑦 = −𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑥 and linear 
monitoring cost function 𝑘 depending on the monitoring intensity 𝑘𝑚.  
Simulation results illustrate the assumption about the variation of monitoring intensity and 
two stage level of transaction costs. The result of this hypothesis are provided in the table 6.1. 
The main result of this analysis is that the WA is willing to set monitoring intensity considerably 
less than the maximal possible level. Only when transaction costs increase and monitoring cost 
are constant is found that the WA increases monitoring intensity. This result occurs because when 
the gain by maintaining compliance far exceeds the possible costs from monitoring the desired 
WA’s monitoring intensity remains high.  
In both scenarios with decreasing monitoring intensity the irrigated share increases and 
eventually tariffs increase. The increase of farm’s irrigated share is in line with the reasoning that 
at some level of probability of detection the gain from irrigation exceeds the possible extra 
payment received by sanction. In addition, for 𝑚 > 0 farm’s irrigated share remains below the 
level of unrestricted farm’s irrigates share that is the farm’s profit maximizing irrigable land use. 
Nevertheless, by keeping non-profit maximizing irrigated share the associated water tariffs are 
lower compare with what would be under unrestricted irrigated share.  
Moreover, the increase of monitoring intensity would negatively influence sanction being 
decreasing as the monitoring intensity increases. This observation is in accordance with the 
equation (6.12). As expected, another inference is that the decrease of sanction leads to a lower 
level of transaction costs, arising by sanction, on the other hand puts monitoring costs under 
                                                          
8 The profit and costs function are taken from the paper of Gallerani, (2005) and are further adjusted for testing the 
functionality of the model. The estimation of cost function is made based in farms water requirement with regard to 
cultivated crop and water supply costs is assumed 0.6 €/m3 much higher than the reference case. In addition the 
monitoring costs function is hypothetically created. 
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pressure. As it turns out, WA’s trade-off is between maintaining low level of transaction costs 
arising by sanction with the costs arising by monitoring intensity.  
It is interesting to note also that increasing transaction costs leads to an overall decrease of 
irrigated share, but compared with the previews level of transaction costs (0.05 €/ha) it is realised 
that the farmer for low level of monitoring intensity increase the irrigated share in a larger size. 
This result happened because the increase of transaction costs means that farmers are irrigating 
at higher water cost level which eventually raise their willingness to take a costly action. In this 
manner the WA is forced to raise the level of monitoring intensity to prevent such a behaviour as 
provided in the second part of the table by numbers in bold which represent the level of social 
benefits.   
On the other hand higher monitoring intensity are translated in higher monitoring costs, 
hence high monitoring costs might not be justified by the gain of inducing farm’s compliance. In 
this respect the maximization of social benefit is achieved at lower level than the maximum level 
of monitoring intensity. 
 
Table 6.1. Monitoring intensity, transaction costs, irrigated share, water tariffs, sanction, 
monitoring costs, farm’s profit with restriction on water use and with no restriction in 
water use, social benefit. 
𝒎 𝜹 𝒙 𝒕 𝝈 𝒌𝒎 𝝅(𝒙) 𝝅(𝒙𝑷𝑹) 𝒛 
1 0.05 0.668 1169.2 23.54 5 5097.54 5121.07 3927.16 
0.9 0.05 0.668 1168.96 25.85 4.5 5097.81 5121.07 3927.56 
0.8 0.05 0.668 1168.79 28.66 4 5098.15 5121.07 3927.92 
0.7 0.05 0.669 1168.72 32.14 3.5 5098.57 5121.07 3928.25 
0.6 0.05 0.67 1168.78 36.59 3 5099.12 5121.07 3928.51 
0.5 0.05 0.672 1169.05 42.45 2.5 5099.85 5121.07 3928.67 
0.4 0.05 0.672 1169.67 50.48 2 5100.88 5121.07 3928.68 
0.3 0.05 0.673 1170.93 62.11 1.5 5102.44 5121.07 3928.4 
0.2 0.05 0.677 1173.57 80.05 1 5105.06 5121.07 3927.49 
0.1 0.05 0.684 1180.18 107.73 0.5 5110.3 5121.07 3924.73 
0 0.05 0.717 1210.79 0 0 5121.07 5121.07 3910.28 
𝒎 𝜹 𝒙 𝒕 𝝈 𝒌𝒎 𝝅(𝒙) 𝝅(𝒙𝑷𝑹) 𝒛 
1 0.1 0.668 1233.71 23.94 5 5097.14 5121.07 3861.03 
0.9 0.1 0.668 1233.74 26.01 4.5 5097.67 5121.07 3861.32 
0.8 0.1 0.668 1233.9 28.46 4 5098.31 5121.07 3861.56 
0.7 0.1 0.669 1234.24 31.4 3.5 5099.09 5121.07 3861.71 
0.6 0.1 0.671 1234.82 35 3 5100.07 5121.07 3861.76 
0.5 0.1 0.672 1235.76 39.46 2.5 5101.34 5121.07 3861.63 
0.4 0.1 0.674 1237.29 45.07 2 5103.04 5121.07 3861.25 
0.3 0.1 0.677 1239.81 52.16 1.5 5105.43 5121.07 3860.4 
0.2 0.1 0.682 1244.25 60.54 1 5108.96 5121.07 3858.66 
0.1 0.1 0.691 1253.23 65.37 0.5 5114.54 5121.07 3854.77 
0 0.1 0.717 1278.06 0 0 5121.07 5121.07 3843.01 
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As it turns out the main result from this table and with a policy implication consist in the 
fact that the WA act strategically in the way of maximizing social benefits and in inducing 
monitoring intensity for detecting farms action. In term of policy implication this result indicates 
that the WA chooses to keep low monitoring costs in order to avoid the losses on the social benefit. 
 
 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study a principal-agent model is developed by demonstrating how the WA could 
mitigate the negative impact of the moral hazard problem for irrigated agriculture. The model is 
straightforward and does not integrate complexities in term of increasing level of information 
asymmetries. According to the mechanism design results suggest that the WA is able to keep 
higher level of social benefits even when the monitoring intensity is not maximized. Nevertheless, 
this result varies with level of monitoring costs. 
The proposed incentive water pricing scheme can be considered as an efficient mechanism 
for sustainability of the use of water resource and might reach the WFD objective in term of 
integration of economic tools. 
Under full information the implementation of pricing strategy is straightforward. Under 
incomplete information the solution changes by weakening the efficacy of pricing strategy. Needs 
to be highlighted the optimal solution is deviated from the one with full information because of 
implications of monitoring and transaction costs. Especially transaction costs arising by sanction 
and cost of monitoring are fundamental in determining the new equilibrium solution under 
incomplete information. 
 In addition, involving sanction in modelling approach, facilitates the operational way of 
the WA in determining the solution and adjustment of sanction in a way of making the contract 
incentive compactible enables the WA to avoid direct distortion of the irrigated share or tariffs. 
From the result this outcome is attainable because the estimation of the optimal level of sanction 
as a function of irrigated share and monitoring probability, in the equilibrium solution, its value 
is determined up to the level that incentive constraints binds. In addition, involving sanction in 
the model is by means of not only discouraging farm’s cheating action but also influencing the 
increase of effectiveness of irrigation network by incentivizing the farmer to irrigate rationally. 
The adoption of this water pricing scheme seeks to maintain at low level the burden of 
monitoring and transaction costs because at some point the gain by implementing the incentive 
water pricing scheme might not justify the loss in term of social benefits by monitoring (i.e. this 
outcome is not included in table displayed under results section but refers to the case when 
monitoring costs and transaction costs are higher than the one introduced so far). However, the 
introduced mechanisms allow to assess cases under what level monitoring is efficient and allows 
to easily assess trade-offs from positive impact of monitoring and costs suffering by monitoring.  
The policy implication arising from study turn to be; the implementation of a pricing 
strategy depends upon environment surrounding the irrigation network. If the cost recovery of a 
providing resource is not the only goal of the WA, a more restrictive water pricing strategies may 
be suggested with the purpose of minimizing the costs of resource provision and resource 
conservation.  
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The model introduced at a given form has several limitations. The main one stands with 
the fact that its implementation relay in a hypothetic assumption, not allowing the achievement 
of results from real case study and realisation of its real implications. Another limitation of the 
model consist on the monitoring technology which is not defined in this study (i.e. but could 
generate different level of monitoring costs compare with the one introduced so fare) but 
monitoring is considered as one of possible options to deal with moral hazard problem for 
irrigated agriculture.  
The research can be extended in exploring strategies to manage moral hazard problem in a 
settings with more than one farm type and checking for strategies to optimize the problem by 
facing different level of monitoring costs arriving from different farm types.  
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Chapter 7 
7. Summary of Results, Contribution, Policy Implications and 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 Summary of results  
This research provides a formal analysis of water pricing for irrigated agriculture under 
asymmetric information. The focus is on two asymmetric information problems: adverse selection 
and moral hazard that do exist in the field of irrigated agriculture and heavily affect water pricing.  
The study is based on principal-agent theory applied to the role of the WA in designing 
incentive water pricing schemes for the management of the water resource. Besides incentive 
strategies, flat rate tariffs also are analyzed, which are already applied in several surface irrigation 
networks of EU (Italy, Greece, Malta and Poland). More importance is given to the internal design 
of incentive water tariffs and how they contribute to provide incentives for a more efficient water 
use and a rational sharing of water supply costs for the provision of irrigation water, while the 
flat rate is use mostly as a benchmark solution.  
The research highlights the use of incentive water pricing as a tool for improving the 
efficiency of irrigation networks. In general the results show that there is a possibility to achieve 
a more cost-effective pricing strategies than flat rates. The incentive strategies improve the 
outcome of the society as a whole and accomplishes at least part of the WFD principles. 
What arises from the analysis is that the outcome of the policy is influenced by several 
factors that significantly affect the optimal solution, the chosen mechanism by the WA and also 
the economic efficiency of the incentive strategy. In extreme cases, economic efficiency would 
even suggest the WA to not adopt the incentive strategy. Anyway, it is shown that the two pricing 
policies have different impacts on economic and environmental indicators. In this regard in Table 
7.1 some findings of each pricing instrument are summarized.  
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Table 7.1. Summary of results 
 Pricing strategies  
 Incentive pricing Flat rate 
Advantages  
 Water tariffs are function of farms water 
supply costs (i.e. tariffs are set based on 
individuals generated costs from 
irrigation) 
 Encourages water conservation and 
pollution reduction 
 Tariff discrimination among farmers   
 Monitoring tools motivate farmers 
toward compliance with the rules of the 
contract (i.e. dis-incentivise costly action) 
and the efficiency of monitoring strategy 
increases with increasing monitoring 
probability (i.e. in cases when 
monitoring costs are independent of the 
monitoring frequency)  
 The efficiency of incentive tariffs 
increases when water supply costs are 
high and transaction costs low  
 The society is better off with incentive 
strategies than flat rates (i.e. greater 
efficiency than flat rates) 
 Farms profit is higher than 
incentive tariffs  
 Flat rates have low transaction 
and implementation costs  
 Easy to administer  
 
Disadvantages 
 Increase of water tariffs is associated 
with a decrease of irrigated share and 
decrease of farms profit 
 Under asymmetric information the 
policy needs to impose a restrictive 
criteria (not always) to some farmer to 
guarantee the implementation of the 
policy (i.e. the WA adjust water tariffs or 
irrigated share to some farmer to avoid 
cheating behaviour of some others) 
 The characteristic of farm types 
surrounding the irrigation region (i.e. 
profit and costs function, and 
heterogeneity in water use and irrigated 
share among types) not always favour 
the implementation of incentive tariffs 
 Transaction costs (i.e. direct transaction 
costs and indirect transaction cost) 
impedes implementation of incentive 
strategies (i.e. pushing to less efficient 
optimal solution) 
 Its implementation is more politically 
complicated 
 Economically not efficient for 
resource provision 
 no link between water tariffs 
and water use 
 not encourages efficient water 
use and conservation  
 High environmental costs (i.e. 
pollution due to irrigation) 
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 Contribution and future impact analysis  
The goal of incentive water pricing is to encourage farmers to a more efficient water use. By 
linking water tariffs with water usage, it provides an incentive to use the water resource 
efficiently. In addition, it brings the message that water is a scarce resource and its availability 
partially depends on irrigation choices.  
The European WFD, inter alia, is addressing the need of limiting the overexploitation and 
misuse of water resources outlining the principles upon which Member State should rearrange 
the governance of water resources (European Commission, 2000 and Exposito and Berbel, 2017). 
These are: the Full Cost Recovery (FCR) principle, addressing the need for a greater financial 
autonomy of local WAs; the Incentive Pricing Principle (IPP) addressing the need to use efficient 
economic instruments; and the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), addressing the need to let users 
bear the costs they generate. However, the adaptation of these principles is challenging for most 
of the surface irrigation networks.  
The development of incentive water pricing might be considered as a potentially cost-
effective measure for the achievement of WFD objective, as the contribution of the study to the 
literature goes in accordance with the article 9 of Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. Here, 
the treatment of IPP is accomplished by introducing an incentive water-pricing scheme, which is 
designed in such a way that water tariffs paid by farmers reflect (with some approximation) the 
amount of water they use. The FCR implies that the amount of money collected is based on water 
supply costs. In principle, cost recovery here includes costs of delivering water to the farmers and 
in addition, it covers associated transaction costs. With regard to the PPP, the model used in this 
study does not incorporate an additional payment as a mean of achieving PPP criteria. This would 
further increase the overall tariffs to be paid by farmers which in turn affect their decision for 
irrigation and cultivated crop. However, the implementation of incentive pricing strategies make 
possible to move the system in the direction of the PPP. On the one hand, incentive pricing has 
an impact on water conservation and eventually resulting in water saving and nutrient leaching 
reduction. On the other hand, the same scheme can incorporate environmental costs as part of 
the cost for water provision and hence enter in the model above through the WA objective 
function. 
On the contrary, the flat rate system of water pricing is not in accordance with WFD 
principles, the cost of water resource might be covered but this scheme fail to incentivize farmers 
for more efficient water use and also violating the PPP by not incentivizing farmers toward water 
conservation and pollution reduction due to irrigation.  
In doing so, the incentive pricing model results in more efficient water management 
practice and generates higher social benefits. In addition, incentive mechanisms can be 
considered as a tool for increasing the efficiency of pricing policy and to achieve the goal of 
softening the burden of lack of information in relations of WAs-farmers.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study improves the 
knowledge of the information asymmetry issue by identifying and analyzing barriers and 
constraints that cause information asymmetries. Then the use of principal-agent theory played an 
essential role in determining solutions that mitigated problems of information asymmetries in 
irrigated agriculture. In doing so from the use of incentive strategies, is expected an improvement 
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of the economic and environmental conditions between the WA and farmers and enhance water 
use efficiency in irrigated agriculture. 
Secondly, the incentive water pricing strategies introduced in previous chapters are 
innovative in the conceptualized form. The developed method, besides information asymmetry, 
count for interaction of transaction costs with price design strategies. Though irrigation water 
pricing schemes under adverse selection have been introduced before, most of these models do 
not capture the effects of transaction costs (e.g. Dridi and Khanna, 2005) or transaction costs are 
only considered from payment transfer as in the papers of Smith and Tsur (1997), Gallerani (2005) 
and Arguendas and van Soest (2011).  
Smith and Tsur (1997), analyzed the incentive pricing strategy based on the observed 
output and considered transaction costs in function of money transfer (taxes). Their result 
indicate that transaction costs increase per-unit water supply costs and also decrease the slope of 
output schedule as transaction costs increase. These results are alike to estimates achieved in 
chapter three. Gallerani (2005) provides a pricing strategy under asymmetric information by 
incorporating transaction costs on tariffs. The way of modeling transaction costs is similar to the 
mechanism designed in this thesis but the author try to capture only the effects of transaction 
costs coming from payments. In this thesis, transaction costs are related to the implementation of 
the new incentive pricing criteria and to monitor water usage. The author found that transaction 
costs have no effect when the full costs of water use is very low, while their impact becomes 
evident when water costs increase. This result achieved by Gallerani, (2005) is comparable with 
the result achieved in this study for the fact that in both policy designs it is highlighted the 
negative impact on policy due to transaction costs and this becomes more evident as water costs 
increase. The similarity of results arise because in Gallerani (2005) and in this research transaction 
costs are internalized in the farm’s payment transfer (i.e. chapter 3). This directly affects their net 
profit and irrigated share. Eventually the negative effect of transaction costs becomes stronger as 
water supply costs increase. 
In addition, the method used to analyze the adverse selection problem (i.e. Chapter 3) 
resembles the model developed by Arguendas and van Soest (2011). However, these authors 
analyze a strategy for provision of conservation programs and treat the role of fixed costs in 
achieving the optimal solution, overlooking the effects of direct transaction costs. The authors 
found that the optimal menu of contracts is the second best (similar with what we found in 
chapter 4). In comparison with this study, in Chapter 3 of the thesis is analyzed a case when the 
first best menu of contract is achievable even under asymmetric information. In addition, the 
analysis of this research highlights the importance of characteristics of profit and cost functions 
in driving the optimal solution and in determining the best policy option.  
With regard to the moral hazard problem, few papers handle this issue. For example, 
Ozanne et al. (2001) addresses the moral hazard problem with the focus on the compliance 
monitoring on the agri-environmental schemes. The authors show that if monitoring costs are 
fixed, the first best level of input used and compensation payment is achievable and if monitoring 
costs are assumed to be a function of monitoring efforts, only the second best solution is achieved 
corresponding to a lower level of input abatement and payment. These results are similar to what 
is achieved in Chapter 5 of the thesis where the moral hazard problem is solved with no 
information rent and in Chapter 6 when the monitoring costs are a function of monitoring effort, 
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resulting in a higher level of water tariffs and higher level of irrigated share. This happened 
because in Chapter 6 is shown that the trade-off is between low monitoring costs and the loss 
from costs arising from the increase of irrigated share. This is in contrary to Ozanne et al. (2001) 
where the trade-off is between greater input abatement and higher monitoring costs. 
Furthermore, White (2002), provides a theoretical analysis of the design of menu of 
contracts under hidden information and hidden action. The author conclude that an input change 
policy can be readily modified in order to provide incentives for producers to truthful report the 
input use. This general conclusion is found also in the mechanism designed in this thesis because 
it is illustrated that distortion of tariffs or irrigated share incentivize farmers to behave truthfully. 
To my knowledge, none has introduced a model that involves monitoring strategies 
through incentive tariffs as provided in chapter 5-6. With these models, the intention was to 
distinguish the problem between the WA and farmers by analyzing how the quality of 
information might condition the WA pricing strategies providing a motivation to use/not use flat 
rates in the absence of water metering. Even where these models do not show significant 
advantages in policy change, this background permits for further exploration of how ex-ante and 
ex-post analyses contribute to determine water tariffs and allocation of water resources under 
conditions of asymmetric information. 
In addition, the method developed in this thesis allows WAs/consultants to better design 
pricing strategies that guarantee cost recovery when water is unmetered. The theoretical 
interpretation and practical examples developed so far integrate strategies that might be 
considered as a foundation upon which to develop policy design prescriptions for other 
situations, to enhance or extend other models needed to address particular research questions.  
 
 Policy implications 
This research can be considered as a way of exploring possible strategies to evaluate the 
regulation of the water resource for irrigated agriculture by assessing some of the current policy 
problems and suggesting policy instruments possibly usable to meet these problems in EU 
regions. 
In this line and based on the analysis conducted in this study the following policy 
implications are drawn with regard to water pricing policies: 
 
 Policy needs to adapt to differentiated local conditions  
A general lesson learned from the design of different incentive mechanisms is that policies need 
to adapt to different local conditions. This is especially true when information asymmetries 
impose costs to reveal farm water use; these different conditions, especially costs and profits from 
irrigation (opportunity costs or diversion and distribution costs) affects also the optimal design 
of policy mechanisms. 
 Heterogeneity among farm types potentially affects the decision of implementation of a 
given policy.   
The degree of farm heterogeneity in water use and land use is an important issue while designing 
water pricing schemes for irrigated agriculture. Indeed heterogeneity among farm types may 
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allow WAs to implement easily discrimination policies when heterogeneity is easily observable. 
On the other hand, it may require high cost of implementation of a given policy design and costs 
of monitoring farmers can be considerable high by hindering the implementation of contract 
discrimination when there is a high level of heterogeneity, even if heterogeneity is known, but 
the characteristics of each farm are not evident. 
 Policy design needs to take into account explicitly monitoring costs and information rents.  
The necessity of this distinction is because transaction costs in irrigated agriculture pricing 
strategies are considered in the context of adaptation of a policy and are explicitly involved in a 
policy. Information rents are related with the distortion of the size of input or charges where there 
is incomplete information and come out from designing the policy, implicitly involved in the 
policy design. The existence of these costs affect the design of the policy instrument by making 
its adaptation more costly because of payment transfer, monitoring administration or costs for 
enforcement activities (explicit) and including information rents (implicit) by input or output 
distortion until making questionable the implementation of a given policy because of moving to 
a more costly allocation mechanisms.  
 The impact of asymmetric information must be considered while designing policies.  
The presence of asymmetric information problems in irrigated agriculture characterized by 
adverse selection and moral hazard partially explains why WAs face higher water supply costs 
compared with what would appear from farmers apparent use. In addition, incomplete 
information is fundamental in a policy design and must be taken into consideration in design and 
implementation processes. Often policy implementation process may require additional costs in 
order to reveal the lack of information. In this contest, incentive strategies might be considered as 
instruments which could soften the burden of information failure, having in mind that this 
anyway implies trade-offs or at least cost for the WA.  
 Evaluation of adaptation of theoretical ideas to practice. 
In theory, menu of contracts might appear more complex than what would potentially be 
observed in practice. In practice, relaxation of contract differentiation might be less limited 
compared with theoretical conceptualisation. Differentiated contracts can be established in cases 
where heterogeneity among farm types justify their use and implementation cost are low. The 
degree of differentiation does not need to be as sophisticated as theoretical analysis would hint 
at, but could approximate the same idea with a lower number of contracts solutions. Experiments 
could also be devised to check in practice the relevance of differentiation concepts. Empirical 
examples also show that in some cases differences among more and less sophisticated 
instruments are not very important, so there could be the case for keeping the status quo. 
 Considering irrigated share as a proxy of volume used in policy design. 
Despite the fact that water supply for irrigation is not directly measured in volumes, if available 
information exist about the observed variables (i.e. farm types and crop cultivated and irrigated 
area), the irrigated share of land could be considered as a reasonable proxy of volumes used. In 
some cases, in which strict volumetric pricing is not feasible, this could be considered as a good 
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proxy for water tariffs as long as it is much better observable; when observation and detection is 
costly effective. 
 Adaptation of monitoring tools should be given more importance in irrigated agriculture. 
Adaptation of monitoring technologies is very useful to control water delivery and understating 
irrigation water management. In cases where illegal water usages are found, the improvement of 
monitoring and controlling technology may soften the burden of the social loss due to lack of 
information. In circumstances where there are solutions to reduce costs of monitoring, through 
technological improvements, this instrument must be considered. For example, satellite 
monitoring by using remote IT infrastructure should be seen as a part of effective option that can 
be used because might result cost effective to control the operation of irrigation projects. 
Lowering monitoring costs, has proven to have a relevance in more effective pricing design and 
makes more efficient to go in the direction of incentive tariffs. 
 Trade-offs between incentive pricing and efficiency gain. 
Incentive strategies might not always be applied because its solution might result too complicated 
and its efficiency gain might not justify its implementation. The complication might arise from 
practical issues (costs of implementation and information) or related with the political 
sensitivities where regulator regimes might not support the adaptation of a given policy. 
 Development of policy design that guarantee cost recovery and allocative efficiency. 
The irrigation water agencies that administer the water pricing system are key players to 
understanding the design of irrigation water tariffs and its adoption. Water agencies must 
consider the incentive strategies as an integral part of their structure of management plans and 
establishing irrigation water pricing schemes that enhance irrigation water management by 
adopting pricing policies that would cover the water supply cost and guarantee efficient water 
allocation to farmers. The results show the interplay between cost recovery and allocative 
efficiency and the need for joint design. 
Fostering the implementation of incentive strategies would be of interest of WAs for their 
possible adaptation to facilitate future economic policy analysis of important yet intractable for 
irrigated agriculture problems. However, an effective water pricing scheme would require an ex-
ante evaluation of potential effects on society.  
With regarding to water pricing, the improvement of irrigation water systems firstly must 
consider the reasons behind the current pricing strategies. In this way factors that influence 
efficient/inefficient pricing mechanism with regard to the sector may be determined. Based on 
this, alternative pricing mechanisms can be better analyzed and their impact on society assessed. 
Therefore, water pricing strategies should be designed in function of local or particular regions 
with regard to irrigation systems, water availability, farm type and size, cultivated crop, irrigation 
technology and degree of heterogeneity.  
 Often well-developed theoretical strategies are not rationally established in practice. For 
example: if farm’s action towards the water resource is not investigated by WA’s, they might 
largely benefit by overusing the resource. Its incentive to overuse the resource arise from the 
information advantage that users possess. Under such a costly action, the WA must identify and 
clarify farms incentives toward the water resources. Once the incentives are clarified, the policy 
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maker can analyze a situation and predict likely behavior in terms of choice of strategy and 
consequences that are likely to result.  
 
 Limitations and further research 
The results of this thesis show that the use of incentive water tariffs with suitable contract 
solutions makes it possible to address to some extent the problem of information asymmetries in 
the irrigation sector. Water agencies may benefit from using indirect water pricing schemes that 
would allow modulating water tariffs with the water supply costs deriving from farmers’ water 
use. However due to complex nature of the issue analyzed in this thesis, to carry out the analysis 
many assumptions have been adopted. Thereby it is important to identifying cases to which 
developed mechanisms are not expanded and limitations of the modeling approach.  
With regard to adverse selection, one limitation might be considered that the developed 
model does not disentangle fixed and variable costs as applied for optimal conservation contracts 
on the paper of Arguedas and van Soest (2011). This extension in assessing optimal menu of 
contracts to a more complex environment would be another challenge for WAs in determining 
optimal solutions. This option would create other trade-offs between decision of suggesting a 
policy which might require the imposition of costly restriction on farmers or accepting 
deregulation.  
In addition, the assessment of adverse selection problem provided contracts solution under 
different assumptions. However, there is still room to investigate other options considering 
different combination of profits and costs to check for other contract solutions (i.e. some of 
potential extinctions are listed in section 3.4.4). Another limitation with adverse selection problem 
is associated with their implementation. Indeed the mechanism designed identify several model 
features that have not previously introduced but its practical implement depends on the 
characteristics of the case study that permits to apply these strategies.  
Another limitation of the study was the preclusion of estimation of well-behaved profit and 
costs function which limited the achievement of more tractable results. For instance the cost 
function estimated to provide the empirical analysis does not internalized all possible water 
supply costs. Which may lead to a weak performance of the model and undermining results for 
particular purposes. In addition, a weak assumption in the model may be considered the way 
that transaction costs were taken when designed the policy. For example here transaction costs 
are simply taken to be linear on tariffs and sanctions, but not specified in detail concerning 
sources and structure, which is shown to be crucial in assessing the policy implementation by the 
water regulator.  
With regard to moral hazard, formal analyses were obtained in a simplified way by 
considering a single farm type, disregarding the assumption that the WA can identify a 
distribution of types in which practically may be difficult to realize the impact on environment 
and overall water supply costs. In addition, the modeling approach does not consider the 
presence of risk aversion. By considering a risk averse farmer, the effect of incentive tariffs would 
be different and likely less relevant, including another trade-off between risk distribution and 
ability to change farmers behavior. 
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The modeling approach could be further extended even without major modifications. For 
example defining in different manner transaction costs might result in different policy inferences. 
Transaction costs considered in Chapter 5 and 6 can be allocated to a specific type of transaction 
costs; transaction costs arising from the implementation of pricing strategy and transaction costs 
coming from sanctioning the farmer. Which may have the same implication in policy design, but 
an assessment of an empirical example in a more detailed manner can separately distinguished 
the impact on the society.  
In addition, the research can be extended in the form of analyzing the design of mechanisms 
that consider moral hazard and adverse selection jointly, similar to the model designed for agri-
environmental policy from White (2002). This would allow to assess the potential trade-offs 
between the gains achieved by implementation of the policy and the loss from costs arising from 
enforcement and information rents. The analysis of this problem jointly might generate other 
trade-off related with additional information costs needed to guarantee the provision of 
regulation which probably further undermines the power of incentive strategies. 
Other mechanisms may be designed under the conditions of asymmetric information, 
checking for monitoring strategies and technologies that would result to be more socially efficient 
especially in cases of surface irrigation networks and investigating how the development of these 
mechanisms influences the WA’s and farmers objective. An understanding of these concerns is 
relevant not only as a motivation for doing research but also for introduction of new tools and 
strategies for adaptation in irrigated agriculture  
Another important aspect not seen here is that are not considered a combination of 
economic instruments (incentive water pricing) with regularity instruments (non pricing 
instruments). Indeed, there is an extensive literature supporting the hypothesis that enforcing 
incentive pricing schemes enables the reduction of pressure on water resources. In reality, tariffs 
are not the primary tool targeted to control water usage for irrigation (Grimble, 1999) neither to 
promote efficient use (Varela-Ortega et al., 1998) but is rather a way to condition the allocation of 
supply costs according to the alleged water use. In doing so, further development of the study 
may be directed toward a combination of economic and regulatory instruments (i.e. as quotas 
and turns play an important role in conditioning water uses, which in fact are partly 
approximated by this work) in designing incentive mechanisms for the management of water 
resources for surface irrigation networks with the main purpose to minimize the overall cost of 
reaching given policy objectives, as well as to generate revenues to maintain and improve water 
provisions, to foster water conservation and to create a permanent incentive for technological 
innovation.  
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that irrigation water pricing options could be more 
adequately assessed based on improved sources and knowledge of basis information such as cost 
arising for supplying water to a given network, characteristics of the irrigated district in term of 
farm types, cultivated and irrigated area, technology and farm-level economic results.   
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Chapter 8 
8. Conclusions 
The method addressed in this study offers insights into pricing design options and a flexible 
criterion of assessment for identifying a tariff strategy as efficient as possible and adaptable to 
different conditions of asymmetric information and for different levels of water use costs and 
transaction costs. This research, differently from the most of the literature of water pricing under 
asymmetric information conditions aims at maximizing social benefits not only focusing on the 
cost optimization process but also considering the profit from the use of water. 
The introduced incentive strategies serves as a tool for the WA to allocate water supply 
costs among water users based in their contribution to overall costs. In comparison with flat rate 
water tariffs is shown that incentive tariffs not always result in better instrument in term of 
maximizing social welfares. The main constraints are costs arising from asymmetric information 
and costs arising from direct transaction costs. When these costs are low enough, incentive water 
pricing are superior to a flat rate strategy and offers solution at lower social cost for provision of 
the water resource. On the contrary, considering cases when costs due to information asymmetry 
between WA and farmers are high and transaction costs are high incentive strategies turns to be 
costly strategy for the WA in term of maximization of social benefits. In addition, farm 
heterogeneity increases the benefits arising from the adoption of incentive tariffs when 
transaction costs are low for the provision of the resource to heterogeneous farmers. 
The research concludes that when the regulator faces hidden information on distinguishing 
farm types, the regulator provide incentives to reveal farmers private information by providing 
discrimination contracts with an additional payment for one of the farmers (and possibly a 
change in the share of irrigated land) in order to incentivize some others to behave truthfully. 
When the regulator is unable to observe farms’ hidden action, the regulator could impose a 
monitoring strategy by involving sanction as an instrument to incentivize farmers to be compliant 
with their statement as long as this mechanism result cost-effective (i.e. monitoring costs are 
lower than the gain from the implementation of this tool).   
Usually, the design of policy under incomplete information is complicated for the regulator 
because of costs incurred to guarantee its implementation. This study is promising for providing 
insights into how the regulation of irrigated agriculture is handled by WAs when facing 
incomplete information throughout the policy design process. However, more tractable results 
from empirical applications have yet to be considered and further investigated in order to provide 
evidence of the suitability of these solutions for more diffused implementation. 
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10. Appendix  
 Appendix 2.1 
Practical implementation of water pricing across EU states 
Austria  Mixed tariff: fixed charge and volumetric charge. 
 Tariff system vary however between regions. 
 
Belgium  Mixed tariff: fixed charge (diameter of pipe) and volumetric (decreasing) 
block tariffs. 
 Fixed administrative charge (varying per municipality) and flat 
volumetric (Brussel Region) 
 Combined tariff (Walloon Region ):  
o Fixed charge for renting of water meter  
o Decreasing volumetric tariff 
 
Bulgaria 
 
No uniform pricing system nationwide. Total irrigation water prices depend on 
the sourcing of irrigation (gravity or pump). Each IWUA (Irrigation Water Use 
Association) uses a different method to calculate and set price).  
 Area based charge 
 Volumetric charge 
 
Cyprus 
 
Government / Public schemes for irrigation: Flat volumetric tariff with varying 
price levels (use). No differentiation between areas. Differentiated tariffs for bulk 
supply to irrigator’s organizations and for individual farmers (latter: higher 
tariffs). Different (lower) tariff for water provided from treated sewage effluent. 
Overconsumption charged at a price multiple of the regular prices.  
 
 Irrigation divisions and non-governmental suppliers: no charge by the 
government.  
 
o Usually volumetric charge, considering total financial costs of 
abstraction and relevant utilities.  
o Area based charging or charge based on irrigation time exists in 
some small irrigation divisions abstracting water from the few 
natural surface water sources (small rivers).  
 
Czech Republic 
 
 Water tariffs from public water supply systems are regulated by law: 
mixed tariff system, fixed charge and a volumetric charge above a 
threshold level.  
 
Finland  Agricultural water (e.g. livestock and dairy farming) from public piped 
water supply system: Mixed system of fixed charge and volumetric 
charge  
France 
 
 For non-gravity fed systems: mixed (binomial) tariff is most commonly 
used (fixed part based on area and volumetric part based on water use 
 Flat gravity fed irrigation systems 
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Germany 
 
 Mixed system: fixed charge and volumetric charge for public water 
supply 
Greece 
 
 Flat rate (area-based) tariffs (predominant) 
 Volumetric charging (less frequent)  
 
Hungary 
 
Price is set by the supplier and divided in three parts: 
 Resource fee 
 Delivery charge (usually region based and volume based minimum 
supply charge) 
 Costs of ‘watering’ (maintenance costs, energy costs, wages) 
 
Ireland 
 
Mixed tariff: 
 Volumetric charge: all non-domestic users are charged based on 
volumetric usage 
 Farmers using pubic water supplies pay a standard charge for the 
installation and operation of a water meter. 
 
Italy Consorzi di bonifica e irrigazione (RIB or Irrigation Boards). Pricing systems are 
established independently in each RIB leading to a wide variety of different 
systems in place, even in closely located areas (depending on volume, type of 
cultivation or type of irrigation).  
 Flat rate (per hectare) water charges are predominant (very different 
between regions) 
 Volumetric charge is very rare and usually includes in a mixed system: an 
area rate and volumetric charge 
Sardinia: water price depending on three variables:  
 type of irrigation 
 type of cultivation 
 size of area  
 
Luxembourg  Flat volumetric charging (water supply differ by municipality but are 
calculated on a harmonized methodology) 
 
Malta  Flat rate 
 Flat volumetric tariff  
 
Poland  Mixed system: fixed charge and a volumetric charge 
 Flat rate (per hectare) water charge 
 
Portugal 
 
Water Resources Levy (since 2008) constitutes of different components. 
Additionally, complex mechanism of charging by water users’ associations 
(WUA) exist: 
 Mixed system of fixed charge and volumetric charge 
o Fixed charge per hectare ameliorated or reclaimed land 
o Fixed charge for irrigation hectare 
o Volumetric charge  
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o Drainage fee, when drainage of excessive water needed 
o Crop-based fee application for specific crops and projects 
 
Romania 
 
Water prices differ according to use, also within the agriculture sector itself. The 
price is a volumetric charge and reflects a contribution for using the water 
resource and the water management system.  
 
Slovak Republic 
 
Negotiated prices for water supply on average 0,031 €/m³ and maximum 0,046 
€/m³ regardless of the type of use. 
 
Spain 
 
 Area based fee  
Additional tariff is imposed by ID to cover the costs of the District itself. 
Legislation allows payment by volume, surface or mixed. Several approaches 
prevail:  
 Annual fee per hectare (flat rate) 
 Mixed system: fixed charge + variable charge  
 Irrigation-even fee 
 Volumetric tariffs 
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 Appendix 3.4.2 
The optimization problem facing the water regulator now is subject of binding constraints 
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿[(𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑐(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + (1 − 𝛿)[(𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑐(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2] A.3.13 
s.t:  
𝐶𝑅1: 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1  A.3.14 
𝐶𝑅2: 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑐(𝑥2) + 𝑣𝑡2 A.3.15 
𝐼𝐶1 𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 ≥ 𝜋1(𝑥2) − 𝑡2 A.3.16 
𝐼𝐶2 𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 ≥ 𝜋2(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 A.3.17 
 
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿[(𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑐(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + (1 − 𝛿)[(𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑐(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2]  A.3.13 
+𝜇1[(1 − 𝑣)𝑡1 − 𝑐(𝑥1)]   
+𝜇2[(1 − 𝑣)𝑡2 − 𝑐(𝑥2)]   
+𝜇3[𝜋1(𝑥1) − 𝑡1 − 𝜋1(𝑥2) +  𝑡2]   
+𝜇4[𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 − 𝜋2(𝑥1) +  𝑡1]   
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡1
= −𝛿𝑣 + 𝜇1(1 − 𝑣) − 𝜇3 + 𝜇4 = 0  A.3.13a 
𝜇1 =
𝛿𝑣+𝜇3−𝜇4
(1−𝑣)
 ; −𝛿𝑣 + 𝜇1(1 − 𝑣) + 𝜇4 = 𝜇3  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑡2
= −(1 − 𝛿)𝑣 + 𝜇2(1 − 𝑣) + 𝜇3 − 𝜇4 = 0  A.3.13b 
𝜇2 =
(1−𝛿)𝑣−𝜇3+𝜇4
(1−𝑣)
; −(1 − 𝛿)𝑣 + 𝜇2(1 − 𝑣) + 𝜇3 = 𝜇4    
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝑐′(𝑥1)) − 𝜇1𝑐′(𝑥1) + 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥1) = 0  A.3.13c 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥2
= (1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐′(𝑥2)) − 𝜇2𝑐′(𝑥2) − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) + 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 0  A.3.13d 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜇1
= [(1 − 𝑣)𝑡1 − 𝑐(𝑥1)] = 0; 𝜇1 ≥ 0; [(1 − 𝑣)𝑡1 − 𝑐(𝑥1)] ≥ 0 A.3.13e 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜇2
= [(1 − 𝑣)𝑡2 − 𝑐(𝑥2)] = 0; 𝜇2 ≥ 0; [(1 − 𝑣)𝑡1 − 𝑐(𝑥1)] ≥ 0 A.3.13f 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜇3
= [𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 − 𝜋1(𝑥2) + 𝑡2] = 0; 𝜇3 ≥ 0; [𝜋1(𝑥1) − 𝑡1 − 𝜋1(𝑥2) + 𝑡2] ≥ 0 A.3.13g 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜇4
= [𝜋2(𝑥2) − 𝑡2 − 𝜋2(𝑥1) +  𝑡1] = 0; 𝜇4 ≥ 0; [𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 − 𝜋2(𝑥1) + 𝑡1] ≥ 0 A.3.13h 
 
From the assumption that CRi binds can be considered that 𝜇1 > 0 and 𝜇2 > 0 and from equations A.3.13e 
and A.3.13f is received: 
[(1 − 𝑣)𝑡1 − 𝑐(𝑥1)] = 0; 𝑡1 =
𝑐(𝑥1)
(1−𝑣)
  
[(1 − 𝑣)𝑡2 − 𝑐(𝑥2)] = 0; 𝑡2 =
𝑐(𝑥2)
(1−𝑣)
 
Given the assumption that ICi does not bind, the conditions A.3.13a to A.3.13d further reduce two: 
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𝜇1 =
𝛿𝑣
(1−𝑣)
  
𝜇2 =
(1−𝛿)𝑣
(1−𝑣)
  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝑐′(𝑥1)) −
𝛿𝑣
(1−𝑣)
𝑐 + 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥2
= (1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐′(𝑥2)) −
(1−𝛿)𝑣
(1−𝑣)
𝑐 − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) + 𝜇3𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝑐′(𝑥1)) −
𝛿𝑣
(1−𝑣)
𝑐′(𝑥1) = 0  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥2
= (1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −   𝑐′(𝑥2)) −
(1−𝛿)𝑣
(1−𝑣)
 𝑐′(𝑥2) = 0  
From the above equation, the following fist best optimal solution is achieved:  
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) =
𝑐′(𝑥1)
(1−𝑣)
  
𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) =
𝑐′(𝑥2)
(1−𝑣)
  
Figure A.3.4.2 shows the corresponding optimal solution for each farm type is achieved at the point where 
indifference curves are tangent with the profit curves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let’s check why the IC does not bind and evaluate if the cost function (i.e. 𝑐′(𝑥1) = 𝑐′(𝑥2) ∀ 𝑥) taken for both 
types equal impacts the reached solution. 
Suppose that individual farmer has private information and act strategically to maximize his benefit and 
consider that its benefit depends only from the choice he makes. In addition, the farmer is aware about 
costs and benefits facing in function of his decision. In doing so, is assumed that the farm type 𝑖 ∈ 𝑛 = 1, 2  
has tow possible strategies ℳ1,2 and his net benefit varies in function of his chosen strategy 𝑉𝑖(ℳ1, ℳ2), 
considering that farmers act opportunistically and behave as a profit maximizes, without loss of 
generality, 𝑉1(ℳ1) = 𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1; 𝑉1(ℳ2) = 𝜋1(𝑥2) − 𝑡2; 𝑉2(ℳ1) = 𝜋2(𝑥2) − 𝑡2;𝑉2(ℳ2) =  𝜋2(𝑥1) +  𝑡1. The 
strategy choice is the one that maximizes his net benefit which is in function of the irrigated share 𝑥𝑖 and 
water tariff 𝑡𝑖.  
If considered that the IC1 binds in optimum then can be written in the following form: 
Figure A.3.4.2. Illustration of the optimal irrigated 
share, water tariffs and profit for each farm type 
𝑥1
𝐹𝐵 𝑥2
𝐹𝐵 
𝑡1
𝐹𝐵 
𝑡2
𝐹𝐵 
𝜋2(𝑥2
𝐹𝐵) 
𝜋1(𝑥1
𝐹𝐵) 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 
𝑥𝑖 
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𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 = 𝜋1(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 
𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 − 𝜋1(𝑥2) + 𝑡2 = 0 
From assumption, is known that CR1 binds with strict equality.  
𝑡1 = 𝑐(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1 
𝑡1 =
𝑐(𝑥1)
1 − 𝑣
 
Substituting the value of 𝑡 in the IC and writing in the form of FCO with respect to 𝑥 the solution is: 
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  
𝑐′(𝑥1)
1−𝑣
− 𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) +  
𝑐′(𝑥2)
1−𝑣
= 0  
Simplification of the above equation yield to: 
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
From the assumption of properties of profit functions this statement 𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) = 0 cannot be true. 
The hypothesis indicates that the cost function is assumed linear on 𝑥 for both types, which implies that 
𝑐′(𝑥1) = 𝑐′(𝑥2) and 𝑐′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝑐′′(𝑥𝑖) = 0 and farm’s profit function is concave and increasing along the 
𝑥. Eventually involves 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≠ 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑗) ∀ 𝑥𝑖 (see. Figure A. 3.4.2) and 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑥𝑖) > 0 and 𝜋𝑖
′′(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 0. Which 
eventually makes 𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) ≠  𝜋1
′ (𝑥2)  
Therefore the incentive constraint does not bind for both types and the solution implies 𝑉1|ℳ1(𝑥1, 𝑡1) > 
𝑉1|ℳ2 (𝑥2, 𝑡2) (i.e. 𝑉2|ℳ1(𝑥2, 𝑡2) > 𝑉2|ℳ1(𝑥2, 𝑡2) and this proof hold for both IC.  
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 Appendix 3.4.4 
The optimization problem facing the water regulator now is subject of binding constraints 
 
max
{𝑡1,𝑥1;𝑡2,𝑥2}
𝑆 = 𝛿1[(𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑐1(𝑥1) − 𝑣𝑡1] + 𝛿2[(𝜋2(𝑥2) −  𝑐2(𝑥2) − 𝑣𝑡2]  
s.t:  
CR1: 𝑡1 ≥ 𝑐1(𝑥1) + 𝑣𝑡1                
CR2: 𝑡2 ≥ 𝑐2(𝑥2) + 𝑣𝑡2         
IC1: 𝜋1(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 ≥ 𝜋1(𝑥2) −  𝑡2 
IC2: 𝜋2(𝑥2) − 𝑡2 ≥ 𝜋2(𝑥1) −  𝑡1 
 
 
The water authority wants to impose the most social welfare-maximizing menu of contracts. The water 
regulator know that he bears higher water supply costs from high productivity farmer and he is less willing 
to make a restriction to him and the water authority imposes a more restriction criteria to the low 
productivity type by making IC1 to be biding which inevitably make CR2 not binding9. In addition the 
purpose is to provide discrimination contracts  
Rearranging the above Kuhn-Tucker conditions and adjusting with respect to different cost function for 
each type, under binding constraints the following solution is achieved: 
𝜇1 =
𝛿𝑣+𝜇3−𝜇4
(1−𝑣)
  
𝜇3 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑣  
𝜇1 =
𝑣
(1−𝑣)
  
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) −  𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) − 𝜇1𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) + 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) − 𝜇1𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) + 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
𝛿𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) + 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (𝛿 +
𝑣
(1−𝑣)
) 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
 𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) +
1−𝛿
𝛿
𝑣 𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (1 +
𝑣
(1−𝑣)𝛿
) 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
(𝛿 − 𝛿𝑣 + 𝑣)𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (
𝛿−𝑣𝛿+𝑣
(1−𝑣)
) 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
𝛿+(1−𝛿)𝑣
𝛿
 𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (
(1−𝑣)𝛿+𝑣
(1−𝑣)𝛿
) 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
(𝛿 − 𝛿𝑣 + 𝑣)𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (
𝛿−𝑣𝛿+𝑣
(1−𝑣)
) 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1
∗) =
𝑐1
′(𝑥1
∗)
1−𝑣
  (A.3.22) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥2
= (1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)) − 𝜇2𝑐2
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) + 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)) − 𝑣𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
                                                          
9 In this setting is disregarded the option of imposing restriction criteria on the input as it is provided in the most of 
the literature. 
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(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)) − 𝑣[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2)] = 0  
(1 − 𝑣)𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 𝑐2
′ (𝑥2) + 𝑣[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜋2
′ (𝑥2)]  
𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) =
𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)
(1 − 𝑣)
+
𝑣
(1 − 𝑣)
[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜋2
′ (𝑥2)] (A.3.23) 
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 Appendix 3.4.5 
𝜇1 =
𝑣−𝜇2(1−𝑣)
(1−𝑣)
  
𝜇3   = (1 − 𝛿)𝑣 − 𝜇2(1 − 𝑣)   
𝜇2 =
(1−𝛿)𝑣−𝜇3
(1−𝑣)
  
𝛿(𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − 𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) − (
𝑣−𝜇2(1−𝑣)
(1−𝑣)
𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) + ((1 − 𝛿)𝑣 − 𝜇2(1 − 𝑣))𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) = 0  
(𝛿 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑣 − (1 − 𝑣)𝜇2)𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (
𝑣−𝜇2(1−𝑣)+(1−𝑣)𝛿
(1−𝑣)
𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) = 0  
(𝛿 + 𝑣 − 𝑣𝛿 − (1 − 𝑣)𝜇2)𝜋1
′ (𝑥1) − (
𝛿+𝑣−𝑣𝛿−(1−𝑣)𝜇2
(1−𝑣)
𝑐1
′ (𝑥1)) = 0  
𝜋1
′ (𝑥1
∗) =
𝑐1
′(𝑥1
∗)
1−𝑣
  (A.3.22) 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝑥2
= (1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)) − 𝜇2𝑐2
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) + 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
(1 − 𝛿)(𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) −  𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)) − 𝜇2𝑐2
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) + 𝜇4𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
(1 − 𝛿)𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) − ((1 − 𝛿) +
(1−𝛿)𝑣−𝜇3
(1−𝑣)
) 𝑐2
′ (𝑥2) − 𝜇3𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) = 0  
𝜋2
′ (𝑥2) =
𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)
(1−𝑣)
+
𝜇3
(1−𝛿)
[𝜋1
′ (𝑥2) −
𝑐2
′ (𝑥2)
(1−𝑣)
] = 0  (A.3.24) 
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 Appendix 5.2.5 
𝑧 = 𝜋(𝑥) − 𝑐(𝑥) − 𝑣 (
𝑐(𝑥)
1−𝑣
+
𝜋(𝑥∗)−𝜋(𝑥)
 𝑃1−(1− 𝑃0)
), 
𝐿
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜋′(𝑥) − 𝑐′(𝑥) − 𝑣 (
𝑐′(𝑥)
1−𝑣
−
𝜋′(𝑥)
 𝑃1−(1− 𝑃0)
) = 0, 
𝐿
𝑑𝑥
= (1 +
𝑣
 𝑃1−(1− 𝑃0)
) 𝜋′(𝑥) =
𝑐′(𝑥)
1−𝑣
, 
𝜋′(𝑥) =
𝑐′(𝑥)
(1+
𝑣
  𝑃0−(1−𝑃1)
)(1−𝑣)
, (A.10) 
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 Appendix 6.2.1  
 
𝑍(𝑥) =  𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿 (
𝑐(𝑥)
1−𝛿
)  
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜋(𝑥)′ − 𝑐(𝑥)′ − 𝛿 (
𝑐(𝑥)′
1−𝛿
) = 0  
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜋(𝑥)′ − (1 +
𝛿
1−𝛿
) 𝑐(𝑥)′ = 0  
𝜋(𝑥)′ =
𝑐(𝑥)′
(1−𝛿)
         (A.7)  
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 Appendix 6.2.2  
 
𝑍(𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑃(𝑚)) =  𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿 (
 𝑐(𝑥)+𝑘𝑚
(1−𝛿)
+
𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥)
𝑃(𝑚)
  ) − 𝑘𝑚     
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜋(𝑥) −  𝑐(𝑥) − 𝛿 (
 𝑐(𝑥)+𝑘𝑚
(1−𝛿)
+
𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥)
𝑃(𝑚)
  )   
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑥
= 𝜋(𝑥)′ −  𝑐(𝑥)′ − 𝛿 (
  𝑐(𝑥)′
(1−𝛿)
−
𝜋(𝑥)′
𝑃(𝑚)
  ) = 0     
𝜋(𝑥)′ −  𝑐(𝑥)′ −
 𝛿 𝑐(𝑥)′
(1−𝛿)
+
𝛿𝜋(𝑥)′
𝑃(𝑚)
= 0   
(1 +
𝛿
𝑃(𝑚)
) 𝜋(𝑥)′ − (1 +
𝛿
(1−𝛿
)  𝑐(𝑥)′ = 0    
𝜋(𝑥)′ = (
 𝑐(𝑥)′
(1+
𝛿
𝑃(𝑚)
)(1−𝛿)
)              
 
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑃(𝑚)
= (−
 𝛿𝑘
(1−𝛿)
+
(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥))𝑃(𝑚)′
𝑃(𝑚)2
  ) = 0   
(
(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥))𝑃(𝑚)′
𝑃(𝑚)2
 ) =
 𝛿𝑘
(1−𝛿)
+ 𝑘    
𝑃(𝑚) = √
(𝑘)
(𝜋(𝑥𝑃𝑅)−𝜋(𝑥))(1−𝛿)𝑃(𝑚)′
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
